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Abstract 
Albert Bandura’s construct of moral disengagement has been recognized as 
theoretically useful for the study of self-destructive behaviors and moral 
disengagement, and to provide a unique criterion for empirical investigation of 
United States combat veterans returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The purpose of this project is to better understand predictors related to the 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions in order that self-destructive behaviors 
related to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, such as drug and alcohol abuse, and the 
ultimate self-destructive behavior of suicide, might be mitigated.  Charles Snyder’s 
hope construct, Harold Koenig and Arndt Büssing’s concept of intrinsic religiosity 
and Corey Keyes’ notion of psychological flourishing are chosen as viable 
predictor variables.  Hope and intrinsic religiosity are found to be significant and to 
be correlated with moral disengagement.  Inferences regarding the results are 
postulated and suggestions are made for research regarding other possible 
predictors of moral disengagement.  Agentive moral reinforcement is discussed and 
proposals offered related to increasing psychological resilience and decreasing the 
agent’s risk associated with moral disengagement. 
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Definition of Key Terms 
Agentive moral reinforcement is the developmental process of strengthening 
the fidelity of self-regulatory mechanisms that govern moral conduct whilst 
diminishing a propensity for the employment of psychosocial maneuvers licensing 
the activation of psychological mechanisms leading to the selective disengagement 
of moral self-sanctions. 
Flourishing is the self-perceived success in areas such as relationships, self-
esteem, purpose, and optimism (Diener et al., 2010). 
Hope reflects individuals’ perceptions regarding their capacities to (1) 
clearly conceptualize goals, (2) develop specific strategies to reach those goals and 
(3) initiate and sustain the motivation for using those strategies (Snyder et al., 1991; 
Tong, Fredrickson, Chang & Lim, 2010). 
Moral development is understood in the context of the Four Component 
Model, which consists of moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and 
moral character, and suggests that advancement in these areas by individuals is 
possible (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). 
Moral disengagement is psychosocial maneuvers by which moral self-
sanctions are selectively disengaged from inhumane conduct. 
Moral judgment refers to that specific aspect of moral development that 
focuses on the cognitive ability of the individual to understand morality in the 
context of the situation. According to neo-Kohlbergian theory, the individual can 
be categorized in three successive moral schema equating to different levels of 
moral adequacy: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional (Rest & 
Narvaez, 1994). 
Moral relativism is the meta-ethical thesis that the truth or justification of 
moral judgments is not absolute but relative to some group of persons (Zalta, 
2008). 
Moral universalism is used in its most common form as synonymous with 
moral objectivism in that the discovery of what is right is not dependent on what 
anyone thinks. Instead, it is treated like a fact, the authority of which comes from 
sources such as nature, humans or God depending on the perspective. 
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Positive psychology is offered as a science that takes as its primary task the 
understanding of what makes life worth living.  It is also used as a general term for 
the study of positive emotions, positive character traits, and enabling institutions. 
Religiosity is operationalized herein as three distinct aspects of the human 
condition and includes (1) organizational religious activity such as going to church, 
(2) non-organizational religious activity such as prayer and meditation, and (3) 
intrinsic religiosity such as subjective belief in God and the commitment to such 
belief (Koenig & Büssing, 2010)
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Over the past decade, much research has been done related to issues 
surrounding combat veterans, including self-destructive behaviors and Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and there is a great deal of government funding 
to support such research (Ehley, 2014).  The U.S. Military has focused on 
developing aspects of psychological resilience in an attempt to reduce self-
destructive behaviors, which have become especially unnerving to military and 
civilian leadership as they apply specifically to veterans of wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq (Pargament & Sweeney, 2011).  Multiple deployments and the advent of 
asymmetric warfare seem to be creating widespread challenges amongst U.S. 
Military members on a scale not evident since the Second World War.  Self-
destructive behaviors include increases in the abuse of drugs and alcohol, divorce 
rates, and the number of suicides, the ultimate self-destructive behavior.  However, 
published suicide rates and other measurable self-destructive behaviors related to 
combat veterans are inconsistent.  As will be discussed in more detail, some 
researchers present rates of suicide that are no different than for the general 
population, others present rates that are extremely high compared to the general 
population.  How can research be presented with such different findings resulting 
from what would seem to be such an unassuming type of data to collect?  In 
seeking an answer to this question, it becomes evident that some researchers were 
including only certain types or categories of combat veterans, like those who 
experienced direct or indirect enemy fire, while other researchers used the entire 
military population, including soldiers who had never deployed, or never 
experienced anything like combat conditions.  This issue was an important 
consideration in the development of specific population parameters for this project 
and our decision to focus the research on recently deployed commando-type 
combat veterans whose missions have involved a high probability of direct contact 
with the enemy. 
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Research Aims and General Methodologies Employed 
Research focused on understanding cognitive processes and resulting 
behavioral manifestations is complex and problematic in that by using a range of 
social scientific methods to answer questions spanning the spectrum of planned 
behavior, we often marginalize the subjective human aspect (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975).  Many considerations are necessary in order to understand human action that 
is considered self-destructive in nature.  Some factors may be considered more 
universally objective, such as behavioral aspects related to the act of physical 
abuse, while other factors are too individually subjective and must therefore be 
considered in some personal - what we shall often refer to as agentive - form.  It is 
not enough to apply universally applicable terms without scrutinizing the agentive 
assumptions implied in the use of such language, first, because this tends to 
overlook the complexities of human cognition and behavior, and second, because to 
apply terms universally implies some agreement in regards to the logical and 
rational use of the terminology in question.  To mitigate this problem, we aim to 
consistently apply an agent-centered perspective with regards to conclusions that 
might be drawn from our more empirical analysis.  By doing this we recognize both 
the importance of empirical consistency and problems that often co-exist with such 
consistency.  Thus we start more empirically oriented in the early chapters and 
move to a more subjective analysis in later chapters. 
The empirical portion of this research employs a standard non-experimental 
research design to test measurable latent variables.  These latent variables consist of 
perceptions that in turn allow us to formulate a testable model.  The model is 
presented first in a basic linear form at the end of chapter 2.  We test each latent 
variable and several control variables for significance and then test the 
predictability of the overall model using statistical analysis software (SPSS).  We 
then modify our model to include only those latent variable constructs that 
demonstrate statistical significance and re-test the predictability of the model.  This 
allows us to focus the remainder of our investigation on the possible relationship 
between the statistically significant latent variables.  Specifically, we seek a better 
understanding of what is meant by hope, intrinsic religiosity and moral 
Introduction 3 
 
disengagement and how they relate to one another.  Research within the social 
sciences often ends by simply drawing inferences from the results of data analyses.  
We consider a single methodological approach as insufficient in assisting us in 
answering the deeper more subjective questions we pose related to the relationships 
between such things as hope, intrinsic religiosity and moral disengagement within 
the context of the U.S. Military.  Therefore, we continue our investigation by 
utilizing an agent focused philosophical lens, which allows us to be more specific 
in our conclusions while controlling for larger contextual differences.  This 
approach allows us to recognize and correct for a deficiency involved in utilizing 
universally applied psychological constructs that involve particularly moral 
characteristics.  This additional philosophical investigation is critical in helping us 
to discern what is relevant and why in respect to the development of 
servicemembers’ psychological resiliency.  We define terms initially on the basis of 
what they are commonly assumed to mean within the U.S. Military context only to 
challenge aspects of the terminology later from an agentive perspective.  This 
initial course is necessary in order to achieve our primary goal of establishing a 
theoretical position that describes the factors affecting self-destructive behavior 
supported by standard methods employed in the social sciences.  However, the 
intent for this project has always been to establish more than a scientifically 
testable theoretical model.  We wish to explore the nature of the limitations of the 
terminology used to develop such a model and identify both strengths and 
weaknesses of generalizable claims through the lenses of the individual moral 
agent. 
An agentive understanding might be viewed as an ultimately impossible 
endeavor due to the subjective nature of the engagement, and while we certainly 
recognize this problem, the relevant empirical evidence suggests that there are 
categories of agents within the military context that can be generalized within 
groups and compared against other groups that are philosophically and discernibly 
different.  These are groups within the U.S. Military that are clearly divergent in 
their understanding of some of the basic aspects of life, such as spirituality, 
religiosity, hope, being, and morality.  The method we employ allows us to first 
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understand basic empirical connections between psychological constructs that 
became evident through experience, interviews and reviews of pertinent literature 
and later to further analyze each construct and their connections in a more 
subjective manner.  Of course this does not mean that we reject our original model.  
The mixed methodology that we employ allows us to focus more philosophically in 
the later chapters on those aspects we are currently able to support through a more 
quantitative methodology.  This approach also allows us to focus our attention on 
understanding the various meanings, connotations and connections between 
significant aspects related to self-destructive behaviors; these aspects being hope, 
intrinsic religiosity and moral disengagement.  Thus, we explore these specific 
aspects through varying subjective philosophical lenses commonly found in the 
U.S. Military.  Finally, we advance a theoretical, yet pragmatic, suggestion of how 
the U.S. Military might go about strengthening the psychological resilience of 
soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines regarding the disengagement of moral self-
sanctions that is required to commit self-destructive behaviors. 
Moral inquiry limited to the field of psychology is challenging.  Inevitably 
we must subjectively categorize our assumptions in order that we understand some 
reasonable form of generalizability.  Varying ethical perspectives is important in 
avoiding outright moral prescription, while categorical ethical perspectives allow 
us to make sense of some subjectivity through a more scientific examination.  We 
aim at a balance between the two.  The field of psychology often draws upon wider 
philosophical and social debates so that things like values, standards, and moral 
principles are generalizable to a larger population.  For example, research has 
demonstrated that neo-Kohlbergian moral development is rooted in a Rawlsian type 
of principled moral reasoning in which things such as fairness and justice are 
preeminent, and words like fairness and justice must be disambiguated in order to 
make sense of the general construct and testability of the theory.1  Therefore, it is 
logical to prescribe the moral aspects of such terms on a basis of universal 
                                                
1 For a more complete explanation see Mensch, K. G. (2009). “Belief and 
Moral Judgment: Considering Implications of a Religious Paradox in neo-
Kohlbergian Moral Reasoning,” Doctoral Dissertation, Regent University. 
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rationality.  In the research that follows, we are intentionally careful of the 
subjective problems related to moral universality as it naturally conflicts with an 
agentive perspective of inquiry. 
Initial Basis for Exploration 
Albert Bandura became famous following his “bobo doll” experiments that 
he conducted in the 1960’s.  These studies provided a scientific foundation for his 
social learning theory.  He was able to demonstrate that people imitate others by 
way of observational learning.  After many years of experimentation and 
exploration he published his seminal theoretical work, Social foundations of 
thought and action: A social cognitive theory.  Published in 1986, this text provided 
theoretical insights into social cognition and learning, self-efficacy and moral 
development.  Social Cognitive Theory and its relation to the disengagement of 
moral self-sanctions is both encompassing and enlightening (Bandura, 1986).  His 
ideas regarding psychological mechanisms that are activated in order to disengage 
from one’s own moral self-sanctions, assuaging guilt and relieving self-
condemnation were of particular importance to the development of this project.  
Certainly we welcomed his focus on the autonomous moral agent and his notion of 
moral self-sanctions as a way to move forward in the study of moral psychology 
without being generally morally prescriptive.  Bandura (1986, 1999, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2015) places the responsibility for moral belief on the agent without apology, 
which is useful for a project in moral psychology because it focuses on what the 
agent believes is moral as opposed to measuring the agent’s action or belief against 
a prescriptive principle or moral system. 
Alistair MacIntyre’s attention to varying worldviews and philosophies and 
how they should be examined in relation to one another, and specifically his work 
including After Virtue and his Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry, was also 
helpful in the conceptualization of this project.  MacIntyre’s continuous 
encouragement for a return to open and respectful scholarly discourse, the kind of 
discourse that he suggests has been lost in parts of the Academy, the kind of 
exceptional communal dialogue that might produce novel understanding for all 
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involved and where respect for persons is paramount, was an important moral 
perspective that influenced the construction of this project.  MacIntyre’s 
encouragement of interdisciplinary perspectives, along with Bandura’s agent 
centered Moral Disengagement Theory, gave us motive to focus the placement of 
ultimate responsibility of moral rightness upon the agent and at the same time, treat 
different theologies and philosophies of moral rightness with dignity.  
Bandura’s (1999, 2002) research also led to our understanding of how self-
destructive behaviors were intimately connected to the disengagement of moral 
self-sanctions.  It seemed to us reasonable that one would activate psychological 
mechanisms in order to disengage from their moral schema and commit self-
destructive behaviors, which has been supported in previous research (Moore, 
Detert, Trevino, Baker, & Mayer, 2011).  This general line of thinking, that a 
rational individual would not intentionally harm himself or herself, along with the 
research connecting moral disengagement and self-destructive behaviors eventually 
led to the development of the main thesis contained herein.  This thinking and 
previous research also encouraged us to explore basic questions such as, what 
things about a person, what attitudes, what manner of philosophies, what aspects of 
the human being, might affect one’s propensity for moral disengagement. 
For purposes of general introduction, it is important to note that the 
literature that covers questions like these is vast, and elements have been addressed 
in many fields including psychology, philosophy and theology.  In the sub-
discipline of positive psychology, flourishing is meant to convey one’s ability to 
live life in a meaningfully optimal way, as opposed to living a trivial or unfulfilled 
existence struggling to get through each day.  This consideration led to Snyder’s 
concept of hope, which focuses on the psychological aspects of goal-directed 
agency and one’s ability and desire to create pathways for success.  Adrienne 
Martin’s more encompassing work on hope was beneficial in understanding a more 
complete account of Snyder’s (1994, 2002) conception.  Connections were also 
established between certain spiritual and religious aspects of well-being and moral 
disengagement, which was added to the general inquiry of this project.  These 
aspects of being human were formulated as theoretically supported predictors to the 
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disengagement of moral self-sanctions, and therefore became the focus of our 
empirical investigation.  We will of course discuss the above works at length in the 
following chapters. 
Contextual Ties to Comprehensive Soldier Fitness 
Understanding the context for this research is important.  In the early part of 
this decade the U.S. Army was being sued by atheist organizations for purportedly 
creating an intimidating, or perhaps something of a disagreeable, religious 
environment.  This was due to the implementation of a new program referred to as 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, but specifically, because of the programmatic 
aspect known as Spiritual Fitness, which was one of five major categories of 
soldier well-being as defined by the U.S. Military.  The U.S. Army was attempting 
to create more psychologically resilient soldiers in order to stem the tide of self-
destructive behaviors, which had become prevalent amongst its ranks, such as the 
abuse of alcohol, family tribulations, and suicide.  The U.S. Army seemed to 
believe that something like spiritual resilience was an important soldierly 
characteristic worthy of cultivation in the Army’s war against self-destructive 
behaviors and the promotion of psychological resilience. 
Tension exists in the U.S. Military between what some might call freedom 
from religion, and others might refer to as freedom to practice religion as is 
evidenced by recent lawsuits brought against the U.S. Military by organizations 
like the Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers (MAAF).  However, it 
seems common for new soldiers who suddenly find themselves in especially 
restrictive environments for perhaps the first time in their lives, to feel that their 
individual identity is in jeopardy and test the limits of control and authority.  This is 
a well-known challenge for leaders in the U.S. Army.  Whether manifested as a 
right to grow hair longer than standards permit or wear questionable attire off-duty, 
young soldiers will often find ways to assert their personal freedom.  Of course, 
these actions become particularly troublesome for leaders when they cause discord 
in the unit because unit cohesion is a tenet of military tactical and operational 
advantage.  Our research seeks to better understand some of the psychological 
Introduction 8 
 
factors related to religiosity and spirituality so that leaders in the U.S. Military can 
make good decisions based on a superior understanding of the psychological 
impacts.  We also aim to help military leadership appreciate possible psychological 
consequences resulting from differing interpretations of orders and regulations 
related to what they call spirituality.  
Contextual Ties to Hope, Religion and Psychological Flourishing 
As stated earlier, it was important that this project should have an empirical 
foundation based in theory, something psychologically testable to establish 
repeatable results, and Bandura’s (1986, 1999, 2015) Theory of Moral 
Disengagement and resulting psychometric instruments provided that initial 
foundation.  Not only was his work with the disengagement of moral self-sanctions 
theoretically connected to self-destructive behaviors, Bandura also provided 
direction regarding additional concepts that we determined to be important in 
understanding why soldiers may have a higher or lower propensity to commit self-
destructive behaviors.  As we shall discuss at length in the following chapters, 
things such as hope and despair, religious and spiritual inspiration, and constructs 
found in positive psychology, such as the idea of flourishing, emerged as critical 
aspects related to moral disengagement and self-destructive behaviors.  We came to 
believe that specific psychological concepts were not only in some way related to 
self-destructive behaviors, but that certain psychological constructs might act as 
predictors of one’s propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions and 
self-destructive behaviors (Moore et al., 2011; Seligman, 2011).  We considered 
that if we could more fully understand the relationships between these constructs, 
we could also better contextually understand some of the problems related to self-
destructive behaviors in the U.S. Military. 
With this goal in mind, we attempted to empirically test a predictive model 
whilst maintaining the utmost consideration for the individual’s moral autonomy.  
Hence, our model reflects the view that we may be forewarned of an individual’s 
propensity for self-destructive behaviors by forecasting the individual’s propensity 
for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  In our model, the inclusion of 
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particular theoretically supported predictors to moral disengagement are key to a 
more comprehensive understanding of problems related to self-destructive 
behaviors.  The consideration of spirituality seemed suitable as it was not only 
theoretically connected, but also logically and pragmatically connected.  In fact, it 
is already being assumed that a relationship between spirituality and self-
destructive behaviors exists in the U.S. Military and that their Spiritual Fitness 
programs create moral resiliency.  In our research, we determined that the U.S. 
Military’s understanding of spirituality is more closely aligned to a particular 
psychometric construct of religiosity.  Furthermore, the military believes that, 
spirituality, or what we often more precisely refer to as religiosity, is assumed to be 
a key aspect of holistic well-being.  In other words, increasing the psychological 
resilience of the soldier in the U.S. Military involves the strengthening of a spiritual 
aspect. 
The term spiritual had been chosen by the U.S. Military as an attempt at full 
inclusiveness and as a way to bypass the consternation that any derivation of the 
term religion would surely produce in this pluralistic society.  This does not mean 
that some servicemembers, as we establish in the following chapters, did not regard 
spirituality as something of a religious component to Comprehensive Soldier 
Fitness.  This issue of terminology relates to the chaplain’s primary responsibilities 
in a U.S. Military unit, which are soldierly and personal aspects related to spiritual 
and religious orientation.  One of the interesting facts about the U.S. Army 
Chaplain Corps is that it has diversified its membership over the past 20 years.  
There are now not only Protestant and Catholic chaplains, but also Muslim, Jewish, 
Wiccan and others.  This diversity in chaplains also creates a form of complexity in 
relationships in the pluralistic society that is the U.S. Military, which sees good in 
both religion and spirituality, and wishes to encourage it generally.  However, 
tension often arises, tension that is somewhat implied in the U.S. Constitution, 
where there is a sort of dual proposition of freedom of religion and freedom from 
religious imposition. 
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Additional Context for this Project 
Next we considered certain contextual actors.  First is the military 
commander who is not only responsible for things like mission accomplishment 
and unit cohesion, but also for the health and welfare of each soldier.  These 
commanders have their own spirituality, religion or skepticism and can be 
unguarded about their religious positions.  These same commanders hold great 
influence and authority within their military units.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand how commanders’ and chaplains’ interpretation of the U.S. Military’s 
policy regarding Spiritual Fitness might affect the soldiers in their units.  Military 
psychologists also have a role to play in soldiers’ well-being and psychological 
resilience.  U.S. Military psychologists are able to directly influence commanders 
and therefore should be considered in the interpretation of soldiers’ spiritual 
matters that might be considered psychologically associated.  These three particular 
actors would normally play an important role in the case of a soldier exhibiting 
self-destructive tendencies.  The precarious nature of these relationships in the 
context of the U.S. Military became straightaway evident.  The prospect of 
situations like, an ardently atheist commander working together with a Wiccan 
chaplain leading solders in one unit, and a passionately evangelical commander and 
a Baptist chaplain leading another, seemed challenging.  In other words, soldiers in 
different units might have very different experiences, depending on factors related 
to spirituality and religiosity, and the U.S. Army didn’t know what effect these 
experiences might have on the soldiers’ overall well-being.  Our research 
recognizes the importance of such experiences and aims to better understand the 
more objective as well as the more subjective antecedents of moral disengagement. 
Ultimately, this project was designed to test hypotheses related to whether 
or not the U.S. Military and other similar organizations might be able to affect the 
propensity for moral disengagement by understanding the psychological constructs 
of hope, flourishing, and religiosity, and then to better understand these constructs 
from a subjective perspective.  Psychometric instruments for hope, religiosity, 
flourishing, and moral disengagement were utilized to develop a testable linear 
model.  We used this model to develop a survey instrument that was administered 
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to a sample of U.S. Military commando type combat veterans.  The data was 
collected using an online survey instrument and later analyzed to determine 
statistically significant constructs as well as the overall predictive strength of the 
model.  Next, we sought to better understand statistically significant predictor 
constructs associated with the model, specifically hope and intrinsic religiosity, and 
their relationship to the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  We therefore chose 
to investigate these specific aspects that predict a propensity for moral 
disengagement by way of differing philosophical perspectives found to be common 
in the U.S. Military.  In the case of hope, we consider a more existentialist view 
and a more theistic view.  In the case of intrinsic religiosity we consider a more 
theistic view, a more agnostic view, and a more atheistic view.  These perspectives 
provide new insight into the understanding of hope and intrinsic religiosity in the 
context of the pluralistic society that is the U.S. Military. 
Summary of Findings 
The results of the empirical analysis were consistent with regards to several 
expectations.  The empirical study supported that several constructs have a 
significant relationship with the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  They 
included the constructs of hope and the particular aspect of religiosity known as 
intrinsic religiosity, which focuses on belief in a higher power and the impact that 
this belief might have on one’s life (Koenig & Büssing, 2010; Snyder, 1994, 2002).  
Thus, we investigate these constructs both psychologically and philosophically. 
The notion that the construct of psychological flourishing had a significant 
relationship with moral disengagement was not supported, although this idea 
remains quite plausible.  This particular result was somewhat unexpected because 
there seemed to be a strong theoretical connection between the psychological 
construct of flourishing and moral disengagement (Bandura 1999, 2015; 
Fredrickson & Losada, 2005).  Furthermore, the U.S. government has spent 
considerable amounts of economic capital operating under an assumption that 
psychological flourishing is important in decreasing self-destructive behaviors.  If 
psychological flourishing is not in fact significantly related to a propensity for 
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moral disengagement, it would seem inconsistent with the U.S. Military’s current 
understanding of Comprehensive Soldier Fitness.  Therefore, although we do not 
focus extensively on the construct of psychological flourishing herein, we do 
encourage further research into the possible connection between flourishing, moral 
disengagement and self-destructive behaviors.  
Organized and non-organized religious activities were also not supported by 
our empirical investigation as good predictors of moral disengagement.  This result 
was not entirely surprising in that many people attend religious functions and say 
prayers, yet they would not consider themselves to be religious or even spiritual.  
Since our empirical research did warrant additional investigation regarding hope 
and intrinsic religiosity, we conducted further inquiry relating to divergent yet 
common philosophical viewpoints that would allow for the discovery of issues 
related to the generalizability of our data.   
Several distinct and incommensurable philosophies pervade the pluralistic 
culture in the U.S. Military.  The first of these philosophical positions we 
categorize as the agnostic or existentialist position, depending on the context.  In 
the U.S. Military, this perspective can be seen in the paratroopers whose primary 
church is the cargo bay of an Air Force C130 and who, just prior to a nighttime 
parachute assault, might pray something like this: “God, if you’re up there, please 
help my parachute to open thus preventing an experience with gravity that I would 
rather avoid for the time being.”  The intent of this inquiry was to inform us of how 
hope and intrinsic religiosity were generally defined in the mind of the more 
agnostic or existentialist soldier, and then what this understanding might mean in 
relation to the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  Another philosophy of life 
used to more completely interpret hope and intrinsic religiosity is that of the more 
atheist type of soldier.  This thinking seems less common in commando-type units 
where members are consistently confronted with the prospect of a quick and awful 
death.  Paratroopers of this sort might focus more on calculating the odds of a 
malfunction or accident prior to the nighttime jump referred to earlier.  We also 
explore a philosophy of life associated with a more theistically minded soldier.  
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This is a category of soldier who not only believes in a higher power, but also 
believes that they can personally commune with the divine.2 
The current form of this project culminates with the proposition that it is 
essential for researchers to better understand the predictors of moral 
disengagement, such as hope and intrinsic religiosity, and to appreciate the same 
through varying philosophical perspectives.  Furthermore, that leaders in pluralistic 
organizations such as the U.S. Military, should consider employing approaches that 
allow for a minimization of risk related to relationships that might be conducive to 
activating psychological mechanisms leading to the disengagement of moral self-
sanctions.  Attempts by leaders, chaplains, psychologists and other counselors to 
assist people in mitigating a propensity for moral disengagement should be 
approached with an urgent respect for the moral autonomy of the agent.  Instead of 
attempting to reconfigure or redefine the agent’s moral schema, respect for the 
agent’s moral autonomy should be valued and honored if the psychological stability 
of the agent is to be considered a paramount concern. 
The result of these considerations is what we refer to as agentive moral 
reinforcement, that is, an approach to encouraging psychological resilience that 
stresses thoughtful respect for the autonomy of the moral agent and the 
strengthening of the agent’s moral schema, as opposed to a reordering or outright 
replacement of certain principled moral reasoning.  This respect for moral 
autonomy is fundamental to a process in which the agent might be able to conserve 
the necessary responsibility and dignity of maintaining their own moral schema.  
Therefore, a leadership perspective is introduced that emphasizes the importance of 
agentive moral reinforcement as a proactive measure that should be taken to reduce 
risk related to an agent’s propensity to disengage from his or her own moral self-
sanctions. 
                                                
2 The divergent philosophies utilized in chapters 6 and 7 were developed 
and categorized over several years through numerous conversations with chaplains 
and commanders from the U.S. Army and the United States Marine Corps. 
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Navigating the Following Chapters 
In order to examine as full a spectrum of moral behavior as is possible with-
in the constraints of the study, we ask two fundamentally different questions.  First, 
we ask if the agent’s action is consistent with his or her own moral schema.  This 
agentive perspective allows us to examine moral disengagement and draw conclu-
sions about the intent of moral activity.  Second, we examine whether these actions 
or the intent of the actions are considered ethical or not, depending on the categori-
cal philosophical perspective.  The point of the following chapters is to intentional-
ly bring together moral questions and various lenses of analysis from traditionally 
different disciplines.  We will consider aspects of moral psychology, philosophy 
and theology in an attempt to understand a more complete picture of human belief 
and action that will hopefully lead to new and better ways of understanding ethical 
behavior and developing moral resiliency. 
We begin in chapter 2 with an introduction of relevant literature related to 
the U.S. Military’s Spiritual Fitness Program and positive psychology.  This chap-
ter culminates with a general thesis about certain aspects related to moral disen-
gagement and self-destructive behaviors.  We theorize a connection between psy-
chological hope, flourishing and religiosity, and the disengagement of moral self-
sanctions.  Following our explanation of the theoretical support for such a relation-
ship, we develop testable hypotheses.  Utilizing several psychometric instruments 
that measure each latent variable (hope, religiosity, flourishing, and moral disen-
gagement) and that are merged into a single survey instrument, we then test these 
hypotheses and underlying latent variables.  We control for several aspects that 
U.S. Military commanders and chaplains have identified as possible influencers of 
our latent variable constructs. 
In chapter 3 we continue our analysis by attempting to more clearly under-
stand what things such as spirituality, moral development and positive psychology 
mean, and how these subjects are related.  Varying views on what is meant by 
things such as religiosity and spirituality are presented as we argue for specific def-
initions that form the basis of our analysis in chapter 4.  The disambiguation of 
terminology used in this form of interdisciplinary research is critically important 
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when conducting research in certain disciplines, which traditionally utilize different 
definitions for certain terms. 
In chapter 4 we attempt to test aspects of our thesis by empirical means 
through the use of latent social science constructs and traditional quantitative meth-
ods.  We limit our population to combat veterans in the U.S. Military who have re-
turned from combat within six months of participating in this study.  Our sample 
draws specifically from commando-type units such as the 82nd Airborne Division 
and the 10th Mountain Division.  The empirical study is intended to be exploratory 
and therefore necessitates a smaller number of respondents who meet what we con-
sider multiple important criteria, rather than focusing on a larger more diverse sam-
ple, because we wish to control for as many exogenous variables as possible in this 
type of limited study.  Little research has been done with such stringent population 
parameters.  As we argue in chapter 2, the lack of appropriate population parame-
ters regarding military and veteran populations can be problematic for accurate 
analysis.  Next, following collection of the data and an initial screening for statisti-
cal outliers, we utilize a basic structural equation modeling technique and analyze 
the model using multiple regression and other standard forms of statistical analysis 
to draw conclusions from the data. 
The purpose of chapters 5 and 6 is to more deeply explore aspects of human 
cognition and behavior related to moral disengagement.  We employ philosophical 
inquiry to better understand hope and intrinsic religiosity as related to moral disen-
gagement by way of varying assumptions related to worldviews commonly found 
in the U.S. Military.  We first identify several relatively distinct worldviews found 
in the U.S. Military and then explore how individuals with these different 
worldviews might interpret varying conceptions of hope and intrinsic religiosity 
related to moral disengagement.  We specifically focus on divergent aspects of 
philosophical assumptions held by many U.S. Military members by identifying 
possible consequences of such assumptions and how these assumptions might af-
fect cognitive processes related to our inquiry.  Finally in chapter 7, from our anal-
ysis of the empirical investigation and the philosophical inquiry, we offer a new 
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theory of agentive moral reinforcement aimed at encouraging the development of 
moral resilience.
Chapter 2 – Comprehensive Soldier Fitness 
Many post-9/11 governmental military organizations including those in the 
United States and United Kingdom have been involved in projects to affect the 
psychological resilience of their members.  This work was arguably stirred by a 
noticeable increase in the self-destructive behaviors of their members returning 
from the theater of war.  The U.S. Military has implemented psychological 
resilience programs in all of its service components including the Army, Navy and 
Air Force.  These programs are all variations of what is known as Comprehensive 
Soldier Fitness (CSF) in the U.S. Army, which focuses on many aspects of 
individual health, including psychosocial and spiritual areas.  This is a recent and 
notable shift in focus from a more singular attention to physical fitness.  Programs 
focused on affecting soldier psychologies and laden with philosophical overtones 
have not come without controversy. 
High rates of suicide, spousal and child abuse, alcohol and drug abuse, and 
further self-destructive behaviors related to PTSD, depression and other 
psychological disorders have prompted the U.S. Military to spend many millions of 
dollars in exploratory research in areas such as practical positive psychology in 
hopes of enhancing psychological resilience (Seligman, 1998, 2002; Gillham, 
2000).  The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program advanced by the U.S. Army is 
a holistic approach to fitness and it has led in the roll-out of military 
Comprehensive Fitness Programs (CFP) in general.  The once dominating but still 
central theme of physical fitness has now been joined by a concern with other 
aspects of human well-being such as family life, social interaction, emotional 
stability and spiritual health. 
The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program utilized by the U.S. Army is 
based on positive psychology, described by the University of Pennsylvania as: 
…the scientific study of the strengths and virtues that enable individuals 
and communities to thrive. The Positive Psychology Center promotes 
research, training, education, and the dissemination of Positive Psychology. 
This field is founded on the belief that people want to lead meaningful and 
fulfilling lives, to cultivate what is best within themselves, and to enhance 
their experiences of love, work, and play.  
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The Positive Psychology Center developed a model consisting of five 
unique yet interrelated dimensions, described in Table 1.  The model does, perhaps 
somewhat conspicuously, lack a distinctly moral aspect, something beyond mere 
professional ethics.  Instead, the moral aspect is either assumed within or 
incorporated into other aspects of Comprehensive Soldier Fitness.  Nevertheless, 
since the start of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, many public ethical tragedies 
regarding the conduct of military personnel, related to matters such as PTSD, 
depression and substance abuse, embolden questions regarding moral development 
and ethical behavior in the ranks of the U.S. Military.  It therefore seems reasonable 
that the U.S. Military would emphasize a unique dimension of fitness related to 
moral self-awareness and behavior.  However, moral development programs can be 
particularly challenging when they are created with psychological aims in 
religiously pluralistic societies.  Thus, it is not ultimately unexpected that the U.S. 
Military might focus on ideas of right and wrong in Comprehensive Fitness 
Programs through professional ethics.  Considering the history of the U.S. Army’s 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program, it appears that, prior to 2009, this moral 
characteristic was originally intended to fall within the sub-construct of spiritual 
fitness.  Due to the consternation that resulted from initiation of this formal 
program, promulgated by atheist and other anti-religious groups, the moral aspect 
was relatively quickly diluted into something less than an agentive personal 
morality and something more aligned with social norms.  This agentive moral 
aspect can of course be complicated by an indubitable connection to religiosity, and 
perhaps was therefore set aside for something less controversial and more akin to 
professional ethics.  Although words like character self-control are utilized in what 
is referred to as the emotional fitness dimension of CSF, the focus with emotional 
fitness seems much more closely aligned with the behavioral results of emotional 
feelings and much less on something like moral reasoning.  Thus, if examining the 
moral dilemma, it seems most appropriate to appeal to the Spiritual Fitness 
dimension within the CSF program. 
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Table 1 
Aspects of the U.S. Army’s Comprehensive Fitness Program 
 
Dimension Definition 
1. Physical Performing and excelling in physical activities that require aerobic 
fitness, endurance, strength, healthy body composition and 
flexibility derived through exercise, nutrition and training. The 
physical domain also encompasses the OTSG Performance Triad 
initiative of sleep, activity, and nutrition to improve personal and 
unit performance, resilience and readiness. 
2. Emotional Approaching life's challenges in a positive, optimistic way by 
demonstrating self-control, stamina and good character with your 
choices and actions. 
3. Social Developing and maintaining trusted, valued relationships and 
friendships that are personally fulfilling and foster good 
communication including a comfortable exchange of ideas, views, 
and experiences.  
4. Spiritual One's purpose, core values, beliefs, identity, and life vision. These 
elements, which define the essence of a person, enable one to build 
inner strength, make meaning of experiences, behave ethically, 
persevere through challenges, and be resilient when faced with 
adversity. An individual's spirituality draws upon personal, 
philosophical, psychological, and/or religious teachings, and forms 
the basis of their character. 
5. Family Being part of a family unit that is safe, supportive and loving, and 
provides the resources needed for all members to live in a healthy 
and secure environment.  
Note. Information retrieved on February 20, 2013 from www.csf2.army.mil. 
 
For many service members, the Spiritual Fitness aspect of Comprehensive 
Fitness Programs may seem intimately related to their religiosity and personal 
morality.  But, the U.S. Military has recently distanced itself from this notion, 
stating that Spiritual Fitness is not religiosity and instead that it relates simply to 
the human spirit.  Yet, for those who understand religiosity and spirituality as 
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perhaps distinctive yet quite imperative to a good personal existence, a position 
statement of this kind may not suffice.  Two recent quotes demonstrate the more 
humanistic definition of spiritual as defined by the U.S. Military in the Resiliency 
Tips noted in two of the recent editions of the Comprehensive Soldier and Family 
Fitness Quarterly: 
Spiritual - Do you know someone personally who has demonstrated amaz-
ing resilience through really challenging circumstances? Think how you 
would like to imitate the spirit of that person (2012, vol. 2). 
 
Spiritual - Take a break from your busy schedule to meditate on what is re-
ally important to you (2012, vol. 1). 
 
The Comprehensive Solder Fitness program was introduced to the broader 
U.S. Army in 2009 with the help of researchers from the University of 
Pennsylvania (American Psychologist, vol. 66-1).  The program, including the 
aspect of spiritual fitness, is now being implemented in other services such as the 
U.S. Air Force.  In a recent publication a U.S. Air Force Non-Commissioned 
Officer (NCO) described the spiritual component of the CSF program thus: 
In my view, there are several ways we can be spiritually fit, even if we're 
not religious…Spiritual fitness is about finding those practices or routines 
which will help you deal with stressful situations, whether they are in 
deployed locations or not. It could mean leaning on your chaplain if you 
happen to be religious, or it could mean leaning on a close friend or 
confidant if you're not. It could mean transcendental meditation, or focusing 
on a connection with nature. For me, the bottom line regarding spiritual 
fitness is all about the ability to overcome stressful situations or bad times, 
and being able to focus my attention on mission accomplishment (Retrieved 
on February 17, 2013 from 
http://www.jble.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123332437). 
 
In the same article, the officer, Master Sgt. Potvin (Air Combat Command) 
emphasized several specific ways to be more spiritually fit including: Connecting 
with friends and family and keeping yourself out of isolation, being nice to others, 
utilizing mind-body exercises such as yoga or tai-chi, and taking care of things at 
home.  Several of these suggestions allude to moral action and developing the mor-
al self, yet the statement almost seems to suggest that doing this apart from religion 
is, or perhaps ought to be, the norm in the U.S. Military.  There may be no specific 
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issue with this suggestion in general within a pluralistic society such as is the case 
in the U.S. Military, although it does seem to avoid the issue of the keenly religious 
service member who bases their existence, hope and morality within the context of 
their religious beliefs. 
The distancing from religion in general, and religious or theologically based 
philosophies of life specifically, might be viewed as a demonstration of freedom of 
religion on the one hand, and freedom from religion on the other, depending of 
course on the beliefs of the authority or service member.  The first legal action was 
initiated almost immediately following the U.S. Army’s decision to move forward 
with the CSF program.  The Spiritual Fitness component of the CSF program clear-
ly made some soldiers feel uncomfortable with the religious overtones related to 
this spiritual area.  The U.S. Army has responded to soldier objections over Spiritu-
al Fitness by removing any significance with regard to religion and placing the em-
phasis on a much broader, yet perhaps convoluted, concept of the human spirit. 
Inception of Spiritual Fitness  
In 1987 the Department of the Army (DA) published Pamphlet 600-63-12 
entitled Spiritual Fitness.  This seems to have remained an inconspicuous docu-
ment until the effects of prolonged war in the early 21st century encouraged inquiry 
into the effects of multiple deployments on military personnel.  Studies have shown 
that the effects of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan do increase the risks of 
PTSD and self-destructive behaviors in combat veterans (Hoge, Castro, Messer, 
McGurk, Cotting, & Koffman, 2004).  However, studies conducted by the U.S. 
Military often attempt to disassociate the effects of prolonged war on the individual 
by sometimes focusing analysis on active duty personnel and other times convolut-
ing the data by generalizing to populations not indicative of the sample.  For exam-
ple, concluding that suicide rates are not higher among servicemembers than the 
general U.S. population by not controlling for the population parameter of combat 
veteran sufficiently.  In other words the population is not controlled for combat 
veterans who experienced actual combat.  Therefore it is arguable that biased re-
sults confound the issues related to the long-term effect of combat on former mili-
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tary personnel.  The confusing of this population issue seems to muddle an almost 
obvious conclusion, that traumatic experiences in combat do in fact significantly 
contribute to long-term mental health issues in combat veterans, especially when 
the military support system is no longer available (Boscarino, 1995). 
An example of research that seems to convolute the issue is a study con-
ducted by the Naval Health Research Center, where it is stated outright that PTSD, 
depression and substance abuse have been demonstrated as higher in combat veter-
ans.  Yet ambiguity remains in what constitutes self-destructive behavior, the moti-
vation behind risky and self-destructive behaviors, and the limiting of subjects un-
der consideration (Thomsen, Stander, McWhorter, Rabenhorst, & Milner, 2011).  
The debate on what constitutes self-destructive behavior from the perspective of an 
individual moral agent will be explored philosophically in later chapters.  For the 
time being, let us assume that high suicide rates, occurrences of PTSD and related 
psychological issues, elevated numbers of child and spousal abuse, alcohol and 
drug related troubles, and other social pathological behaviors are in fact self-
destructive in their nature.  Evidence also supports the notion that research dating 
to the First World War and even earlier connects pathological behaviors with com-
bat trauma, and that these behaviors are evident in veterans of the Afghanistan and 
Iraqi Wars (Hoge et al., 2004).  This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the 
U.S. Military leadership has chosen to pursue what can only be deemed extraordi-
nary measures in a purposeful attempt to stem the tide of self-destructive behaviors 
that have become rampant in the post multiple deployment lives of many service 
members. 
 
Contemporary Spiritual Fitness 
The 1987 publication entitled Spiritual Fitness is the magnum opus of the 
U.S. Army’s early advance toward addressing the spiritual aspect of soldiers.  This 
text provides a comprehensive starting point for what is meant by spiritual fitness 
in the US Army today and opens with a quote from General George C. Marshall: 
“The Soldier’s heart, the Soldier’s spirit, the Soldier’s soul, are everything” (p. iv).  
The short quote from Marshall is expanded upon: 
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Unless the soldier’s soul sustains him, he cannot be relied on and will fail 
himself, his commander, and his country in the end. It is not enough to 
fight. It is the spirit that wins the victory. Morale is a state of mind. It is 
steadfastness, courage, and hope. It is confidence, zeal, and loyalty. It is 
elan, esprit de corps, and determination. It is staying power, the spirit which 
endures in the end, and the will to win. With it all things are possible, with-
out it everything else, planning, preparation, and production count for 
naught (DA PAM 600-63-12, p. v).  
 
This quote from Marshall is useful in that it reveals an understanding of 
what was originally defined as spiritual fitness in the U.S. Army and communicates 
that the spiritual concept seems fundamentally focused on the beliefs, values and 
attitudes of an individual (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  This is different to the Army’s 
concept of resilience, which centers more on intention and behavior.  The concept 
of spiritual fitness is a combination of the psychological and the philosophical and 
attends to the more formative cognitive aspects of the individual.  This includes 
some primary aspects of what is more commonly referred to as worldview, 
worldview in this sense being something less than spiritual fitness as a whole. 
As stated earlier, spiritual fitness is a component of the US Army’s Com-
prehensive Soldier Fitness program, established in 2009 and costing over 100 mil-
lion U.S. dollars.  CSF was developed with the help of researchers at the University 
of Pennsylvania led by Martin E. P. Seligman, who was the American Psychologi-
cal Association President in 1998.  Several years of development were necessary 
but by 2009 the CSF program was officially unveiled.  Its fundamental claims are 
aimed at better preparing the Army community “not only to survive, but also thrive 
at a cognitive and behavioral level in the face of protracted warfare” (Kimball, 
2007, p. 73). 
An immediately evident challenge in understanding the literature related to 
the CSF component of spiritual fitness is to first understand the many definitions, 
contexts, uses, and implications of the term and its derivations such as spirituality.  
In the U.S. Army’s CSF program, spirituality “refers to the continuous journey 
people take to discover and realize their spirit, that is, their essential selves” (Par-
gament & Sweeney, 2011, pp. 58-59).  A more anthropological definition of spirit-
uality as used within the context of the CSF is stated as “the journey that people 
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take to discover and realize their essential selves and higher order aspirations” 
(Pargament & Sweeney, 2011, p.58).  To better articulate this personal journey, 
Sweeney, Hannah and Snyder (2007) developed a conceptual model that identified 
several psychological structures and processes that they claim, “facilitate the devel-
opment of the human spirit” and include (a) building awareness of the self and the 
human spirit, (b) building awareness of resources to cultivate the human spirit, and 
(c) building awareness of the human spirit of others (Pargament & Sweeney, 2011, 
p. 58).  This is the basis for spiritual fitness within the CSF program. 
The more recent conceptualization of spiritual fitness provides a much more 
psychological conceptualization than is provided in the 1987 Spiritual Fitness 
manual (DA PAM 600-63-12) in which the Department of the Army defines spir-
itual fitness officially as: 
…the development of those personal qualities needed to sustain a person in 
times of stress, hardship, and tragedy. These qualities come from religious, 
philosophical, or human values and form the basis for character, disposition, 
decision making, and integrity (p. 8).  
 
Additionally, the Spiritual Fitness manual, written and edited by a high-
ranking U.S. Army chaplain, defines spiritual fitness as “being right with God, with 
others and with oneself” (Johnston, 2010, p. 1).  The “manual” states that: 
Spiritually fit persons are leaders who make a positive difference in what 
they do.  They have defined a quality of life that allows for service to God 
and Country.  The spiritually fit Soldier, Sailor, Marine, or Airman has the 
personal ability to worship and walk with God while honorably serving Na-
tion, family and oneself. (Johnston, 2010, p. 2) 
 
Spirituality as the overarching aspect of spiritual fitness can most common-
ly be thought of as both a “fundamental dimension of the human being” and “the 
lived experience which actualizes that dimension” (Hansen, 1990, p. 17).  The con-
cept of spiritual fitness as employed by the U.S. Army seems to include the first, 
while focusing pragmatically on the latter, which is of course organizationally logi-
cal.  It seems therefore, the behavioral is meant to be understood as a product of the 
cognitive in that beliefs and values relate to attitudinal formation which relates to 
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intention, which relates to behavioral manifestation, as described in a basic linear 
model (see Figure 1) by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A simple behavioral model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
 
A progression regarding spiritual fitness from the more philosophical to the 
more psychological, which seems to have occurred in the U.S. Army from 1987 to 
2011, is perhaps of no surprise since this seems a normal progression of the appli-
cation of theory to practice.  Furthermore, it does not seem that the problems with 
the implementation of the U.S. Army’s Spiritual Fitness component have arisen 
from a mere lack of definitional clarity, although there do seem to be inconsisten-
cies regarding the programmatic message and how policy has been interpreted.  
Additionally, scientific issues such as generalizability and construct validity seem 
to be instigators of discord and programmatic issues related to spirituality and reli-
gion have surely proved philosophically controversial.  Of course, this is to be ex-
pected as some sort of consequence in a free and pluralistic society in general.  Yet 
in the case of the U.S. Military, there seems to be more of an issue with what 
Alasdair MacIntyre might suggest as an example of incommensurability of values 
and incompatibility of underlying philosophical assumptions.  Individual soldier 
beliefs about spirituality and religiosity do not seem consistent with perceptions of 
what spirituality means to the U.S. Army.  However, it could also be detrimental to 
the soldier and the unit to exclude or minimize a spiritual aspect from holistic sol-
dier fitness, which creates a bit of an organizational dilemma.  Yeung and Martin 
(2013) note that the spiritual aspect of military members ought not be overlooked 
or dismissed and offer: 
Possessing a sense of meaning and purpose in life is strongly positively re-
lated to quality of life. Second, personal religious and spiritual practices are 
Beliefs 
(cognition) 
Attitudes 
(affection) 
Intentions 
(conation) 
 
Behaviors 
 
E
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linked to improved health and functioning (e.g., protective against sub-
stance use). Spiritual meditation may also help improve health (e.g., pain 
tolerance, buffer physiological stress). Third, there is indirect but converg-
ing evidence that support from a spiritual community is generally beneficial 
to health and well-being. Finally, spiritual coping that is related to purpose 
in life (i.e., using spiritual beliefs to cope with stressors) drives post-
traumatic growth and improved well-being, as opposed to coping that is 
more narrowly religious. However, spiritual coping is not necessarily effec-
tive in coping with such physical stressors as pain. Several constructs of 
spiritual fitness may be linked to suicidality, such as religious affiliation (p. 
ix). 
 
Most of the information regarding spiritual fitness that is readily available 
to military members begins with differing definitions or conceptual understandings 
of spiritual fitness.  The conclusions drawn from interpretations of policy material 
are of course widely varying as they are formulated through differing a priori as-
sumptions.  The materials produced by the U.S. Military on notions surrounding 
spiritual fitness seem as though it is assumed that philosophical starting points are 
generally consistent and dependably understood by military personnel, as are other 
areas of human functioning such as physical, mental and social aspects.  Yet, at cer-
tain times the spiritual factor is stated to be “explicitly from a Christian perspec-
tive” (Kassab & MacDonald, 2010, p. 976).  Other literature clearly assumes the 
spiritual aspect of human functioning as part of the holistic health and well-being of 
all people.  At times, terms such as spirituality are used in the literature as some-
thing more synonymous with “resilience skills” and as strictly psychological in na-
ture (Tucker, 2012, p. 1). 
  The U.S. Military’s concept of spiritual fitness is not only offered as a way 
of improving the self, and in the aggregate of course the unit, spiritual fitness is al-
so assessed by use of a standardized test, referred to as the Global Assessment Tool 
(GAT), and is promoted as a major component of the holistic health of the service-
member.  It does seem that a goal of the programmatic aspects of spiritual fitness 
was to effectively reduce the number of PTSD cases and lower the overall number 
of active military suicides and incidences of other self-destructive behaviors, by 
way of providing psychological resiliency training.  According to Leopold (2011) 
self-destructive issues related to psychological disorders have reached a crisis 
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point.  This notion is supported by the large amount of money the U.S. Military has 
dedicated to evaluating sub-components of identified holistic soldier qualities and 
the training associated with improving such qualities.  These components are 
deemed to be especially important in coping with war-related trauma. 
The Global Assessment Tool (GAT) is used to evaluate these important di-
mensions of the servicemember’s life, and provides feedback regarding what per-
haps ought to be done if someone is lacking in one of the holistic areas such as spir-
itual fitness.  While the U.S. Army contends that the GAT evaluation is not exploit-
ed in the promotion process, questions arise concerning whether or not the results 
of the evaluation might influence a servicemembers performance evaluation 
(Banks, 2011).  This is of course in addition to the influence the evaluation might 
have on the individual servicemember’s psychology. 
It seems that the most current trends, terminology, training, and practice 
concerning moral and spiritual issues can be found in just a few series of U.S. Ar-
my and DoD documents from the 1980s.  This does not of course mean in any way 
that the tradition related to such trends, terminology, training and practice was cre-
ated at this time, but simply suggests that the most recent changes to U.S. Army 
guidance on these issues can be traced to just a few key documents.  If we are to 
consider the tradition of spirituality in America as affecting the use of the term in 
the U.S. Military, we should at least consider an interesting change of use with the 
term spirituality occurring around the time of the Second Vatican Council.  Shel-
drake (2007) states: 
The use of the word “spirituality” as an area of study gradually re-emerged 
during the twentieth century but it was only by the Second Vatican Council 
in the early 1960s that it began to dominate and replace older terms such as 
ascetical theology or mystical theology.  The emergence of “spirituality” as 
the preferred term to describe studies of the Christian life increased after the 
Council until it was the dominant term from the 1970s onwards (p. 102). 
     
There are also several key aspects about spirituality and its common use 
noted by Sheldrake (2007) that seem particularly applicable to what has become 
known as spiritual fitness in the U.S. Military.  Perhaps most notably, beyond the 
paradigm shift of spirituality being generally regarded as both individual and col-
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lective in nature, “it was not limited to personal interiority but integrated all aspects 
of human experience” (pp. 102-103).  This seems to be in agreement with the U.S. 
Army’s new notion of the soldier’s holistic health and the Comprehensive Soldier 
Fitness program. 
If we consider that Sheldrake also described the term spirituality as “a me-
dium for ecumenical growth [and]…by the end of the twentieth century this had 
extended further into the wider ecumenism of interfaith dialogue” (p. 103), we can 
begin to understand how the term moved from more of a Christian notion to a 
broader religiously encompassing one.  Couple this with the prolific and ambiguous 
use of terms such as religion and worldview, often meant to encompass all belief 
systems, and with the fact that the origins of spirituality for many lie in specific but 
different sacred texts, and we begin to understand the complexity of the current en-
cyclopedic situation. 
 
The Struggle between Establishment and Freedom 
A central and consistent point of disputation seems to relate to religious 
practice and the struggle between what are referred to as the establishment and free 
exercise clauses in the U.S. Constitution.  Army Regulation (AR) 165-1 states that 
“Congress recognizes the necessity of the Chaplain Corps in striking a balance be-
tween the establishment and free exercise clauses” (p. 1).  Traditionally, that bal-
ance has been difficult for leaders to identify and regularly put into practice. 
In December of 2011, the Wisconsin-based Freedom From Religion Foun-
dation sent a letter to the Secretary of the Army asking that he immediately cease 
the spiritual evaluation components of the Global Assessment Tool (Banks, 2011).  
This was not the first time there were concerns about the spiritual fitness compo-
nent of the CSF program and the Global Assessment Tool.  However, this seemed 
to be a clear overture to formal legal action.  The Military Association of Atheists 
and Freethinkers (MAAF) in a recent article claim that servicemembers with an 
atheist persuasion are needlessly being outcast because of a resistance to accept 
what they believe is something akin to religious piety or a call to the supernatural 
(MAAF, 2012). 
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The U.S. Army contends that spiritual fitness is merely offered to all sol-
diers but that the CSF approach is not meant to persuade or coerce soldiers to be-
lieve in a deity or to encourage soldiers to attend church or endorse religion in any 
way.  The U.S. Army also claims that a soldier who scores low on this aspect of the 
Global Assessment Tool, and therefore lacks in spiritual fitness, is by no means un-
fit to serve.  Non-theistic servicemembers, a self-appointed term, are speaking out 
against the entire notion of spiritual fitness and have threatened legal action against 
the U.S. Military for pressuring them to conform to what they view as a form of 
mandatory religious participation or even coercion regarding beliefs and practices 
(Banks, 2011; Surman, 2011). 
This issue is related to a growing dispute over the religious freedoms of 
U.S. Military personnel.  As mentioned previously, it seems that it is not clear what 
the U.S. Military means by spiritual fitness as a consistent concept, much less as an 
operationalizable psychological construct.  Consequently, it might be expected that 
problems might arise when attempting to evaluate or measure military units, lead-
ers, servicemembers and their families on their level of spiritual fitness.  Further-
more, a questionable assessment of such a basic foundation of belief and philoso-
phy of life may of course cause unforeseen problems that might compound and lead 
to a breakdown in military unit cohesion.   
 The dispute between U.S. Military theists and anti-theists will continue to 
be aggravated by policies such as Spiritual Fitness until both sides of the divide are 
willing to consider that respectful and safe environments must be ensured for all 
individuals.  Some ethicists such as MacIntyre (1981, 1988, 1990) might consider 
this problem a matter to be explored through open and respectful philosophical in-
quiry, and perhaps argue that a more complete understanding of the reasoning and 
assumptions behind the notion of spiritual fitness, coupled with a focus on the vir-
tue of respect for persons, might lead to a better relationship between factions.  The 
current discord is surely causing divisions between soldiers and leaders, and very 
likely affecting unit cohesion; a precisely opposite influence of one of the primary 
intentions of Comprehensive Fitness Programs, which is to create unit stability and 
cohesion. 
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The Freedom From Religion Foundation, an organization in the U.S. that 
exists to defend citizens’ constitutional rights related to the separation of church 
and state, claims that the basic rights of the servicemember are being violated 
through an attempt to evaluate the spiritual fitness of soldiers whilst creating an en-
vironment of potential hostility and prejudice towards those who claim to hold no 
religious beliefs, especially those who choose to openly defy belief in a deity.  The 
Foundation has referred to the specific questions found in the Global Assessment 
Tool and the resulting evaluation as haughty and even condescending in nature 
(Banks, 2011; Koltko-Rivera, 2004).   
The Army’s response to such claims has been somewhat guarded and am-
biguous.  However, there has been emphasis placed on the confidentiality of the 
assessment instrument.  The Global Assessment Tool is currently an annual re-
quirement for all non-deployed soldiers, as well as a requirement for all new basic 
trainees.  Questions remain as to the ultimate purpose of the spiritual portion of the 
GAT and whether or not the aspect of spiritual fitness is generalizable to all ser-
vicemembers in the U.S. Military regardless of religious affiliation or belief.  There 
are also questions as to whether the spiritual fitness component is achieving its in-
tended results.  Although the U.S. Military admits it does not yet have enough data 
to support the claim that spiritual fitness is credible as a separate and distinct mili-
tary servicemember quality that improves positive coping skills, decreases the like-
lihood of suicide, and increases the psychological resilience of the soldier in times 
of stress, the instrument is surely being interpreted in diverse ways that include the-
se assumptions of generalizability, reliability and validity (Herron, 2011).  Conclu-
sions based on an assumed validity and reliability of the GAT may be problematic.  
However, it is not uncommon that instruments of this type encounter a myriad of 
issues in both development and implementation.   Social science instruments such 
at the Myers Briggs Type Inventory (MBTI) have encountered challenging prob-
lems regarding use and interpretation.  Difficulties also arise from the administra-
tion, application and interpretation of such instruments.  In the case of the GAT, 
issues could be assuaged relatively simply by the provision of additional training 
on the uses and intent of the spiritual fitness component.  Yet, the heart of the prob-
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lems arising from implementation of the spiritual fitness component of the GAT 
seems a bit more complicated.  At a fundamental level, there does seem to be evi-
dence of an ethical quandary in that the U.S. Military has chosen to administer 
training to soldiers as a consequence of the outcome of the spiritual fitness assess-
ment.  This activity may unnecessarily provoke polemical opposition and does not 
seem to dependably align with solider expectations regarding the constitutionality 
of the assessment and follow-on training.  At a minimum, the consternation ema-
nating from the implementation of spiritual fitness training and assessment seems 
to warrant both scientific and philosophic exploration. 
Consider for a moment that the notion of meditation is commonly defined 
as a harmonization of the mind, body and spirit whilst prayer is normally defined as 
having spiritual communion with a deity.  Statements and phrases contained within 
the Global Assessment Tool are at least as perplexing as attempting to understand 
the difference between what is meant by prayer and meditation.  The GAT tool in-
cludes phrases such as, “I am a spiritual person” and “In difficult times I pray or 
meditate” or “I often find comfort in my religion or spiritual beliefs.”  In the latter 
statement the phrase “spiritual beliefs” may have been added after legal considera-
tions.  Some concerns surround negative perceptions of specific language involving 
terms such as religious or spiritual, but these perceptual concerns are often argued 
away, sometimes as if the concern is simply related to an oversensitivity on the part 
of anti-theists (Dawes, 2005). 
The Director of Development at the Institute of Humanist Studies, Stuart 
Bechman, has described the U.S. Military’s actions surrounding the Global As-
sessment Tool as clearly proselytizing, and as an invasion of privacy.  But in the 
context of the military, any statement regarding unqualified individual privacy is 
surely controversial.  In recent years, the Military Religious Freedom Foundation 
(MRFF) has threatened to launch hundreds of lawsuits on the behalf of service-
members due to supposed theistic activities and the creation of a new environment 
of fear for non-theistic servicemembers by U.S. Military leadership (Surman, 
2011). 
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Soldiers have also accused the U.S. Army of failing to keep soldier Global 
Assessment Tool scores confidential and have accused leadership of issuing prose-
lytizing lectures to those who score low on the spiritual fitness section of the GAT.  
One soldier was quoted in an email to the Military Association of Atheists and 
Freethinkers as stating: 
When this chaplain told me that I failed the [spiritual fitness test] because it 
was [Jesus’] way of personally knocking on my door as an invitation for me 
to come to Him as a [born again, real Christian] so that I could be saved and 
not burn forever in hell for rejecting Him, I thought of…the fact that I was 
already born a Christian and did not need to be born again…[and] I thought 
of my battle buddy…who took a bullet for me in his face…and that he was 
the same kind of Christian as me and this chaplain is telling me that my bat-
tle buddy…is burning in hell for all time (Surman, 2011). 
 
Such statements by any military officer to another servicemember would 
surely raise questions, especially in an environment where encouraging intellectual 
exploration may include an unsavory element of coercion in the dyadic relation-
ship.  Of course, there may be ulterior motives or unexplained circumstances be-
hind such allegations.  And yet, questions as to whether officers and chaplains are 
using rank and position to promote religion, and perhaps coerce soldiers into 
changing their spiritual beliefs, or whether these same officers feel fearful about 
openly professing their true beliefs, are surely important enough to warrant a thor-
ough investigation.  In the same manner, the need for privacy should not be over-
looked for servicemembers who wish to be allowed to practice a religion free from 
intimidation, and who should be allowed to practice religion without fear of repris-
al.  Forms of anti-religious and religious discrimination have always existed in the 
U.S. Military.  Nevertheless, important questions remain as to the currently relevant 
issue of spiritual fitness and possibilities of uniform discrimination. 
The Moral Constituent 
A question seems to naturally arise when considering current Comprehen-
sive Fitness Models as they relate to moral development and ethical action.  Since 
the moral component seems conspicuously vague, are we left to assume that ethics 
should be developed within other constructs within the Comprehensive Fitness 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness 33 
 
Programs, and that this is sufficient in terms of the goals of the organization?  Or, 
might it be better for the organizational goals to encourage moral and ethical 
thought and conduct as a separate and distinct domain of human functioning within 
the CFPs?  The lack of prominence of an ethical or moral domain within CFPs 
surely seems surprising considering their connection to self-destructive behaviors 
and also, following the barbarism of the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal in 2003 and 
numerous public reports of other questionable activities, such as waterboarding, 
conducted by the U.S. Military over the past decade. 
Public brutalities committed by U.S. servicemembers over the past decade 
have surely provoked inquiry into the training around professional ethics and the 
development of moral character.  However, the U.S. Military’s response seems to 
be limited simply to professional ethics training.  In other words, the response 
seems aimed at clarifying the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).  Unfortu-
nately, this legalistic approach has proven to be ineffective in meeting the ethical 
goals of the U.S. Military in so many instances.  The approach normally includes 
some online training and classroom instruction, with perhaps some role-playing 
involving a sort of situational ethics.  Occasionally, the training might include an 
ethical dilemma that is supposed to be solved through something of a Rawlsian per-
spective of social justice, the answer being valid as long as the response falls within 
the UCMJ.  But is this form of ethics training really helping the soldier to tackle 
real world moral dilemmas?  Is this training helping the soldier navigate the moral 
choices he or she has made that might be causing symptoms of Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder to be exacerbated?  Is this ethics training helping to improve what 
the U.S. Military considers the holistic soldier?  Or, in the case of PTSD, is the 
U.S. Military simply trying to temporarily assuage guilt associated with a service-
member’s moral schema by adjusting their sense of moral responsibility? 
Is this dealing with the past aspect of ethics training aimed more at convinc-
ing the soldier, assuming they followed the spirit of the UCMJ and Rules of En-
gagement (ROE), that they are not to blame and that they ought to be positive- 
minded and not dwell on, or perhaps even consider, the morally questionable things 
from their past experience?  If this is the case, then this could be considered an 
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alarming attempt at behavioral modification that might only serve to encourage the 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions and alleviate moral dissonance for a rela-
tively short period of time.  It would seem that such an approach would be a tempo-
rary solution; something aimed at fulfilling immediate organizational goals and ob-
jectives, and not satisfying the substantial risk of personal anguish that might natu-
rally arise when reflection becomes, shall we say, more convenient. 
The lack of a robust moral component within the current Comprehensive 
Fitness Programs seems the result of several factors, including that personal moral 
development was intended to be integrated with the Spiritual Fitness component of 
the CFPs.  It seems obvious that this emphasis has been minimized due to the U.S. 
Army’s response to the alarm that has arisen from anti-theists against things related 
to what they consider an endorsement or promotion of religiosity and spirituality.  
Also, remember that this CSF model is being replicated in other military service 
branches such as the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force.  Therefore, reasonable ques-
tions arise as to whether the U.S. Military is dealing effectively with the moral 
component of the human condition for all or even a majority of servicemembers 
through Spiritual Fitness within the CSP, understanding that the original intent of 
Spiritual Fitness within the CFP seems now to be significantly changed.  Is the U.S. 
Military helping soldiers develop the necessary aspects needed to sense, judge and 
act morally?  Or, is it possible that the U.S. Military is enabling military service-
members to avoid or counter their own moral schema; or as Bandura (1999) might 
question, is the U.S. Military mistakenly encouraging the disengagement of moral 
self-sanctions? 
There is clear evidence to support the claim that the disengagement of mor-
al self-sanctions is related to psychological aspects such as hope and positive think-
ing, morally relevant individual personal traits, moral reasoning abilities and orien-
tations, and dispositional moral emotions.  The disengagement of moral self-
sanctions can also lead to destructive behaviors such as child abuse, suicide, spous-
al abuse, alcoholism and drug addiction (Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, & Mayer, 
2011).  All of these issues are of course considered important to the health and wel-
fare of U.S. Military servicemembers. 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness 35 
 
A lingering question remains concerning the validity of the nomological 
network being utilized by the U.S. Military if it is missing a strong moral compo-
nent, and that excludes or diminishes one’s religion or religious experience, or at-
tempts to capture the impact of such beliefs in a more ambiguous manner (Schwab, 
1980).  In other words, the current Comprehensive Fitness Program as a unified 
construct may not be sufficient in scope.  It may not affect the reduction of self-
destructive behaviors as might be assumed, and the current CFP may not be ulti-
mately consistent with the U.S. Military’s overall intent.  Research suggests the 
importance of religion and traditional spirituality for many individuals and groups, 
including a large percentage of self-identified religious servicemembers, when at-
tempting to describe or predict phenomena related to moral development and which 
are associated with moral dissonance and self-destructive behaviors.1 
Formation of a Research Question Worthy of Attention 
 Understanding that the disengagement of moral self-sanctions can often lead 
to self-destructive behaviors, and that the practice of religion is important for many 
who utilize certain core beliefs as the foundation of their moral beliefs, and being 
appreciative that aspects of psychological resilience are important within the Com-
prehensive Fitness Program (specifically the concepts of hope for the future and 
ability to flourish in the present), we can thus connect the aspects of belief to action 
as described in Figure 2. 
 
                                                
1 See Mensch (2009) for a literature review and analysis of research related 
to moral development and religion. 
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Figure 2. Simple linear model of religious-based hope, moral disengagement and 
self-destructive behavior. 
 
 If we can better understand the predictors for the disengagement of moral 
self-sanctions, while respecting that a propensity for moral disengagement can lead 
to self-destructive behaviors, which are a foundational aspect of resiliency in Com-
prehensive Fitness Programs, then it seems that the U.S. Military would consider an 
improved understanding of moral disengagement and its antecedents as essential to 
the mission of making servicemembers more psychologically resilient.  As a result, 
we ask the following research question based on the model in Figure 2; can we pre-
dict a propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions by understanding 
one’s perceived outlook for the future (hope), one’s current perceptions about the 
present (flourishing), and one’s religiosity?  The first two predictors encompass 
important aspects of psychological resiliency currently utilized in Comprehensive 
Fitness Programs, whilst the aspect of religiosity might be considered evidence of a 
strong religious and spiritual basis for moral thought and action.  In the chapters 
that follow, we consider three distinct aspects of religiosity including aspects of 
both spiritual practice and religious beliefs.
Religious 
Belief 
Moral 
Disengagement 
 
Hope 
& 
Flourishing 
 
 
Behavior 
(Including self-
destructive) 
 Chapter 3 – Disambiguating “Spirituality” 
It is challenging to clearly distinguish between different terminologies that 
refer to something akin to spirituality within the U.S. Military context.  The “Moral 
Leadership Training Program”, which seems to closely correlate with the concepts 
of spiritual fitness, is defined in a 1987 edition of Army Regulation 165-1 Chaplain 
Activities in the United States Army thus: 
The Moral Leadership Training Program of the Army addresses the full 
spectrum of moral concerns of the profession of arms and the conduct of 
war. Moral leadership training focuses on those virtues and values that were 
present in the shaping of America and are still present in the contemporary 
military setting. This training recognizes the inherent dignity of all people, 
the value of the state, and the virtues of good citizenship (p. 21). 
 
This definition for many is likely to invoke some form of spirituality for 
those who base their moral principles within the context of religious virtues and 
values.  The role of the chaplain in the U.S. Army is meant to be inclusive and not 
exclusive in nature, although many would argue that the virtues and values that 
“shaped America” were inherently religious in nature.  Regardless, a pluralistic so-
ciety such as we find in the U.S. Army, will normally allow individuals to apply 
their religious and spiritual freedoms to the ethics that underlie things such as “vir-
tues and values” and the meaning of “dignity for all people.”  The chaplain is the 
religious and spiritual proponent for a U.S. Military command.  The chaplain is al-
so the staff proponent to commanders for “Moral Leadership Training”, as we can 
see from U.S. Army Regulation 165-1 (1987) where it states that, “The chaplain, as 
the adviser to the commander in the areas of morals and morale as affected by reli-
gion, is the principal staff officer for this program” (p.  21).  However, the com-
mander is ultimately responsible for all training programs, including the scope, per-
spective and context, and it is the commander who must ultimately be burdened 
with the translation of such regulations.  In fact, AR-165 (1987) follows by stating, 
“ the range of topics to be addressed requires that commanders consider the appro-
priateness of the topic in assigning the task of conducting command training clas-
ses” (p.  21).  Although there are suggested topics provided throughout the regula-
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tion, commanders are given great latitude in the disambiguation of terms and the 
implied intent of many parts of the regulation. 
The flexibility provided to commanders is a hallmark of the American Mili-
tary in general and something the U.S. Army prides itself in maximizing.  The con-
cept of placing decisions and understanding implied tasks to the lowest level com-
mander allows for quick adaptation to changing battlefield conditions and situa-
tions.  This is of course a principle of warfare that can provide tactical advantage in 
combat.  However, when considering this flexibility in the interpretation and im-
plementation of values, moral principles and virtues, it is possible that this flexibil-
ity and ambiguity might also become problematic.  By interpreting things such as 
moral virtue inconsistently, commanders may inadvertently influence soldiers in 
ways that might possibly create tension between the establishment clause and free-
dom of religion. 
U.S. Army Regulation 165-1, Army Chaplain Corps Activities (2009) states, 
“The first Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits enactment of any law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  Fur-
thermore, this manual makes it clear that the U.S. Congress does recognize the 
need to “strike a balance” between establishment and free exercise clauses.  There-
fore, at least at the strategic level, it is evident that the U.S. Army does recognize 
the potential for tension between two extremes (p. 1). 
The Army Chaplain Corps Activities manual is a key text in that the chap-
lain is the unit commander’s proponent for carrying out such things as the Spiritual 
Fitness component of the Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program.  The 
culture in which the chaplain operates is intended to mirror the culture of the Unit-
ed States in general and it is noted as a “pluralistic religious” culture where Army 
chaplains “demonstrate the values of religious freedom of conscience and spiritual 
choice” (AR165-1, 2009, p. 1).  This manual also cites the establishment clause in 
the U.S. Constitution as prohibiting the mandate of any religion or way of prayer.  
It seems that the latter may be more difficult in practice in that to not pray at certain 
functions or ceremonies would offend some, whilst to pray at any event might of-
fend others.  The manual could be viewed as contradictory in that it cites the estab-
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lishment clause whilst mandating that chaplains provide worship services, religious 
classes and prayers, without compromising their own faith tradition or ecclesiasti-
cal endorsement requirements.  The goals here seem obvious in that the chaplain 
should provide the greatest breadth of religious support possible.  Of course, the 
question as to how well any particular chaplain may be able to provide such sup-
port while following other guidelines and their own religious convictions might be 
of reasonable concern.  It would seem exceedingly difficult to provide such support 
to a military unit when in one unit there may be Protestant, Catholic, Wiccan, 
Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, as well as atheist, agnostic and even anti-theistic sol-
diers, who might be uncomfortable in the presence of any particular religious set-
ting, practice or prayer. 
The U.S. Military also connects behavior and unit culture to religiosity by 
mandating that commanders establish a climate of high moral and ethical standards 
and includes specifically that “The religious program for the Army is the com-
mander’s program” (AR 165-1, 2009, p. 2).  This sort of mandate might of course 
lead to cries of hypocrisy by atheist and anti-theistic individuals and groups.  For 
example, a 2012 article regarding the aforementioned extramarital sex scandal of 
General David Petraeus is entitled, “Hey General Petraeus, How’s That ‘Spiritual 
Fitness’ Stuff Working for You” (Rodda, 2012).  Still, this should not be a distrac-
tion from the central issue that, regardless of personal failings, U.S. Military com-
manders are mandated to create an environment that supports the spiritual needs of 
the servicemembers.  The importance of the spiritual and religious well-being of 
the military servicemember can of course be argued by citing regulations.  Howev-
er, the importance of this kind of well-being and soldier fitness may also be argued 
as vital simply from the U.S. Military’s inclusion of Spiritual Fitness as only one 
five key areas of focus within Comprehensive Soldier Fitness. 
Claims of Spiritual Fitness 
The U.S. Army currently maintains a website designed to present research 
findings related to the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program and makes the fol-
lowing claims regarding CSF in general: 
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Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness is effective:  An evaluation 
completed by Army and Civilian scientists showed that soldiers who re-
ceived [Master Resilience Training] MRT-led resilience training reported 
higher levels of resilience and psychological health over time than soldiers 
who did not receive the training. Most importantly, good leadership matters 
- soldiers improved more when their commanders endorsed the program, 
scheduled training, and select confident Non-Commissioned Officers to 
serve as CSF2 trainers (C2F2 Information Sheet, 2012).1 
 
Three technical report surveys are summed up in the C2F2 Information 
Sheet (2012): 
Survey Validation Technical Reports #1, #2 and #3:  Soldiers who complet-
ed suicide, tested positive for illicit drug use, or committed violent crimes, 
tested as being less resilient than those who did not engage in these activi-
ties.  Officers who were promoted ahead of peers or selected for command 
are more emotionally and socially fit than Officers not promoted early or 
selected for command.  Together, Tech Reports #1 and #2 showed that re-
silience is linked to important behavioral outcomes.  Soldiers who received 
resilience training taught by a Master Resilience Trainer (MRT) improved 
more than those Soldiers who did not receive the training (p. 2).2 
 
According to these reports, psychological resilience training in the U.S. 
Army appears to be more effective among soldiers aged 18-24 than for older sol-
diers.  The training is generally reported as more effective when commanders en-
sure that training is properly scheduled, confident leaders are selected as trainers, 
and the trainers feel supported by individual unit commanders.  Furthermore, these 
reports indicate that psychological resilience is directly related to behavioral mani-
festations of right or wrong conduct.3 
The conceptualization of right organizational conduct in general has come 
to mean more of an “adherence to codes of practice, or the development of those 
codes of practice” (Ladkin, 2006, p. 89).  For some, this may be something of a 
compromise or reduction of ethics or right to the lowest common denominator, the 
rule of law.  The U.S. Military seems to have recognized certain shortcomings of 
                                                
1 Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness (C2F2) reports retrieved from 
http://www.dtic.mil on February 28, 2013. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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this conceptualization in an attempt to better deal with moral dilemmas through 
concepts like spiritual fitness, which offers more than a comparison of expected 
outcomes with behavioral outcomes.  In other words, instead of focusing strictly on 
the consequences of actions related to policy and the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, the U.S. Military seems to be addressing a more complete approach to ethics 
that includes a broader spectrum of beliefs and how they relate to actions, and thus 
aspects of the individual’s behavior such as virtue and principled moral reasoning.  
While a focus on action is surely the hallmark of a bureaucracy such as the U.S. 
Department of Defense, it is perhaps commendable that this organization not only 
recognizes the limitations of such a philosophy, but that it is institutionally attempt-
ing to encourage moral development through spiritual fitness (Cummings, 2000; 
Ladkin 2006). 
However, the implementation of spiritual fitness has come with many chal-
lenges that could jeopardize the integrity of initial programmatic conceptions.  
Osran, Smee, Sreenivasan and Weinberger (2010) claim that placing combat expe-
riences within a meaningful context is beneficial for the soldier because this will 
promote spiritual and emotional growth.  In other words, proper contextualization 
of stressful combat experiences leads to new existential meaning and purpose.  The 
assumption that this is true is surely nothing new, but it is controversial.  In Plato’s 
dialogues we find it clear that Socrates focused his search for wisdom on existential 
questions such as; what am I made of (i.e. does the soul exist), and what is my pur-
pose in life?  Nevertheless, if an organization coerces one to explore such questions 
at an existential level, the intent and process of encouraging exploration may create 
concern, and in this case, the concerns of soldiers fighting for the freedom to be-
lieve as one wishes without coercion or intimidation.  Socrates may have been right 
about the merits of the contemplative life, but not all are ready, willing or able to 
navigate such a life. 
The U.S. Military seems keenly aware of the challenges regarding religious 
coercion.  The U.S. Army’s Comprehensive Solder Fitness program offers that the 
spiritual fitness assessment within the Global Assessment Tool is not a test or 
measure at all and specifically not a pass or fail instrument; and that the results 
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simply provide feedback.  However, if there is no measurement, then the purpose 
and validity of the construct might obviously come into question.  The ensuing ed-
ucation options are not mandatory for soldiers who score low on the spiritual fit-
ness portion of the Global Assessment Tool.  There are however, additional learn-
ing modules offered to those who do score low (Banks, 2011).  Scoring low logi-
cally seems to indicate some form of measurement.  If this seems confusing, it may 
be due to the fact that from one perspective, the GAT seems to do exactly what its 
proponents claim it is not doing - attempting to measure psychological aspects of 
servicemembers.  Brigadier General Rhonda Cornum commented in 2008 that the 
U.S. Army's spiritual fitness assessment was developed partly because people who 
are inclined toward spirituality seem to be more resilient.  She does however stop 
short of claiming that high levels of spiritual fitness make for a better soldier 
(Hagerty, 2011). 
So whether the spiritual fitness component of the Global Assessment Tool 
is a test, questionnaire, survey, or assessment, the Military Association of Atheists 
and Freethinkers (MAAF), founded in 1997, is troubled by the notion of spiritual 
fitness in general, and specifically the spiritual fitness measure included in the 
Global Assessment Tool.  The MAAF did meet with key U.S. Army leaders and 
expressed concern about the spiritual fitness test and language related to the Com-
prehensive Solder Fitness program especially any use of the term religion, as op-
posed to a more neutral term such as spiritual or spirituality.  The MAAF has 
claimed that the three components of spiritual fitness are physical, mental and spir-
itual and that the three are not mutually exclusive but in fact intertwined and mutu-
ally dependent.  This leads to an impression that if one is weak in one area, it nec-
essarily affects the whole.  So any notion that a soldier is lacking in spirituality or 
religiosity, the latter term seems to be preferred by the MAAF, can logically be 
perceived by themselves or others as incomplete or something less than fit.  After 
raising concerns regarding an infringement of rights of non-religious soldiers, the 
MAAF claimed that the bureaucracy of the U.S. Army remains at least indifferent 
to the concerns of an infringement of rights related to non-religious servicemem-
bers, if not outright dismissive.  The situation is complicated by claims that spiritu-
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al fitness is particularly helpful in preventing suicide or sustaining soldiers in times 
of stress.  Army Chaplain (Major General) Douglas L. Carver commented: “That’s 
what spiritual practice does, lighten the load…I’m not sure you can find some an-
swers to those things [referring to issues of guilt and forgiveness] outside of a reli-
gious perspective.”4   
The Director of Duke University Center for Spirituality, Theology and 
Health, Dr. Harold G. Koenig, stated that religion is a “powerful coping behavior” 
for individuals undergoing anxiety and stress, as might be experienced in combat.5  
Many studies have been conducted that essentially conclude that religiosity lowers 
destructive behaviors such as alcoholism, drug abuse and suicide and that those en-
gaged in religious practices have lower rates of depression, and the U.S. Military is 
surely operating under a comparable assumption.  The U.S. Army Chaplain Corps’ 
Center for Spiritual Leadership has proposed a study that will allow researchers to 
follow soldiers in the field for up to a year to determine the impacts of the spiritual 
fitness initiative on their well-being and sense of hope (Agency Group 9, 2010). 
The benefits of spiritual fitness may not only assist people in finding mean-
ing in life but also (a) help soldiers cope with multiple deployments, combat stress 
or injury; (b) protect soldiers from experiencing “moral injuries,” which can occur 
from either participating in or witnessing certain acts during war that may conflict 
with deeply held moral beliefs and expectations; and (c) encourage a supportive 
environment and foster unit cohesion, as many spiritual practices promote tolerance 
of other worldviews and diverse populations.6  It seems that the creators of the U.S. 
Military’s Comprehensive Fitness Programs believe that spiritual and religious 
practices are beneficial to soldiers because it makes them more psychologically re-
silient; but claims of this type, of course, whether true or not, are exactly what the 
Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers seem most concerned about be-
cause they perpetuate the notion that religious soldiers are somehow better soldiers. 
                                                
4 Retrieved on February 28, 2013 from 
http://christianfighterpilot.com/2011/01/04/army-spiritual-fitness-can-lighten-load/ 
5 Ibid. 
6 Retrieved on November 12, 2012 from 
http://www.realwarriors.net/active/treatment/spirituality.php  
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Psychological Moral Development 
Antecedents such as religiosity and spirituality, which an individual may 
put into practice prior to the process of disengaging from their own moral self-
sanctions, are not well understood as directly connected with moral disengagement.  
Moral disengagement can be considered “an individual difference in the way that 
people cognitively process decisions and behavior with ethical import that allows 
those inclined to morally disengage to behave unethically without feeling distress” 
(Moore et al., 2011, p. 2).  The term distress, as used in this definition, is a 
psychological term.  The causes of distress related to moral disengagement might 
cause one to think more about the processing of moral self-sanctions prior to moral 
judgment.  This is referring to moral judgment as a neo-Kohlbergian construct 
(Rest, 1999).  Consider moral judgment as following the formation of moral beliefs 
and values, and that the same is implied in the concept of moral disengagement, 
leading to a somewhat relativistic (but more specifically Rawlsian) type of ethic.  
The presence of this relativistic perspective, which may complicate matters slightly 
at the level of the individual moral schema since forms of what is just, for example, 
can be vastly different, seems necessary from a psychological perspective (Mensch, 
2009).  Otherwise, we risk imposing a prescriptive ethic. 
 
Table 2 
Levels of Moral Development (Rest, 1999) 
Level Description 
Preconventional level Punishment and obedience 
 Individualism and rewards (hedonistic) 
Conventional level Approval of group (good boy/girl) 
 Orientation to authority (law and order) 
Postconventional level Social contract orientation 
 Principled conscience 
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Rest's derivation of neo-Kohlbergian moral development, specifically 
focusing on moral judgment, is presented in Table 2.  Moore et al. (2011) use moral 
disengagement as functioning within the realm of cognition but also as something 
more encompassing than simply moral judgment.  The neo-Kohlbergian conception 
of moral judgment should be considered an aspect of the process related to the 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions on the one hand, but one should also 
consider the psychological distress or feelings of guilt or self-condemnation that 
might follow such disengagement, even if at some distant future time when the 
individual may be provided with the opportunity to reflect in such a way as to 
understand the cause of the distress differently. 
Narvaez and Bock (2002) also provide an interesting and appropriate 
reference to understanding moral disengagement in that their concept of the 
personal interest schema, the maintaining norms schema, and the post-conventional 
schema of cognitive moral judgment can assist in a more holistic view of how one 
might retain a certain moral self-sanction.  There seems to be an obvious 
encyclopedic relationship between these schema and moral disengagement in that if 
someone is more self and survival focused, they might be more likely to disengage 
from their own moral self-sanctions.  This seems a pertinent example of the essence 
of Bandura’s (1999) contention regarding the reasons for the disengagement of 
moral self-sanctions.  In other words, it seems plausible that if an individual is 
operating under a survival orientation, they would likely be more apt to disengage 
morally through a mechanism of, shall we say, diffusion or displacement of 
responsibility.  In fact, Kern and Chugh (2009) support such a claim by connecting 
how individuals process and frame information in order to make ethical decisions.  
This notion also seems to be congruent with Bandura’s (1999 & 2002) assumptions 
regarding moral disengagement as being agent-centered, morally relativistic, and 
yet having social implications. 
An understanding of these aspects of moral development in relation to 
moral disengagement may support a better understanding of possible predictors to 
both constructs, but particularly to the construct of moral disengagement since it 
includes relevant personality traits, moral reasoning abilities and orientations, and 
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dispositional moral emotions (Moore et al., 2011).  There is thus a relevance of 
concepts that are likely to affect things such as personality, emotions and moral 
orientation, characteristics that can be associated with the positive psychological 
concepts of hope and flourishing (Harris et al., 1991 & Diener et al., 2010). 
Osran, Smee, Sreenivasan and Weinberger (2010) claim that placing com-
bat experiences within a meaningful context is beneficial for the soldier, in that it 
promotes spiritual and emotional growth.  In other words, proper contextualization 
of stressful combat experiences leads to new existential meaning and purpose.  This 
is consistent with research that suggests moral development education has a posi-
tively mediating relationship with self-efficacy and that increases in perceived self-
efficacy, in this case specifically related to morality and ethics, do have a signifi-
cant impact on cognitive functioning.  The research also includes perceived self-
efficacy as a mediating factor related specifically to depression and PTSD and that 
a propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions, resulting in such things 
as spousal abuse and suicide, may be significantly lessened due to complimentary 
educational endeavors, both psychological and philosophical, and related to moral 
development (Bebeau, Rest, Narvaez, 1999; Ahn & Picard, 2006; Bandura, Capra-
ra, Barbaranelli, Gerbino, and Pastorelli, 2003; Bandura, 2007). 
Forethought, intentionality and self-regulation are key components in Ban-
dura’s (1989, 1996, 2001) agentic perspective of social cognition.  The self-
regulatory aspect seems particularly relevant to the goals and objectives of the U.S. 
Military, and related to spiritual fitness training.  For Bandura (2001), personal 
agency operates within a broad network of sociocultural influences.  He states:  
In these agentic transactions, people are producers as well as products of 
social systems.  Social cognitive theory distinguishes among three modes of 
agency: direct personal agency, proxy agency that relies on others to act on 
one’s behest to secure desired outcomes, and collective agency exercised 
through socially coordinative and interdependent effort. Growing transna-
tional embeddedness and interdependence are placing a premium on collec-
tive efficacy to exercise control over personal destinies (p. 1).  
 
Bandura has proposed a framework that assists in understanding the disen-
gagement of moral self-sanctions (1999).  The disengagement criteria have been 
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utilized to develop an instrument that is intended to measure a respondent’s pro-
pensity for moral disengagement, specifically related to competitive sport, which 
seems in many ways quite similar to the environment of competition found within 
officer training programs in the U.S. Military (Boardley & Kavussanu, 2007).  The 
practice of spiritual fitness is in part aimed at reducing PTSD and self-destructive 
behaviors, and what can also be categorized as self-destructive products of the dis-
engagement of moral self-sanctions, such as suicide and child abuse.  Therefore, 
one might question whether it is beneficial for the U.S. Military to pursue formal 
programs of education in moral development, addressing both the psychological 
constituent (such as is found in the Resterian Four Component Model) and philo-
sophical concepts (such as consequentialism, deontology and virtue theory), as 
complementary and even perhaps preeminent factors in spiritual fitness.  Training 
in moral development has been encouraged as part of larger leader development 
programs in the United States Marine Corps (Murthy, Dingman & Mensch, 2011).  
Although any direct connection regarding a decrease in the propensity for the dis-
engagement of moral self-sanctions of people who have matriculated through such 
programs is still unclear, it seems that the U.S. Military has presumed such an asso-
ciation is likely. 
Spirituality in Society and Positive Psychology 
Mellinger (2011) describes what she considers a general cultural shift from 
the decades of the Jesus Freaks of the 1960s and 1970s, to the moral majority of 
the 1980s and 1990s, to a more contemporary focus back to the power of belief in 
truth.  Additionally, she posits a “depth of belief” that is greater than simply affect 
and that includes the seeking of a virtuous existence, something beyond mere cog-
nition and far beyond the emotive.  She says that people in the United States seem 
to be generally and more openly seeking a genuine relationship with the divine in 
hopes of living a life of virtue and a humble character consistent with conviction 
instead of hypocrisy (personal communication, December 4, 2012, Evangelical 
Theological Seminary).  Woods (2006) similarly describes how in modern culture, 
some see authentic spirituality as a product of the lived life, rather than merely 
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something of an academic endeavor.  Woods offers that many people in today’s 
society seek a connection with God in ways that assist people in forming a coherent 
system of beliefs, the result being something of a more communal relationship with 
the divine. 
The societal context is ordinarily implicated in inferences made in psycho-
social research.  Since the science of psychology tends to follow generally held so-
cietal philosophies, it seems rational that there would emerge a focus on creating a 
psychology that fits with the contemporary religious experience.  Accordingly, 
there has been a noticeable societal shift in the practice of psychology over the past 
30 years.  What was formerly a focus on post-pathological diagnosis and treatment 
has led to a concentration on the development of positive coping skills that contrib-
ute to psychological resilience, or perhaps even resistance, to psychological trauma 
or other psychological distress.  This is an attempt to affect the core beliefs of indi-
viduals, which for many, are inextricably connected to their personal spirituality.  
The term spirituality has emerged, commonly not restricted to a theological con-
text, but instead used to express a more general human perspective, which seems to 
have aligned quite nicely with the emergence of the field of positive psychology in 
the United States (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Pargament & Sweeney, 2011). 
What has become known as the science of positive psychology is somewhat 
controversial and there has yet to emerge what is generally considered a clearly co-
herent and encompassing theory.  Still, the applications and emergent theories in 
positive psychology seem exceedingly culturally relevant.  Moreover, researchers 
in the field of positive psychology have made considerable advances over the past 
decade, especially in descriptive terms.  It is perhaps the prescriptive notions in 
positive psychology, that are treated as something like science that has rid itself of 
the burden of philosophical ethics, that provoke the most ardent adversaries.  In or-
der to fully accept the conditions of the science of positive psychology, challenging 
philosophies including some basic ethical philosophies must be assumed in the pur-
suit of empirical data and analysis.  This is surely a noble pursuit of science, to con-
tinue to consider the moral domain, regardless of the fact that ethical assumptions 
can easily become polemic.  For example, the neo-Kohlbergian view of moral de-
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velopment requires a prescriptive Rawlsian view of social justice and a resulting 
psychological prescription.  So for some, like Christians, the assumed highest mor-
al principle of justice may not be appropriate because these individuals might as-
sume a highest moral principle more akin to benevolence or love (Mensch, 2009). 
It is important to be aware of such philosophical debates in positive psy-
chology, not so one might simply discount the field outright, but instead, under-
stand its merits where warranted and otherwise be normatively skeptical where 
necessary; as when virtue or good character might be assumed by the psychologist.  
Additionally, the merits of addressing more negative aspects of human psychology 
such as suffering, weakness and disorder are surely worth exploring.  Positive psy-
chology has more recently become known as the science of the study of positive 
emotions, positive character traits, and enabling institutions, and more generally as 
the science of  “understanding…what makes life worth living” (Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 13).  This appreciation leads to a more complete appre-
ciation of psychology, the highs and the lows, not simply the lows, the trials and 
the happiness, not simply the suffering and despair.  Perhaps most importantly, pos-
itive psychology may help in understanding one’s strengths in relation to one’s 
weaknesses, whereas psychology has traditionally focused on merely the latter 
(Seligman, Steen, Park & Peterson, 2005). 
The components of positive psychology are best described by the acronym 
PERMA, which stands for positive emotion, engagement, positive relationships, 
meaning, and accomplishment/achievement (Seligman, 2011).  Table 3 provides 
the definitions for each term. 
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Table 3 
PERMA 
Term Definition 
Positive Emotion For us to experience well-being, we 
need positive emotion in our lives. Any 
positive emotion like peace, gratitude, 
satisfaction, pleasure, inspiration, hope, 
curiosity, or love falls into this category 
– and the message is that it's really im-
portant to enjoy yourself in the here and 
now, just as long as the other elements 
of PERMA are in place. 
Engagement When we're truly engaged in a situation, 
task, or project, we experience a state of 
flow, time seems to stop, we lose our 
sense of self, and we concentrate 
intensely on the present. 
Positive Relationships As humans, we are "social beings," and 
good relationships are core to our well-
being. Time and again, we see that peo-
ple who have meaningful, positive rela-
tionships with others are happier than 
those who do not. Relationships really 
do matter! 
Meaning Meaning comes from serving a cause 
bigger than ourselves. Whether this is a 
specific deity or religion, or a cause that 
helps humanity in some way, we all 
need meaning in our lives to have a 
sense of well-being. 
Accomplishments/Achievements Many of us strive to better ourselves in 
some way, whether we're seeking to 
master a skill, achieve a valuable goal, 
or win in some competitive event. As 
such, accomplishment is another im-
portant thing that contributes to our abil-
ity to flourish.  
Note. Definitions retrieved from http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/perma.htm on 
June 20, 2013. 
 
The research related to positive psychotherapy is certainly promising, but it 
is also a bit controversial.  Contributing studies often have issues ranging from low 
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sample sizes to questionable control factors in placebo groups.  In a study pub-
lished in 2006, the authors readily admit issues with a low total sample size that 
included the control group (N=40), so low that some might dismiss any conclusions 
as exploratory or even speculative (Seligman, Rashid & Parks, 2006).  Other re-
search, especially telephone or web-based interventions, is often plagued with is-
sues such as the Hawthorn Effect or longitudinal problems related to the science of 
what constitutes a valid control group.  These are surely complicating concerns that 
should be taken into account as appropriate in drawing conclusions and devising 
psychological interventions that are utilized for servicemembers.  Still, positive 
psychology has many promising applications in the U.S. Military (Duckworth, 
Steen & Seligman, 2005). 
These challenges surely exist but the positive psychology archetype is well 
established and is supported by the theories of many pioneers of more traditional 
psychology such as Rogers (1951), Maslow (1954, 1962), Jahoda (1958), Erickson 
(1963, 1982), Vaillant (1977), Deci and Ryan (1985), and Ryff and Singer (1996).  
Still, such appeals do not really weaken arguments related to the more philosophi-
cal challenges produced by the current understanding of positive psychology, espe-
cially from the field of ethics.  In fact, several of the appealed-to authorities were 
criticized for similar philosophical issues, specifically related to what Maslow 
might consider higher order functioning.  The following quote is telling regarding 
the approach of particular groups and related to both positive psychology and posi-
tive education: 
The schooling of children has, for more than a century, been about accom-
plishment, the boulevard into the world of adult work.  I am all for accom-
plishment, success, literacy, and discipline; but imagine if schools could, 
without compromising either, teach both the skills of well-being and the 
skills of achievement (Seligman, Ernst, Gillham, Reivich & Linkins, 2009, 
pp. 293-294). 
 
This is an appeal to the merits of positive psychology by infusing it into the 
educational process.  The problem of this lack of skills related to well-being is sure-
ly connected to the broader issue of a general shift away from the liberal arts, like 
philosophy and literature, and toward a more vocational education that has come to 
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dominate the American education system.  Seligman et al. (2009) explored this is-
sue of well-being further and defend the need for debate by appealing to the “preva-
lence of depression among young people” and the thinking that “almost everything 
is better now than it was 50 years ago”, with specific examples including better 
homes, clothing, purchasing power and cars (p. 294).  This argument seems more 
philosophical than psychological, and surely controversial.  Yet, since the onus is 
on the science to support through empirical investigation, positive psychologists 
have made respectable attempts to construct valid research over many years to tack-
le what has traditionally been discussed as strictly philosophical issues.  The U.S. 
Military has experienced desperate times over the past decade of prolonged war, 
and many military leaders are willing to implement programs that might facilitate 
the claims of positive psychology.  As with many psychological practices, the re-
wards of success seem to outweigh the risks associated with an incomplete scien-
tific understanding. 
 Operationalizing the concept of happiness has become a focus in positive 
psychology.  Happiness is currently understood by way of three particular aspects.  
The first is hedonic positive emotion that includes such things as love, joy, pleasure 
and contentment.  Maximizing this kind of emotion is a key characteristic to happi-
ness according to positive psychology.  The second aspect of happiness is known as 
the engaged life, of which the concept of flow is a major component (Csikszent-
mihalyi, 1990).  In this case, positive psychology appeals to Aristotle’s notion of 
engaging in one’s talents to the best of one’s ability as a major basis for the realiza-
tion of the good life.   Csikszentmihalyi (1990) describes flow as being “one with 
the music” and the loss of self-consciousness and the feeling of the stoppage of 
time.  In order to complete the positive psychological conception of happiness, the 
concept of the meaningful life is offered as an increase with regard to “connections 
to others” and “causes that transcend the self.”  Here, the concept of the meaningful 
life is of course a philosophical assumption.  These assumptions are important to 
consider when operationalizing happiness as a line of empirical research, and not 
mere “grandmotherly common sense.”  That said, the research does not overly 
seem to appeal to common sense and instead suggests plausible findings such as 
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“optimistic people are much less likely to die of a heart attack than pessimists” 
(Seligman et al., 2009, p. 296).  However, problems may arise if the philosophical 
assumptions related to the empirical study are not universally accepted.  This of 
course cannot be assumed and so discourse regarding variants of such assumptions 
is surely warranted.  Therefore, this particular philosophical issue does seem to be 
dealt with satisfactorily by positive psychologists, which in turn seems to afford 
opponents a superfluous opportunity to disregard empirical research from the field. 
The U.S. Army developed the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program part-
ly in response to evidence related to positive coping skills and psychological resili-
ence.  The CSF model includes the aforementioned personal dimensions of social, 
family, emotional, spiritual and physical.  The U.S. Army seems not to have based 
spiritual fitness in any particular ontological truth, but instead allows leadership to 
encourage the search for truth, self-knowledge, and purpose in life (Sweeney, Han-
nah & Snider, 2007).  The spiritual in this sense is offered as something distinct 
from personal identity.  Still, it does seem to possess a tone of sacred quality.  As 
used in the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness sense, the notion of spirit is “tied inti-
mately to other higher order qualities, including purpose and meaning, enlighten-
ment, authenticity, interconnectedness, and self-actualization” (Pargament & 
Sweeney, 2011, p. 58). 
Philosophical Challenges Related to Positive Psychology 
At a Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and 
Commerce (RSA) event in the United Kingdom, Seligman was asked (Seligman & 
RSA, 2011) if is and ought, from a moral perspective in positive psychology, are in 
alignment with one another?  In other words, what is, ought to be, morally speak-
ing.  His response was essentially that is and ought “are completely orthogonal” 
and he continues to state: 
Aristotle believed that happiness, virtue, truth, and beauty were all the same 
thing.  I think that is completely wrong and that these are different human 
capacities, and that if you take PERMA…the study of well-being is com-
pletely different from the study of ought, the study of morality, which is dif-
ferent from truth, which is different from beauty (Seligman & RSA, 2011, 
23:19-24:36).   
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This response seems somewhat consistent with the study of psychology and 
this may be an attempt to provide an explanation as to why ought in a moral sense 
is less relevant to the individual in a relativistic and pluralistic society.  Neverthe-
less, this question seems to provoke less of an argument about science and more of 
an argument for philosophy; and it is surely important that assumptions be 
acknowledged and defended philosophically before conclusions are drawn from 
empirical data.  It also seems likely that philosophical problems will continue to 
plague the field until they are more fully addressed.  Seligman (2011) also provides 
the example that Osama Bin Laden’s life experience probably rated very highly in 
regards to what we mean by PERMA, but that he was “condemnable” in his actions 
and that PERMA is not relatable to “good and evil” which is of course a descriptive 
argument (Seligman & RSA, 2011, 23:19-24:36).  However, a major problem 
seems to be that PERMA and other aspects of positive psychology are often trans-
lated into and implemented as a prescriptive approach.  It naturally becomes an is-
sue of debate when a moral argument is supported strictly on descriptive terms, as 
this is arguably not possible since implications of morality often become prescrip-
tive when programmatic assumptions are projected on an organization. 
This is perhaps the greatest challenge to positive psychology; coming to 
terms with the philosophy of the psychology and providing a consistent and articu-
late defense.  Of course this is not the strength of many psychologists, and so some 
antagonists will completely discount various aspects of positive psychology, or 
even the entire discipline, due to a myriad of ostensible philosophical issues such as 
non-sequiturs related to diagnosis and treatment and post hoc ergo propter hoc fal-
lacies related to prescriptive moral assumptions.  Such attacks on the philosophical 
grounding of positive psychology seem to lead to a need for a better philosophical 
defense of its assumptions.  Still, there seems to be hesitation in attempting a clear-
ly articulated philosophical defense, which is evident from the positive psycholo-
gists’ inability to clearly disambiguate related terms such as universal morals and 
truth.  This is a problem in the related field of moral development and has been ar-
gued over for several decades with the inevitable result of division.  The division is 
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based on issues related to such things as inference, assumptions and prescriptions in 
the science of psychology that result from differences in philosophy.  The debate 
has been somewhat beneficial for the field of moral development as the disputes 
have encouraged many moral developmental psychologists to refine and better de-
velop their philosophical arguments related to their science.  It is of little consola-
tion if one party in psychology believes it is above the philosophy of science.  Alas, 
there seem to be those in the field of psychology who believe they are immune to 
defending the philosophy of their science when attempting to utilize inference or 
prescriptive analysis, or even admitting that philosophical assumptions exist within 
their own research.  This brand of pseudo-scientific vanity can lead to something 
like pop-psychology, which is exceedingly unfortunate.  There seems to be psycho-
logical empirical evidence that is too often tainted by a refusal to address the phi-
losophy of the science (Mensch, 2009). 
Positive psychologists have also tended to divorce positive psychology from 
the fundamental philosophical assumptions of most humanist psychologists.  Wa-
terman (2013) claims that, “proponents of humanistic and positive psychology start 
with different premises about human nature and the nature of the psychological en-
terprise” (p. 124).  Waterman continues: 
In general, humanistic psychologists are not pleased with the study of hu-
man potentials and well-being with respect to theory, research, or therapy.  
These two perspectives [are] a function of the extensive differences in their 
philosophical grounding…with respect to (a) ontology, including the ways 
in which human nature is conceptualized regarding human potentials and 
well-being; (b) epistemology, specifically, the choice of research strategies 
for the empirical study of these concepts; and (c) practical philosophy, par-
ticularly the goals and strategies adopted when conducting therapy or un-
dertaking counseling sessions (p. 124). 
 
These claims are at least valid in that they identify a divide that currently 
exists in the philosophy of psychology within the humanistic and the positivist tra-
ditions.  However, both traditions have similar goals in that humanistic and positive 
psychology wish to improve and heal the character of people, and both look to do 
this through psychotherapy, education, and advancing a philosophy of psychology 
and research methodologies related to social psychology (Waterman, 2013).  Fur-
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thermore, both traditions claim similar origins in Maslow (1943, 1954) who wrote 
prolifically about positive emotion, even utilizing the term positive psychology in 
his 1954 publication, Positive Psychology in Motivation and Personality.  Never-
theless Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) “criticized humanistic philosophy 
for its association with self-help movements and for encouraging self-centeredness” 
(p. 125).   
The issue of the self reveals a fundamental difference in personal agency 
between these two factions.  On the one hand the humanist psychologists seem to 
place a great deal of emphasis on the individual understanding, reflecting and com-
ing to beliefs and judgments that they would consider their own.  On the other 
hand, positive psychology seems to attempt to view the human condition as more 
feeble and people as needing more guidance in the process of discovery.  It is as if 
the humanistic tradition presumes the agent ought to struggle with personal philo-
sophical issues, whilst the positivist tradition wishes to offer answers to philosophi-
cal matters such as telos and meaning.  The latter allows the applied science to uti-
lize descriptive analytics as a foundation, and then be much more prescriptive in 
application (Waterman, 2013). 
The divide between the philosophies of positive psychology and humanist 
psychology currently means they seem to be somewhat incompatible and surely, as 
MacIntyre (1981) might argue, incommensurable.  Waterman (2013) states: 
I contend that both the desire of positive psychologists to distance them-
selves from work in humanistic psychology and the critiques of positive 
psychology advanced by humanistic psychologists are based on incompati-
ble philosophical perspectives with respect to ontology, epistemology, and 
practical philosophy (p. 126). 
 
Waterman (2013) suggests that the extent of these differences is so vast that 
it is “impossible for proponents of the two disciplines to find much in the way of 
common ground” (p. 126).  This split between positive psychology and humanist 
psychology seems to be what MacIntyre (1981, 1990, 1998) would in fact consider 
a sort of case study for his concept of incommensurability.  Waterman goes on to 
propose a meaningful discourse under a new paradigm, perhaps with a mutual un-
derstanding of the incommensurability.  This surely seems like a worthy endeavor 
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since, as MacIntyre (1981) proposes, are we to choose Nietzsche or Aristotle, and if 
we choose, then how are we to move forward as scientists within a discipline in a 
fruitful manner?  The current answer seems unsatisfactory at best in that if what 
Waterman suggests is true, then positive psychology and humanist psychology 
might very well continue to function as separate disciplines, thus causing confusion 
and perhaps even unscrupulous science to be conducted by those who are not over-
ly familiar with the underlying philosophical differences.  Most troubling for posi-
tive psychology as an emerging discipline is that, as is not uncommon in the history 
of psychology in general, sidestepped philosophical assumptions could lead to re-
search methodologies, analyses, inferences and applications that are abstruse if not 
outright misleading. 
The ontological divide between humanist psychologists and positive psy-
chologists is surely challenging to bridge.  The humanists base their ontology in 
existentialism, consistent with the cause of human agency and so placing great 
power in the hands of the beholder, the self.  Waterman (2013) cites Sartre (1943, 
1956) who states “existence precedes essence” and that humans must define who 
they are by their own consciousness, however limited by biological constraints.  
The humanistic psychologist also appeals to Fromm (1950) who states that “Man is 
the only animal for whom his own existence is a problem which he has to solve and 
from which he cannot escape” (p. 23).  Placing human agency solely on the human 
being leads to a problematic rejection of any absolute moral position and inevitably 
leads to a relativistic moral rationale, something consistent with social constructiv-
ism.  The essence of the humanist contention is that as humans, we should not turn 
to other people or institutions to tell us what we ought to do, only perhaps what we 
could or might do.  In other words, this philosophy supports the notion that our des-
tiny is our own and we create or otherwise assume the standards by which we live.  
Central to humanistic psychology is the concept of human freedom and the auton-
omous agent “with the capacity for making choices with attendant personal respon-
sibility” (Waterman, 2013, p. 127).  This could be a philosophical problem for 
those not convinced that moral relativism should be applied to psychology, espe-
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cially for clinical psychologists who, whether acknowledged or not, implement in-
terventions based on an assumed and prescriptive notion of morality. 
This humanistic argument can be viewed as contrary to positive psycholo-
gy, which by its very presentation assumes that the answers to life’s questions re-
garding happiness and meaning, among other things, are fundamentally the respon-
sibility of science to understand, and are therefore empirically determinable.  In the 
absence of objective science, the positivistic psychologist essentially utilizes prob-
ability theory to determine not only what is, but what ought to be, and then for-
wards a formulation of this ought to the agent as a sort of truth.  In this case, a par-
adox arises since the individual cannot be concurrently treated as an independent 
moral agent whilst prescriptively applying an objective morality to the agent.  In 
the positivist tradition based in probability theory, statistical support is gained by 
meeting pre-determined standards often used in the social sciences such as confi-
dence intervals, which then allow the researcher to argue based on a statistically 
supported reality.  The theoretical psychologist can take an unobservable or latent 
variable construct and create a form of reality often explained through theoretical 
models.  These theoretical models can then be passed on to users of the theory, 
such as clinical psychologists or other counseling practitioners, in the form of 
treatments or interventions.  However, the humanistic psychologist would likely 
object to any form of moral prescription since the personal agent is no longer free 
to determine the moral state for him or herself.  This use of moral probability may 
be unsatisfactory to many, yet it is arguably the best we can do if we are going to 
attempt to address the moral within the psychological.  This seems more like a call 
to respectful philosophical debate in hopes of beneficial rewards similar to what 
MacIntyre (1981) offers, as opposed to the absence of moral discourse that seems 
to be the current norm within psychology in general. 
If the only things the individual can know are things about him or herself 
then only the agent can assume certainty about things such as feelings, thoughts, 
perceptions, emotions, and reasoning.  Of course, these agentive aspects can only 
become known through introspection.  It seems that the humanistic psychologist 
would be contented with this proposition, while the positivistic psychologist might 
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oppose the same.  This is the crux of the ontological divide between these two 
camps in psychological discourse, the age-old rivalry between Cartesianism and 
Behaviorism (O’Donohue & Kichener, 1996).  Of course, as this ontological divide 
turns into the practice of psychology, this mere philosophical problem can emerge 
as a moral problem, especially when considering the issue from a perspective of 
prescriptive psychological intervention.  This problem of intervention seems espe-
cially troubling when attempting to understand the meaning of variables such as 
psychological identity, and the interpretation of what is taking place with respect to 
such variables acting on other variables (Waterman, 2013). 
Another philosophical segregation between humanist psychology and posi-
tive psychology is an epistemological problem.  The epistemological problem is 
conspicuous when considering the phenomenological girding of each psychology.  
The humanist tradition has a greater focus on qualitative research, which is to be 
expected by its ontological philosophy that is more closely associated with personal 
experience.  In other words, it is reasonable that if the individual is the central fig-
ure of study as opposed to a population of individuals, qualitative methodologies 
are perhaps more anticipated, even though lacking in generalizability.  Positive 
psychologists on the other hand appear to focus more on science based in statistics 
and probability theory through the use of quantitative methodologies and specifi-
cally, statistical analysis of large samples.  This may be expected considering the 
philosophical ontology and logical positivism found in this form of psychology.  
This is not to say that each camp, the humanistic and positive psychologists, will 
not advocate for a mixed method approach to research, but the overlapping of anal-
ysis from the two divergent perspectives is somewhat absent in the literature.  The 
epistemic issue is further explained by Waterman (2013): 
This failure to communicate across the divide is exacerbated not only by the 
fact that few researchers are asking both idiographic and nomothetic ques-
tions regarding a given construct but also because the publication practices 
of the majority of psychology journals lead to the acceptance of articles re-
porting mostly or exclusively studies involving either quantitative or quali-
tative methods.  Among researchers, those preferring one methodological 
approach seldom read the published research generated by the other meth-
odology (p. 128). 
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It is not unexpected that researchers have a tendency to lean toward their 
preference of methodologies, but if the problem is as formidable as Waterman pro-
poses, then this epistemological divide may lead to practical applications and inter-
ventions that are not fully informed, or altogether misconstrued.  With this consid-
eration in mind, it may be prudent to consider the practical philosophical aspects of 
this division and the possible implications of bringing theory to practice, especially 
when considering such things as interventions, counseling and therapy.  Under-
standing this division between humanistic and positive psychology is certainly im-
portant in helping to understand arguments regarding the purported constraints and 
limitations ensuing from each philosophy and methodology.  Perhaps improved 
discourse between the two camps might encourage researchers to clarify philosoph-
ical assumptions and the resulting problems of these philosophies, as well as bring 
together varying research methodologies to produce a more coherent theoretical 
framework and a less contentious practical psychology. 
Concerning Moral Disengagement 
Burris, Harmon-Jones, & Tarpley (1997) tested the hypothesis that disso-
nance reduction attenuates dissonance-related negative affect using a “belief dis-
confirmation paradigm” (p. 37).  This hypothesis was developed from Festinger’s 
(1957) cognitive dissonance theory, which is consistent with more current theoreti-
cal constructs that assess behavioral manifestations as representations of beliefs, 
attitudes, intentions and affect.  Assumptions that belief is linked to behavior are 
quite apparent in the field of moral development and moral psychology, from the 
levels of moral development relating to moral action proposed by Kohlberg and 
Candee (1984) to the moral disengagement criteria of Bandura (1999, 2002).  Rest 
(1986) provides a good description of a rational/deliberate model of moral reason-
ing where one moves from awareness of one’s moral schema, or moral sensitivity, 
towards moral situations, to the deliberative judgment of those situations, to inten-
tion, and finally to action.  This is supported by Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) basic 
linear model of planned behavior. 
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Without addressing the full spectrum from philosophical belief to observed 
behavior, there will inevitably be something absent from a model that is thought to 
be comprehensive in scope, such as the U.S. Military’s Comprehensive Fitness 
Programs.  Strong evidence relating cognitive dissonance to a personal morality, 
and the connection of such dissonance to a myriad of possible diagnosable mental 
disorders, many of which include subsequent self-destructive behaviors, should be 
reason for exploration and greater understanding of moral psychology in general 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Beliefs coupled with an intimate under-
standing of one’s values are critical components when considering moral develop-
ment (Mensch, 2009).  Bandura’s (1999) description of the mechanisms leading to 
the selective disengagement of moral self-sanctions requires that, from an agentive 
perspective, the individual be familiar with their own moral schema in order that 
activation or deactivation of moral self-sanctions can occur.  Bandura (2001) de-
scribes three modes of moral agency: 
Social cognitive theory distinguishes among three modes of agency: direct 
personal agency, proxy agency that relies on others to act on one’s behest to 
secure desired outcomes, and collective agency exercised through socially 
coordinative and interdependent effort (p. 1).  
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Figure 3. Bandura’s psychological mechanisms through which moral self-sanctions 
are selectively disengaged from detrimental practices at different points in the exer-
cise of moral agency (Bandura, 1986, 1999, 2002, 2007).7 
 
 Moral agency has “dual aspects manifested in both the power to refrain from 
behaving inhumanly and the proactive power to behave humanely” (Bandura, 2002, 
p. 1).  The concept of self in this case connects personal standards, which are linked 
to self-sanctions and affective self-regulatory mechanisms.  Bandura (2002) claims 
that these mechanisms of moral disengagement are not utilized unless activated by 
the agent.  The psychosocial mechanisms by which self-sanctions are selectively 
deactivated come in various forms. 
 
Moral Disengagement and Self-destructive Behaviors 
There has been a long-standing connection between what has come to be 
known as moral disengagement and traditional cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957).  Burris, Harmon-Jones, and Tarpley (1997) discuss a possible connection, 
which they refer to as the belief disconfirmation paradigm, where actions are com-
pared to current beliefs and those beliefs are either altered or the information is re-
jected or denied.  Furthermore, Mensch and Dingman (2010) argue that a moral 
                                                
7 In the most recent moral disengagement model presented in Bandura 
(2015) he refers to reprehensible conduct as detrimental practices and detrimental 
effects as injurious effects (p. 3). 
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aspect is always present when a relationship is involved, which is important to un-
derstand when considering our application of moral disengagement in the following 
chapters.  It is precisely this sort of psychological dissonance and adaptation of 
cognition that seems to be the essence of what Bandura (1999) is referring to in his 
moral disengagement construct.  In other words, moral cognitive dissonance can be 
thought of as a precursor to the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  Therefore, 
a series of related events takes place where the agent determines if this action is 
consistent with his or her current moral belief system.  If it is not, the moral belief 
system can be altered or avoided by a disengagement of moral self-sanctions that 
then becomes a moral belief disconfirmation.  It is also possible that, after some 
reflection, the agent may eventually come to understand this action as immoral, and 
therefore recognize a previous disengagement from his or her own moral self-
sanctions.  Here the agent, who at some previous time activated psychological 
mechanisms leading to the disengagement of moral self-sanctions, comes to realize 
that he or she was initially self-deceived.  Upon reflection, the previous psycholog-
ical state of affairs can become in essence a falsified belief.  This former moral po-
sition, presently coming into question, can of course lead to cognitive dissonance.  
The agent may struggle as he or she reflects to determine the moral rightness of the 
initial action by way of some new understanding related to disengagement criteria 
that may have been originally utilized to assuage the anguish of the original act. 
Moral disengagement and cognitive dissonance considered from a perspec-
tive of personal agency are plausibly associated with self-destructive behaviors.  
However, individuals do not normally operate in complete autonomy and instead 
operate within society, which should encourage an understanding of moral disen-
gagement as principally agent-centered, but as also representing interaction within 
triadic reciprocal causation.  Bandura (1986) explains triadic reciprocal causation 
as environmental, behavioral and personal factors related to reciprocal determinism 
that occurs in human activity.  This is of course a social cognitivist perspective of 
human activity.  Activation of the mechanisms of moral disengagement allow for 
individuals with similar moral standards to operate differently (Bandura, 1986, 
2002).  Although one might question the veracity of the moral standards held by 
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each agent, the propensity to disengage from one’s own moral self-sanctions seems 
more likely in those who have a less complete understanding and sensitivity to 
moral judgment (Mensch, 2009). 
The sociocognitive model of moral development (Bandura, 1999; Bandura, 
Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996) theorizes that moral behavior can be 
viewed as a criterion of moral standards and moral self-sanctions.  This sociocogni-
tive model is different from the work of Piaget (1932) and Kohlbergian and neo-
Kohlbergian models (Rest & Narvaez, 1999) that emphasize moral reasoning.  The 
Bandurian model includes moral reasoning but focuses on self-regulatory mecha-
nisms (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  Although these two theoretical constructs surely 
overlap regarding certain affective, cognitive and conative aspects, the disengage-
ment of moral self-sanctions through cognitive restructuring is of specific interest 
because of the cognitive restructuring process related to moral disengagement and 
the moral dissonance that can result if the restructuring is incomplete or ineffective.  
This ineffective or incomplete moral restructuring can then lead to self-destructive 
behavioral manifestations that seem to be at the heart of the U.S. Military’s goals 
regarding psychological resilience. 
 
Defining the Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement 
It is important to note that although Bandura (1999, 2002) applies an agen-
tic perspective to the concept of moral disengagement, the mechanisms are activat-
ed in a social context.  Moral self-sanctions are not activated through some kind of 
unadulterated cognition apart from the world and the society in which one abides.  
Instead, the disengagement of moral self-sanctions occurs in a social setting of rec-
iprocity.  Next we shall explore various aspects of moral disengagement as de-
scribed and defined by Bandura. 
The first category of disengagement criteria focuses on the conduct itself.  
This is a cognitive reconstruction of the mind related to a former action that would 
be unpalatable and not congruent with the moral self-sanctions, yet which involves 
adapting a new moral structuring of the mind allowing the conduct to be justified.  
Hence, the first criterion is known as moral justification. 
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Moral justification focuses on the reconstruction of the behavior itself.  This 
allows people to engage in harmful behavior and even atrocities by justifying to 
themselves the superiority of their own morality over another group or individual.  
Holy wars such as the Crusades, the assassinations of presidents and other leaders, 
and military action have all been presented to masses and then internalized as mor-
ally justifiable through the use of mechanisms of moral disengagement that focus 
on the behavior directed against others (Bandura, 2002). 
The use of drones to kill adversaries in countries that are not at war with 
one another, and where the country is considered a sovereign nation by the United 
Nations, is described by some as targeted assassination, which the U.S. Govern-
ment adamantly denies as this action would be counter to the laws of the United 
States.  Still, this type of military action is often viewed as an explicit violation of 
U.S. and international law.  In this case, the behavior of a government, a chain of 
command, and inevitably the pilot flying the drone who pulls the trigger to fire the 
missile, will likely morally account for such action in order to justify past and fu-
ture engagements.  So, moral justification can and often is observed as an argument 
provided by a higher authority, in this case the U.S. Government and U.S. Military 
command, which is then adopted by persons to morally justify their own behavioral 
manifestations.  However, this should not be confused with displacement of re-
sponsibility, which will be diagnosed later.  Bandura (2002) notes that moral justi-
fication can often be observed as the leadership within a society or organization 
attempts to mobilize the masses and convert socialized peoples into dedicated 
fighters or workers, through the use of such justification.  Perhaps this can be seen 
nowhere more strikingly than in the propaganda campaigns of the Nazi regime un-
der the leadership of Joseph Goebbels prior to and during the Second World War.  
By convincing the German masses through massive propaganda campaigns of their 
moral superiority over other races, nations, peoples and even the Church, the Nazis 
were able to turn a once dignified people into a den of ravenous wolves who were 
willing to give their lives for a terribly defective moral argument.  This is moral 
justification at an extreme; however, this form of justification is common in every-
day situations as we maneuver psychologically and physiologically through life. 
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Euphemistic labeling is another mechanism of moral disengagement that is 
affiliated primarily with the conduct itself.  If one considers that language can 
shape patterns of thought and influence conation, it is not difficult to realize how 
words and the structure of sentences can act as a mechanism for the disengagement 
of moral self-sanctions.  Language can be used to sanitize the actions of the indi-
vidual, another person or a group and is often used to make immoral actions seem 
morally better, or perhaps even amoral (Bandura, 2002; Lutz, 1987). 
 The military establishment in general has been known to commonly use 
euphemistic language to what Gambino (1973) refers to as, sanitizing activities.  
For example, one phrase in common usage in the U.S. Military is that a unit intends 
to “seek out, close with, and destroy the enemy.”  This is uncharacteristically direct 
language, specifically the word destroy, yet even here we can understand how the 
term enemy is used to vilify a person and sanction their destruction, and although 
here we focus on the language, we will discuss later the disengagement criteria that 
are also intended to dehumanize the object of the act.  More commonly, words and 
phrases such as eliminating the threat, target of opportunity, surgical strikes, neces-
sary force, collateral damage, and servicing the target are used to sanitize the mo-
rality of the act itself.   
This type of action sanitization is often used by others and even, might we 
confess, ourselves in our daily lives.  Politicians and lawyers, the sophists of our 
day, could perhaps be viewed as masters of language sanitization.  Instead of using 
the term execution, they might instead prefer the term capital punishment.  Of 
course, marketing and advertisement executives are often focused on the utilization 
of language that might encourage euphemistic labeling in their potential buyers.  
Words like organic, fat-free, pre-owned, can be used to detract or distract the con-
sumer from what they are actually eating or buying.  Companies use terms like 
transformation, career opportunities, organizational change, restructuring, lean and 
efficient, to describe layoffs, downsizing or selling off of company assets and staff.  
But it is not simply the use of euphemistic words and phrases that Bandura (2002) 
connects to moral disengagement, but also the intent of the language directed at the 
consideration of an act as less immoral, more moral or altogether amoral.  Euphe-
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mistic labeling is focused on the action.  Religious organizations, pastors and 
preachers often utilize euphemistic labeling and might even attempt to defend such 
use as fostering some greater good.  For example, people who have died are often 
referred to as being “promoted to Heaven.”  Religious groups categorize them-
selves as fundamentalists or conservatives, often appealing to some superior moral 
position.  Of course, most prominent and debatable euphemisms in religious organ-
izations are normally tied to the word truth; with statements like, “Believe me here, 
I know and have seen what it is I thus defend, and it is surely the truth.” 
Clear and concise language is often not used in euphemism.  The passive 
voice is frequently used in euphemistic labeling as Bandura (2002) so aptly de-
scribes: 
…a driver explaining to police how he managed to demolish a telephone 
pole, ‘The telephone pole was approaching.  I was attempting to swerve out 
of its way, when it struck my front end’ (p. 105). 
 
This is perhaps one of the most commonly utilized forms of moral disen-
gagement, used to the extent it almost seems something of a norm in certain voca-
tions such as politics and the legal professions, and it is perhaps interesting to note 
that many politicians are trained as lawyers.  There is an ethical theme here that 
should be explored further, but this issue has been exposed as far back as Socrates, 
who personally disliked sophistry for perhaps the same morally ubiquitous reasons.  
This is not meant to avoid the use of the term lie, since in many instances evading 
forms of dialogue would be perceived as an outright lie.  However, a focus on the 
sender or receiver, and thus the agent of the euphemism, is appropriate.  An agent, 
utilizing this technique, whether sending the euphemism or receiving it, may in turn 
disengage from his or her own moral self-sanctions.  Consider the action that an 
individual has taken or is about to take, or that an individual vicariously learns by 
viewing the action of another, but then proceeds to transmute into euphemism that 
is inevitably owned by the receiving agent.  This agent-centered activity of trans-
mutation is an emphasis of euphemistic labeling. 
The same agent-focused attention is necessary to understand what Bandura 
(2002) means by advantageous comparison, which he describes quite aptly as the 
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“contrast principle” of moral disengagement (p. 105).  Advantageous comparison 
can be understood as the comparison of something quite virtuous, to something ra-
ther corrupt.  The agent creates a cognitive association between something that the 
agent views as morally right, for example an act of selflessness, with something 
morally wrong, the killing of innocent people.  The agent is then able to construct a 
new paradigm regarding what the agent might call martyrdom through the use of 
suicide bombing, and what others might refer to as the destruction of innocent per-
sons or simply murder. 
A comparison of this sort in some way self-exonerates the agent’s action or 
at least makes it less reprehensible and internally pardons the agent from feelings of 
guilt, shame, or other self-condemnation.  Like other aspects of moral disengage-
ment that focus on the conduct, advantageous comparison typically utilizes a utili-
tarian or consequentialist view of morality to justify the conduct itself.  Certain 
forms of virtue ethics and deontology might naturally be at odds with the underly-
ing philosophical argument, but the important aspect here is that agentive cognitive 
restructuring does take place, even for example in the mind of an ardent Kantian, 
who for the moment has fallen away from their own dutiful moral self-sanctions. 
Moral disengagement is not possible if there are no standards to disengage 
from, morally speaking.  So, for example, if someone truly believes that the act of 
abortion is morally acceptable, say before the twelfth week of pregnancy, then there 
can only be moral disengagement following that standard.  Of course this is often 
not the case over an extended period of time when individuals have time to reflect 
upon past actions and may change their moral reasoning on specific issues.  Only 
basic moral principles are standards that seem to have veracity over long periods of 
time (Mensch, 2009).  So, if the abortionist believes that killing a person is wrong, 
then they must justify that the fetus at a certain point is not a person; otherwise they 
jeopardize something like the fidelity of their own principle of respect for persons.  
They may also focus on the consequences of the action, an action of abortion that 
was initially deemed morally justifiable but later deemed as consequential and so 
focus on the ends, where, in this case, the death of a potential person may inevita-
bly generate moral dissonance.  This specific example is contentious but also sup-
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ported by a great deal of research related to decisions of women to abort a fetus and 
follow-on cognitive dissonance (Major et. al., 2008).   
Of course, Aristotle made similar morally justifiable arguments related to 
slaves and other non-persons, which illustrates the complexity of moral standards 
and how an agent’s action can be exceedingly cognitively multifaceted, often em-
ploying many aspects of moral disengagement simultaneously.  An initial agentive 
focus on moral action can undoubtedly turn into unintended moral consequences.  
We shall elaborate on the specific example of abortion further when we consider 
Bandura’s concept of dehumanization as a criterion focused on the victim and uti-
lized in the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  Simply put, Bandura recogniz-
es the fallibility of the agent at the outset, and therefore the choosing of moral prin-
ciples on the one hand, and the action the agent chooses to commit on the other.  
This dualistic perspective seems helpful in a broader understanding of the results of 
moral disengagement related to moral dissonance and self-destructive behaviors. 
Here we have focused on action but have alluded to how closely action can 
be related morally to a consequence of the action.  The use of moral justification to 
cognitively restructure morally reprehensible action is perhaps the most common 
and effective moral disengagement criteria.  Moral justification, euphemistic label-
ing, and palliative comparison are all focused on the conduct itself by construing 
the conduct as alternatively morally acceptable in order to reduce or eliminate self-
censure (Bandura, 2002).  Next we shall focus on the disengagement of moral self-
sanctions related closely to the conduct, but instead focus expressly on the conse-
quences of action. 
Following the action itself, Bandura (1999, 2002) next focuses on the con-
sequences, or effects, of action.  The first criterion we shall define is displacement 
of responsibility.  Bandura describes this aspect of moral disengagement as mini-
mizing or obfuscating the agentive role in the aftermath of action.  If the agent be-
lieves in a legitimate authority and chooses to view their own actions as stemming 
from the authority’s edicts, commands, orders or decrees, then by avoiding respon-
sibility for the actions and the harm that is inflicted because of such action, the 
agent has displaced the responsibility for such action to another person or group.  
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Bandura notes that this specific type of moral disengagement has been used for the 
self-exoneration of gruesome acts of brutality, pointing to the Nazis and the Nu-
remberg trials where many who had been brought to trial claimed that the destruc-
tion of human life that they wrought was morally palatable because they were 
simply following orders.  Many claimed that they had to follow orders because oth-
erwise, they themselves would have been killed.  Therefore, to avoid self-
condemnation, it can be understood that the mechanism of self-exoneration was 
communicated to the court at Nuremberg in what Bandura (1999) refers to as dis-
placement of responsibility. 
However, Bandura (2002) notes that acceptance of moral responsibility is 
very rarely offered outright.  Instead, authorities tend to sanction broader elements 
of action by sanctioning systems or institutions.  This disguises the accountability 
of the consequences of individual actions so that it might not be inferred or as-
sumed by the agent that there is a legitimate authority that is responsible and ac-
cepting of the blame for the destructive behavior.  This is also problematic when 
the same authority is either unable or unwilling to accept the responsibility that the 
moral agent so freely places upon the authority, because the assigned authority is 
fundamentally unable to accept the burden of responsibility from an agentive per-
spective.  In this form of moral disengagement, authority is relegated to a non-
legitimate moral authority. 
Diffusion of responsibility is slightly different than displacement of respon-
sibility, although both mechanisms focus on the detrimental effects of action.  Dif-
fusion of responsibility has what might be considered something of a debilitating 
effect on moral agency in that it allows the agent to consider the role of agent to be 
less absolute.  Bandura (1999, 2002) describes this as something akin to a transfu-
sion of moral agency from the person/agent to the social context.  The social con-
text can be another person but can also be thought of as an institution such as a 
church, government, corporation, club, or any other organization that might hold 
influence over the agent.  This may be viewed as something less than a complete 
moral displacement.  The subdivision of tasks or duties in some grander structure is 
a hallmark of diffusion of responsibility.  This division of labor allows the agent to 
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view the situation in a smaller context where the morality of the situation can be 
more easily distributed to other agents.  Democratic or collective decision making 
may facilitate diffusion of responsibility because the agent can view their own ac-
tion as only one vote in a larger process and therefore see themselves as not fully 
responsible for the decision of the group (Bandura, 2002). 
The final aspect of moral disengagement, which is also focused on the ends, 
but also the conduct, is known as the disregard or distortion of the consequences.  
By minimizing the effects of an agent’s action, one can more readily commit inhu-
manities without regard for self-sanction.  In many cases this disregard can be due 
to a distancing from the consequences.  Bandura (2002) uses the example of the 
famous picture of a young Vietnamese girl crying and running down a street with 
her clothing burned off by napalm as a catalyst to international policy change in the 
United States during the Vietnam War.  This policy change occurred after the peo-
ple of the United States were confronted with the consequences of the situation by 
viewing pictures and television news reports of the bombing campaigns in Vi-
etnam.  The people, confronted in this way, were appalled and then demanded 
changes in bombing policies.  In this case it is interesting to look further at the per-
spective of the people of the United States.  Did they really not know the conse-
quences of massive, relatively inaccurate, bombing from fifty thousand feet, and 
the effect it would have on the population below?  Certainly the people of the Unit-
ed States knew generally what happens when you drop thousands of tons of bombs 
from high altitude over populated areas.  However, many U.S. citizens chose to dis-
regard a certain conceptual consequentialist consideration of this action and were 
stirred from passivity only when they saw disturbing photographs like the one of 
the young naked Vietnamese girl. 
We might also consider that this type of horrific action may be less con-
demnable in a time of opportunity for disregard or distortion of the consequences, 
as in the current era of technologically “smart” weapons.  After all, consider that 
the further we remove the moral agent, in this case the soldier, from the conse-
quences, the easier it might be for that agent to pull the trigger.  A video-game type 
of warfare is currently being conducted via unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and 
Disambiguating Spirituality 72 
 
other smart weapons that distance the moral agent from the effects of action.  Yet, 
many people do not seem to wish to debate what this type of distanced action does 
to the moral agent sitting at the military computer flying the UAV and launching a 
Hellfire missile at selected targets.  It seems somewhat easier for a soldier to disre-
gard the consequences due to the distance in experiencing the aftermath of such 
actions.  This is nothing necessarily new.  The Nazis were forced to confront this 
issue when they created the mobile killing units known as the Einsatzgruppen (spe-
cial duty units).  The Commander of the Nazi (SS) units, Heinrich Himmler, was 
forced to abandon the idea of utilizing such groups for mass killings due to the 
proximity of the soldiers to the to their actions.  This same regime later decided that 
types of gas were a more efficient way of disposing of people both in terms of the 
economic cost to the state and moral cost to the members of the Einsatzgruppen.  In 
this case, the gas provided an opportunity for soldiers to distance themselves from 
the action of killing. 
The disregard or distortion of consequences is often facilitated in organiza-
tions that have a hierarchical chain of command.  An organization functioning un-
der a hierarchical structure has a greater tendency for operant transmission of moral 
responsibility.  This transmission of moral agency allows leaders to transfer, and at 
the same time disregard or distort, the moral consequences of action.  This is not 
limited to the military, although Bandura (1999, 2002) often uses military or com-
bat scenarios to highlight his point.  The disregard or distortion of consequences 
can just as easily occur in corporations across the globe, where orders are passed 
from high levels and where the workers who carry out the orders are far removed 
from the original order but much closer in proximity to the consequences of the ac-
tion.  
The objects of action complete Bandura’s (1999, 2002) model of moral dis-
engagement.  Dehumanization and attribution of blame focus immoral action on 
the victim of the action, where the victim is treated or thought of as something less 
than the moral agent of the action in the case of dehumanization, or otherwise by 
assigning responsibility to the victim undeservedly in the case of attribution of 
blame.  Bandura (1992) points out that to humanize another is to perceive similari-
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ty, which activates empathic reactions and benevolence in general.  Conversely, it 
is easier to act with harshness upon another if we view them as less than human or 
less than the human we propose ourselves to be.  This is apparent in the Nazis’ 
treatment of the Jews prior to and during the Second World War.  Posters of Jews 
being depicted as monsters, with distorted facial features and with images of devil-
ish eyes and pointed ears were common, and intended to portray an entire race as 
evil, and something less than human.  It was a demonization with the purpose of 
dehumanization.  Of course this related to a strategic goal of top Nazi officials, to 
vilify and find scapegoats for the troubled German economy.  But we do not need 
to turn to the Nazis to find daily examples of dehumanization.  Prejudice, bigotry, 
racism, gender inequality, and inequality in general, all allude to the absolution of 
moral self-sanctions regarding acts or thoughts against those who are considered 
somehow not as worthy of respect as others. 
The depriving of human qualities of one individual or group by another al-
lows for deeds that can result in horrific ends.  All too often it seems that the ends 
are not beforehand so obviously horrific, especially to the actors.  In the corporate 
setting, it is assumed that people prefer to hire other people who are much like 
themselves.  People desire to socialize with others who are similar in looks and 
who are likeminded in many respects, and this type of thinking can often lead to 
seeing others as lesser humans.  At least, people with somewhat lesser qualities 
than the person doing the thinking, the moral agent.  This type of dehumanization 
happens so frequently that laws have been established to protect classes of people 
in society who are at risk of being dehumanized by others, and of course we often 
refer to the result as some form of discrimination.  Managers, and in this case the 
moral agent, that have hiring authority might not consider that they are dehumaniz-
ing an employment candidate until some future point when reflective growth might 
occur.  Nevertheless, dehumanization can manifest itself in forms of discrimination 
and if this were not a prolific issue, there would be little will of the people in socie-
ty to create laws to protect certain groups and classes of people.  The United States 
and many other countries have deemed it necessary to take action to protect certain 
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groups from this kind of discrimination, such as with the Veteran’s Employment 
Opportunity Act.8   
The ability to relate to others in anonymous and impersonal ways seems to 
be more and more prevalent due to technological innovations that encourage a sort 
of interpersonal distance.  Bandura (2002) maintains that impersonal social condi-
tions are normally amenable to the process of dehumanization and that atrocities 
can occur because of these conditions.  This surely seems to be the case as society 
in general moves closer to large techno-bureaucracies and impersonal communica-
tion, which tends to create a divide between the moral agent and the principled eth-
ic of respect for persons.  This divide is perhaps often at the heart of dehumaniza-
tion as a moral self-sanctioning process. 
 
Neurologic Disorder or Moral Disengagement 
It is interesting to note that the disengagement of moral self-sanctions, if 
viewed as a sort of cognitive dissonance, might be considered a diagnosable disor-
der, according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
5).  Patterns of self-destructive behavior might very well be diagnosed as some type 
of mental disorder, especially by those who choose to believe that cognition is 
something of a myth (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  For the purpose 
and clarity of this research, and without the intent of inciting too much in regard to 
the mind-body problem, it is assumed that although complicating neurological 
problems may exist and that medications and other factors may be involved, cogni-
tion does exist and that there are things we can understand about the cognitive pro-
cess from belief to action that cannot, at least currently, be understood by neurosci-
ence. 
Whilst we might hold some expectation that neuroscience might teach us 
something about morality and moral judgment, we will focus on conation and the 
agent’s behavioral manifestations and from these agentive aspects attempt to appre-
ciate the underlying cognition.  Actions will therefore not be conveniently reduced 
                                                
8 Additional information retrieved on February 28, 2013 from 
http://www.armycivilianservice.com/JOA/VEOA.pdf 
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to some sort of mental disorder.  Instead, we place the onus of moral responsibility 
upon the individual self.  This is congruent with the meaning of agent-centered mo-
rality as described by the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy.  Here the 
onus of consideration is placed not on the consequences of the act, such as in utili-
tarian ethics, and the view that moral obligation should be given primarily to the 
agent.  While consequentialism should of course be considered in social ethics, this 
study intends to focus on the perception of the agent, and so admittedly operates 
within a relativistic model of the agent-centered moral domain.   
Through the use of Bandura’s (1999, 2002) construct that focuses on the 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions from an agentic perspective, we hope to bet-
ter understand moral dissonance and resulting self-destructive behaviors by under-
standing the predictors of moral disengagement, and perhaps offer a more concise 
understanding of predictors related to specific disengagement criteria.  Holding a 
relativistic position may be disconcerting to the moral absolutist, but here the intent 
is to strive to understand the mind of the individual moral agent whilst risking the 
assumption that the individual is rationally aware of his or her own moral sanc-
tions.  This allows us to assume the agent can effectually encounter both the disen-
gagement of moral self-sanctions and associated cognitive dissonance.   
Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, and Mayer (2011) suggest that moral disen-
gagement is positively correlated with relativism due to the agent-centered nature 
of the cognitive process and that moral disengagement is negatively correlated with 
idealism.  This is surely something worthy of consideration.  Therefore, following 
the analysis of the data produced in this current project, this specific issue will be 
addressed in detail.  Notwithstanding, if the agent is more of an idealist in that they 
believe they understand moral rightness, they will be less inclined to deviate from 
those principled ethical standards.  The point here is that the relativistic nature of 
the agent-centered approach is necessary in order to comprehend the possible pre-
dictors to moral disengagement.  However, Moore et al. allude to an important 
point.  The disengagement of self-sanctions is in essence relativistic due to the in-
dividualistic, or self, focus of this form of assessment, and this holds for even the 
most idealistic of agents who might seem less inclined to navigate the intricacies of 
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any particular moral dilemma by simply appealing to a larger idealistic approach.  
Still, individually held idealism does not imply that the moral dilemma does not 
exist.  This form of ethical idealism simply suggests that the moral dilemma might 
be disengaged from action by way of different moral lenses, dependent upon the 
individual’s moral schema.  Otherwise we must assume that a comprehensive and 
consistent idealism exists in the ethical practice of each moral agent, which is in-
consistent with an agentive moral perspective free from the imposition of prescrip-
tive ethics.  Perhaps this is theoretically possible, although that is debatable because 
the existence of any moral dilemma would be abolished.  This is arguably possible 
for a god, but it is irrational to assume in the study of human beings.   
Since this research is focused on certain predictors related to moral disen-
gagement, including hope for the future, ability to flourish in the present, and spir-
itual/religious beliefs, it is prudent that we focus on these aspects as possible pre-
dictors to the propensity to disengage morally, and not be mired in debate on the 
rightness or wrongness of the individual’s moral schema.  Else, we are doomed to 
be reduced to conjecture over the rightness of the act itself, thereby deviating from 
the emphasis on the moral agent.  This focus on agency does not make the ethical 
judgment irrelevant to this research, but it does attempt to make a clear distinction 
between the moral schema of the agent and the ethics and values of the culture.  
This issue of ethical judgment should certainly be questioned, perhaps in conjunc-
tion with a sort of situational ethics, although there should be caution regarding the 
danger of prescriptively assigning such judgment.  Accordingly, this research 
adopts an initial position in which the individual is a rational agent able to construct 
a moral schema, as well as a position that suggests the agent is capable of disengag-
ing from this personal moral schema, thus avoiding guilt or self-condemnation.  We 
also do not assume that the moral dilemma will never re-present itself to the agent 
in a different manner, with perhaps different unique outcomes, as the agent better 
defines and comes to know his or her own morality. 
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Measuring the Propensity to Morally Disengage 
The propensity to morally disengage has been linked to a broad range of 
unethical behaviors and over the past two decades there has been a growing interest 
in measuring this propensity, which is based on Bandura’s (1986) theoretical con-
struct related to self-regulation, and which has been commonly referred to as an 
agentic perspective.  This agentic perspective has allowed researchers to develop a 
measure of the propensity to disengage from one’s own moral self-sanctions, which 
is associated with a propensity for unethical behavior in general (Moore et al., 
2011). 
Following Bandura’s general conceptualization of moral disengagement as 
associated with various mechanisms that form tendencies and manifest in individu-
als as traits, Moore et al. (2011) explored a systematic propensity to morally disen-
gage by developing and validating a state trait test.  This measure of the propensity 
to disengage from one’s own moral self-sanctions also serves as a predictor of 
one’s propensity to conduct unethical organizational behavior relative to other con-
structs that “share common conceptual space” (p. 1237).  Similarly, our research 
assumes that certain forms of religious participation and spiritual beliefs, the ability 
to psychologically flourish and be positive in the present, and the level of hope that 
one holds for the future, share this “common conceptual space” and therefore serve 
as predictors for moral disengagement and relevant immoral conduct, such as un-
ethical professional behavior and self-destructive behaviors (p. 1237). 
 
Spiritual Fitness as Moral Development 
Osran, Smee, Sreenivasan and Weinberger (2010) connect the spiritual do-
main with the moral domain by elucidating an understanding of moral meaning in 
the context of spirituality that may lead to personal growth.  This seems to be the 
ultimate goal of the notion of spiritual fitness in the U.S. Military and over the past 
decade as the military has attempted to strengthen the spiritual resiliency of its ser-
vicemembers, many of whom have experienced consequences related to protracted 
warfare.  As noted earlier, the U.S. Military has changed what it means by spiritual 
fitness and its relation to religion since legal challenges began in 2009.  The larger 
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ethical aspects of this challenge seem somewhat irrelevant to this research as they 
focus on matters of politics and not matters of science.  Instead of seeking some 
sort of constitutional agreement, this research pursues theoretical conduits that 
might provide new and perhaps important connections between spiritual fitness and 
moral development.  Additionally, since spiritual fitness proposes the importance 
of an ability to cope with and enjoy life, spiritual fitness is also logically correlated 
to a propensity for moral action.  In other words, the individual will care about the 
significance of their actions and choose to pursue actions that are self-sanctioned.  
If this assessment is accurate, then there should be a coherent connection between 
moral disengagement and spiritual fitness.
 
Chapter 4 – Predicting Moral Disengagement 
The empirical portion of our project was conducted with two important 
questions in mind.  First, we wanted to understand if we could predict the 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions by considering psychological constructs 
related to flourishing, religiosity and hope.  We next asked why, assuming support 
for our first question, these relationships might exist and what can be done to assist 
in influencing these psychological factors and lessen a propensity for moral 
disengagement.  As noted earlier, the literature supports several possibilities for 
answering the primary research question, including suggestions that religiosity may 
have a reciprocal relationship with such things as future hope and current 
flourishing.  Furthermore, if Bandura’s cognitive and behavioral ideas are correct, 
we should be able to predict someone’s propensity for the disengagement of moral 
self-sanctions by way of an understanding of other cognitive constructs.  The 
literature also supports the notion that there should be some significant correlation 
between one’s current positive mental state described as flourishing, and one’s 
hope about the future. 
Finally, and as examined in earlier chapters, the United States Military is 
operating under an assumption that one’s spiritual state, which includes both a 
humanistic spiritual aspect and religiosity, has an effect on the well-being of 
military members and their families.  In an attempt to narrow this definition to 
something more operationalizable, the objective components of what is most likely 
intended by spirituality are considered throughout the remaining chapters, 
including participative religious activities.  The intent here is that if we narrow the 
broader definition now used to encompass the meaning of spirituality by initially 
focusing on behavioral activities, perhaps we can continue to improve this theory in 
the future with supportable evidence.  Therefore, we utilize an objective measure of 
what is meant by spirituality by including objective religious activities, both 
organized and non-organized activities, as well as views regarding spiritual beliefs. 
The research hypotheses are logically presented in the order that they were 
developed.  They were designed to assist in better understanding certain aspects of 
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religion and spirituality, as well as the psychological notions of hope and 
flourishing, and whether these are important to consider in regards to one’s 
propensity to disengage from one’s own moral self-sanctions.  Furthermore, these 
hypotheses allow us to appreciate certain elements of human functioning supported 
by the literature that will help us better understand a propensity for moral 
disengagement.   
Our second research question stirs us to pursue a philosophical inquiry into 
the meaning of certain language and also intends to help us better understand the 
theoretical implications related to inconsistencies in meaning.  In an attempt to 
provide pragmatic and actionable solutions, this question is explored with the 
prospect of offering new insight into particular challenges that may result from the 
implementation of programmatic religiosity or spirituality within intentionally 
pluralistic societies such as those in the United States Military. 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
 Understanding that the disengagement of moral self-sanctions can lead to 
self-destructive behaviors, and that the practice of religion is important for many 
who utilize such core beliefs as the foundation of their moral beliefs, and the as-
pects of psychological resilience within the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness pro-
gram (specifically the concepts of hope for the future and ability to flourish in the 
present), we can thus theoretically connect the aspects of belief to action.  
If we can better understand predictors that affect an increase in the propen-
sity to morally disengage from one’s own self-sanctions, while understanding that a 
propensity for moral disengagement can lead to self-destructive behaviors which 
are a fundamental focus of resiliency in the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Pro-
gram, then it seems that the U.S. Military would naturally consider such evidence 
as valuable to their mission of making servicemembers more psychologically resil-
ient.  At the conclusion of chapter 2 we asked the following question; can we pre-
dict the disengagement of moral self-sanctions by understanding one’s perceived 
outlook for the future, known as hope, one’s current perceptions about the present, 
known as flourishing, and one’s perceived or demonstrated religious beliefs, and if 
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so, how does this inform programmatic interventions aimed at sustained behavioral 
change in general, and specifically the U.S. Military’s Comprehensive Soldier Fit-
ness Program and its derivatives?  The first two predictors encompass important 
aspects of psychological resiliency currently utilized in Comprehensive Soldier Fit-
ness whilst the other aspects related to religion might be considered evidence of 
spiritual belief through self-perception and the practice of religion.  We are now 
able to restate the research question more precisely. 
Restated RQ1:  Can the psychological constructs of flourishing, hope and 
religion assist in understanding a propensity for individuals to disengage from their 
own moral self-sanctions, leading to possible self-destructive behaviors? 
The first hypothesis was designed to test the more behavioral aspects of 
flourishing (F), organizational religious activities (ORA) and non-organizational 
religious activities (NORA) and the more cognitive aspects of psychological hope 
(H) and intrinsic religiosity (IR) proposed in the model. 
H1: The constructs of Flourishing (F), Hope (H), and Religion 
(ORA+NORA+IR) significantly predict one’s propensity for Moral 
Disengagement (MD).  
Ŷ[MD1]=b0+b1H+b2F+b3R 
As a derivative of the first hypothesis, the second focuses more on the 
cognitive aspects of hope (H) and intrinsic religiosity (IR) proposed in our model.  
These two cognitive components seem to be more theoretically aligned with the 
propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  Thus, there is stronger 
theoretical support for the second hypothesis. 
H2: The constructs of Hope (H) and Intrinsic Religiosity (IR) 
significantly predict the propensity for Moral Disengagement (MD).  
Ŷ[MD2]=b0+b1H+b2IR 
Finally, if a connection between religion and moral disengagement can be 
empirically established by testing H1 and H2, it is important to consider the 
following pragmatic question related to challenges faced by this particular 
population of military servicemembers: 
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RQ2:  What can be done to facilitate the free and ethical practice of 
religion and spirituality, as part of the larger understanding of 
soldier fitness, in the pluralistic culture of the United States 
Military? 
Methodology and Measures  
A quantitative non-experimental approach was utilized to understand the 
first research question and the hypotheses. The methodology used to assist in 
understanding H1 and H2 centered on an empirical investigation.  An instrument 
was constructed from groups of items utilized in previously validated instruments.  
The sub-instruments remained intact within the larger measure and the sequencing 
of control variables and sub-instruments was screened for response bias.   The 
items from each predicate construct were presented intact and in the order used in 
previous research studies so as not to jeopardize the integrity of the amalgamated 
instrument.  The overall sequence of items presented to respondents was examined 
to minimize order bias. 
A narrative inquiry and philosophical exploration is offered in later chapters 
in an attempt to better understand the nature of issues brought to light from the 
empirical exploration that follows.  
 
Empirical Exploration of the Data 
The empirical portion of this study of U.S. Military Combat Veterans 
centers on the data collected by utilizing the crafted instrument, which shall be 
referred to as the Flourishing, Future Hope, Religion and Moral Disengagement 
Scale (FHRMD).  The scale was designed by utilizing the instruments created by 
Moore, Detert, Trvino, Baker and Mayer (2011) known as the Propensity to 
Morally Disengage Scale [α = .70 - .90], the Adult Hope Scale [α = .72 - .88], 
developed by Snyder, Harris, Anderson, Holleran, Irving, Sigmon (1991), the 
Flourishing Scale [α = .72 - .88], which measures additional aspects related to 
positive psychology (Diener & Diener, 2009), and the Duke University Religion 
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Index [α = .78 - .91] will measure aspects of organized, non-organized and intrinsic 
religiosity (Koenig & Büssing, 2010). 
These four instruments were provided to each respondent utilizing an online 
survey tool and along with demographic questions that would allow for robust 
respondent analysis regarding the relationship between each construct and a 
combination of the constructs with specific controls for extraneous variables.1  
These constructs were then analyzed to investigate RQ1 generally, and to test H1 
and H2 specifically.  The study was focused on investigating whether participation 
in religious activities, coupled with aspects of psychological flourishing and hope, 
has a significant impact on the predictability of the propensity for moral 
disengagement. 
Moore et al. (2011) suggest that a variety of undesirable behaviors are 
interconnected to someone’s propensity to disengage from their own moral self-
sanctions and that this relationship may be viewed as correlative and reciprocal in 
nature.  In order to better understand the relationship between self-destructive 
behaviors, this research aims to better understand certain characteristics that may 
increase or decrease one’s propensity to morally disengage from self-sanctions.  
The aspects of one’s hope for the future (Snyder et al., 1991), one’s ability to 
flourish with positive feelings and a general sense of well-being (Diener et al., 
2010), and one’s propensity to engage in religious activity (Koenig & Büssing, 
2010), all have a demonstrated tertiary connectivity to personal health and well-
being, both physiological and psychological.  These aspects of human functioning 
have been suspected of affecting moral disengagement in general (Bandura 1996, 
1999, 2002).  This research explores this notion to investigate if the propensity to 
disengage from one’s own moral self-sanctions is predictable by understanding the 
specified aforementioned aspects of human functioning and cognition.  Research 
suggests that it is important to explore and better understand the cognitive 
processes that lead to unethical behavior (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Tenbrunsel 
& Smith-Crow, 2008).  This literature, considered in the context of moral 
                                                
1 See Appendix A and C. 
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disengagement, suggests that the propensity to disengage from one’s own moral 
self-sanctions can be predicted by an understanding of such things as hope and 
spirituality. 
This research used a purposeful sample of combat veterans (N>50) in order 
to conduct a preliminary exploration of the aforementioned hypotheses.  The 
respondents in this study were veterans of the U.S. Military’s conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (2001-present). 
Data collection. Data were collected using the LimeSurvey tool provided by 
the University of Exeter.  The survey was constructed using several sub-surveys 
identified as providing meaningful measurable independent variable data, those 
being the Hope Scale, Flourishing Scale, and the Duke University Religion Index.   
Dependent variable data were collected within the overall survey by including all 
items from the Propensity to Morally Disengage Scale.  Several control questions 
were added to complete the survey and the final survey was provided to several 
researchers at the University of Exeter and Penn State University for pilot testing.  
Accordingly, adjustments were made before the final survey was released.  Survey 
instruments were distributed electronically through the link provided by 
LimeSurvey to specific U.S. Military units and servicemembers based on 
knowledge of their recent combat experience.  The majority of the sample had 
returned from combat within 6 months of taking the survey. 
A total of (N=62) surveys were initially collected.  Surveys that were found 
to be incomplete were removed from the final data set prior to analysis with a 
resulting total of (N=50).  The raw data were transcribed to SPSS and each 
respondent questionnaire was scrutinized for anomalies in the data.  Descriptive 
statistics were analyzed prior to performing inferential multivariate analysis using 
SPSS. 
Respondents were notified that they were free to omit any response or stop 
the survey at any point during the test, which is one likely reason for the relatively 
large number of incomplete surveys.  Each respondent received a notification upon 
completion of the survey with information provided should they have any follow-
up questions for the research team.  No follow-up questions were received.   
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Sampling strategy. In order to add controls to the non-experimental design, 
the decision was made to risk creating potential external validity issues by pursuing 
more stable overall internal validity.  To accomplish a high level of confidence in 
the analysis, a purposeful sample was utilized, which consisted almost exclusively 
of the commando type of combat veterans, who had very recently returned from 
Afghanistan or Iraq, most within 6 months of responding to the survey.  The intent 
of the sampling strategy was to focus on commando-type personnel in order that a 
generalization may be inferred to the larger U.S. Military commando population.  
This population would include units that tend to rotate officers and non-
commissioned officers frequently, such as the 10th Mountain Division, the 101st 
Airborne Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 75th Ranger Regiment.  
These units represent the bulk of the U.S. Army’s 18th Airborne Corps.  
Statistical and quantitative analysis. Quantitative data were analyzed using 
SPSS version 17.0 and translated into appropriate tables.  The original data will be 
maintained in an original version for a minimum of 3 years.  Certain variables such 
as hope (H), intrinsic religiosity (IR) and flourishing were analyzed for multicollin-
earity, which was not discovered.  Regression analysis was conducted as described 
in the hypotheses.  After initial analysis, attention was focused on the predictor var-
iables of hope (H) and intrinsic religiosity (IR), which were both found to signifi-
cantly predict a propensity for moral disengagement (MD).  Variables to measure 
flourishing (F) such as relationships, self-esteem, purpose and optimism were not 
found to be statistically significant.  Organizational religious activity (ORA), such 
as attending church services, and non-organizational religious activity (NORA), 
such as prayer or meditation, were also not statistically significant in predicting a 
propensity for moral disengagement (MD). 
 
Narrative Research Leading to Philosophical Investigation 
The phenomena under consideration are complex and closely related to 
theory in moral psychology and ethics.  Therefore, it was deemed profitable to 
conduct additional inquiry based on relevant literature in order that a more 
complete perspective and understanding of the data might be obtained.  In later 
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chapters, an application of philosophical methods will allow the exploration of 
ethical-related problems and possible solutions beyond the descriptive. 
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Presentation of Empirical Data Results 
This section presents quantitative analysis of each hypothesis respectively.  
However, it is important to note that The Duke University Religion Index (DU-
REL) identifies three aspects of religion for measure.  The first religious subscale is 
referred to as organizational religious activity (ORA) and measures the frequency 
of attendance at religious services.  The second religious subscale non-
organizational religious activity (NORA) measures the frequency of private reli-
gious activities.  Both of these aspects were not found to be statistically significant 
when attempting to predict moral disengagement.  The third religious subscale was 
found to be significant in predicting moral disengagement and is described by 
Koenig and Büssing (2010) as a measure of intrinsic religiosity (IR) or subjective 
religiosity.  Koenig and Büssing (2010) warn against combining these three 
measures in multivariate analysis due to problems with multicollinearity.  There-
fore, each of the subscales was analyzed separately and only intrinsic religiosity 
was found to provide significant results.  Intrinsic religiosity assesses the degree of 
personal religious commitment or motivation and the “pursuit of religion as an end 
in itself”, which are viewed as primary considerations in answering important life 
questions and as preeminent to other needs.  An individual with high IR attempts to 
bring harmony between religious beliefs and actions more than someone with low 
IR (Koenig & Büssing, 2010, p. 80). 
Additionally, controls for servicemembers’ military rank, PTSD, and num-
ber of multiple deployments were found to be statistically insignificant.  These spe-
cific controls were selected due to the possibility of high correlation with other var-
iables, and although this was found not to be the case, it seems prudent to continue 
to consider these particular controls in related future research. 
 
Statistical Tests of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses testing is presented below.  In order to answer H1 and H2, pre-
dictor and criterion variables were analyzed using bivariate and multivariate regres-
sion analysis in SPSS.  Basic regression is utilized for each hypothesis in order to 
minimize the possibility of oversimplification and model bias.  Although some of 
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the analysis may seem redundant, it is important to consider each of the hypotheses 
as presented in order to more fully understand the results. 
 
H1: The constructs of Hope (H), Flourishing (F) and Religiosity (R) 
significantly predict a propensity for Moral Disengagement (MD).  
Ŷ[MD1]=b0+b1H+b2F+b3R 
 
Predicting Moral Disengagement 89 
 
Based on H1, a multiple linear regression was calculated to predict a pro-
pensity for moral disengagement based on levels of hope, flourishing and religion.  
Religion was analyzed as three independent variables.  Preliminary analyses were 
performed to ensure against violations of assumptions of normality, linearity and 
multicollinearity.  A significant regression equation was found (F (5, 44) = 3.24, p 
= .014), with an R2 of .27 and adjusted R2 of .19.  Although we cannot reject H1, 
the independent variables of flourishing (F), organizational religious activity 
(ORA), and non-organizational religious activity (NORA) were not significant. 
 
Table 4 
Regression Analysis for Effects of Hope (H), Flourishing (F) and Religion (ORA, 
NORA, IR) on Moral Disengagement (MD), (N = 50) 
Variable B SE B ß 
Hope -1.02 .401 -.341* 
Flourishing -.214 2.704 .084 
Organizational Religious Activities .990 .366 .716 
Non-Organizational Religious Activities .943 2.148 .085 
Intrinsic Religiosity -2.128 1.016 -.459* 
Note. R2 = .261 (p < .05).  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Table 4 illustrates the results for H1, which indicates that hope (H) and in-
trinsic religiosity (IR) are significant (p < .05) predictors of the propensity for moral 
disengagement (MD). 
H2: The constructs of Hope (H) and Intrinsic Religiosity (IR) 
significantly predict a propensity for Moral Disengagement (MD).  
Ŷ[MD3]=b0+b1H+b2IR 
 
Based on H2, A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict 
participants’ propensity for moral disengagement based on their levels of hope, and 
intrinsic religiosity.  Preliminary analyses were performed to ensure against 
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violations of assumptions of normality, linearity and multicollinearity.  A 
significant regression equation was found (F (2, 47) = 8.23, p = .001), with an R2 of 
.26 and adjusted R2 of .23. 
 
Table 5 
Regression Analysis for Effects of Hope (H) and Intrinsic Religiosity (IR) on Moral 
Disengagement (MD), (N = 50) 
Variable B SE B ß 
Hope -1.025 .376 -.344** 
Intrinsic Religiosity -1.626 .584 -.350** 
Note. R2 = .259 (p < .05).  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Table 5 illustrates the results for H2, which indicate that hope (H) and 
intrinsic religiosity (IR) are significant (p < .05) predictors of the propensity for 
moral disengagement (MD).  The independent variables H and IR account for 
approximately 23% of the variation in the dependent variable MD.  We thus fail to 
reject H2 due to the significance of each independent variable and the R2 indicating 
that H and IR can in fact predict significant and substantial variation in MD.  
Specifically, the results indicate that H and IR are negatively related to MD, so we 
can suggest that greater hope (H) and intrinsic religiosity (IR) lead to a lower 
propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  These results support the 
basic model developed in conjunction with the research question presented in 
Figure 2.  This is a revision of Figure 1 that reflects a more accurate and 
empirically supported representation of an understanding regarding the basic 
research question and is presented in Figure 5. 
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Figure 4. Revised model of hope, intrinsic religiosity, moral disengagement 
and self-destructive behavior. 
Summary of Statistical Analysis 
An analysis of the data from this study reveals that the concept of flourish-
ing based on theories of psychological well-being is not significant in predicting a 
propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  The Flourishing Scale 
focuses six items on social relationships, one item on purpose and meaning, and 
one item on engagement and interest in activities.  The concept of flourishing in 
this study is operationalized by a respondent’s self-perceived success in areas such 
as relationships, self-esteem, purpose, and optimism although the social relation-
ship aspect is emphasized (Diener et al., 2010). 
The particular operationalization of flourishing in this study may be of fur-
ther interest to researchers.  Although flourishing was not supported as a statistical-
ly significant construct in this study, a more intense examination regarding the pur-
pose aspect of flourishing may be warranted, as the more general construct that in-
cludes social capital and humanistic psychological components may convolute a 
possible relationship.  The flourishing construct in this study only utilizes one item 
out of eight that explores a more intrinsic aspect of well-being; this being the item 
related to assessing a perception of present purpose.  It is therefore possible that the 
focus on present purpose in these respondents might overshadow a more general 
lifelong form of purpose and might help begin to explain why the concept of hope 
was significant whilst the concept of flourishing was not.  Of course, this is infer-
ring a great deal from the data and is speculative.  Therefore, more research should 
be conducted to parse out issues related to hope, purpose and a propensity for moral 
disengagement.  It is important to understand the possibility of psychological flour-
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ishing as being vital to well-being.  Regardless, due to the results of this empirical 
study, a central focus on the aspects of hope and intrinsic religiosity is considered 
most prudent for the purposes of this project, and since psychological flourishing as 
measured herein did not demonstrate significant results (p > .05) in predicting the 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions, it is better to focus on those aspects of the 
human condition that are presently supported. 
Hope (M = 68.6, SD = 6.752) and intrinsic religiosity (M = 9.04, SD = 
4.342) were found to be statistically significant (p < .01) and were able to account 
for approximately 23% of the variation in (MD) someone’s propensity to disengage 
from their own moral self-sanctions (M = 52.84, SD = 20.145).  While it is arguable 
that the total predictive power of the model is relatively low, one must consider the 
relative complexity of the moral disengagement (MD) construct.  Additionally, we 
should consider that the relatively low sample size (N = 50) might very well impact 
the R2 result and that an increase in sample size could significantly impact the 
model’s predictive power.  This is the reason for an emphasis on continuing re-
search.  The discovery that moral disengagement can be predicted with such high 
confidence, whilst accounting for a quarter of the variation in such a complex cog-
nitive model, is surely noteworthy and warrants a more thorough investigation.   
 For these reasons, we shall presently explore hope as related to moral dis-
engagement, followed by an examination of intrinsic religiosity as related to moral 
disengagement.  The following chapters are an attempt at a better appreciation of 
the promising significance of these relationships. 
Limitations to Design 
The survey instrument utilized in this research includes some demographic 
questions that have not been independently verified, although many of the 
demographic questions are commonly utilized as control questions in similar 
survey instruments.  Additionally, while it may be prudent to include certain 
demographic items as predictor variables, any such use should be considered 
exploratory until they can be independently verified.  Furthermore any statistical 
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interpretation and inference, although supported by a review of the literature, are 
intended simply to encourage further research.  
The generalizability of any exploratory study should be taken into 
consideration and although an argument could be made that results of this current 
project might be generalizable to similar combat veterans from other wars, different 
demographics, or other countries, this ought not to be assumed.  Until more 
research is conducted utilizing the survey instrument constructed in this research 
study, the generalizability to larger or otherwise dissimilar populations should be 
advanced with scrutiny. 
Finally, the nature of the non-experimental methodology allows for 
interesting exploration in regards to moral issues.  However, moral assumptions 
and philosophical ethical investigation may not be independently verifiable, and 
surely not empirically.  Therefore, examination in later chapters will be conducted 
as cognizant of this challenge and attempt to investigate several incommensurable 
philosophical perspectives.  The particularly multifaceted nature of the 
philosophical investigation in later chapters may be more difficult to empirically 
support, but may also be most useful to those who may utilize this research in a 
pragmatic manner.  Consequently, the chief purpose of this research should be 
considered exploratory with the objective of encouraging continued empirical and 
philosophical investigation.  It is hoped that the further exploration of this and new 
data, as well as additional philosophical inquiry related to such data, will be 
conducted in the future with fewer limitations and constraints. 
Transitioning to a Better Understanding of the Relationship between Hope, 
Intrinsic Religiosity and Moral Disengagement 
Thus far, we have empirically determined that hope and intrinsic religiosity 
are exceedingly important if we are to develop a complete understanding of the 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  However, these operationalizable 
definitions of hope and intrinsic religiosity are limiting.  In our empirical study we 
incorporate well-known, valid and reliable psychometric instruments in order that 
we might have a more empirically supportable initial understanding of hope and 
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religiosity.  We have directly incorporated Snyder’s (2002) survey instrument to 
help us understand hope in a more generalizable manner.  This sort of hope is 
arguably limited, but we will address these theoretical limitations by exploring 
varying philosophical assumptions of identifiably different groups within the U.S. 
Military Community.  Yet, we recognize the limitations of this form of inquiry due 
to the generally positivistic tradition of psychology and that Snyder’s investigation 
of hope is limited by this tradition.  However, Snyder’s conception of hope is the 
most developed and respected within the positivist psychological tradition and his 
theory allow us to explore hope in relation to moral disengagement in a unique and 
substantive way.   
In the same manner, we chose to utilize the Duke University Religiosity 
Index via research presented by Koenig and Büssing (2010) to sort out three 
aspects of religiosity that have been identified by commanders and chaplains as 
evident in the U.S. Military context, and are venerated to varying degrees as helpful 
to psychological well-being, including a more public form of religiosity, such as 
church-going, a more private form of religiosity such as private prayer, and finally 
an aspect of religiosity focused on one’s belief in the power of the divine.   
In order to fully appreciate the implications of these relationships, we must 
explore a more comprehensive examination of hope and intrinsic religiosity, 
beyond what is currently implicit in positive psychology.  If we can better 
understand these relationships, we not only expand theoretical suppositions, we 
assist in praxis related to the lessening of moral disengagement and its more 
pragmatic association with important organizational contexts such as the 
development of professional ethics.  Of course, we make a special effort to speak to 
the military environment.  Military chaplains, commanders and leaders in general 
will profit from this form of philosophical inquiry.  We therefore go to great 
lengths to assist in bringing theory to practice by explicating the nuances of varying 
conceptions of hope and intrinsic religiosity in the following chapters. 
Furthermore, we attempt to employ pragmatism to some extent in order that 
we might provide perspective and draw conclusions from our research that should 
be immediately helpful to the U.S. Military, and perhaps other organizations with 
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similar conditions and difficulties related to moral disengagement and self-
destructive behaviors, such as civilian police forces or private military 
organizations.  We have supported a connection between the disengagement of 
moral self-sanctions and self-destructive behaviors.  Furthermore, we have 
empirically supported the connection between hope and intrinsic religiosity, which 
we will now investigate from the various philosophical perspectives identified as 
pertinent to the U.S. Military Establishment. 
 
 
Chapter 5 – Hope and Moral Disengagement 
In the story of The Great Knock by C.S. Lewis, Lewis meets his new teach-
er, Kirk, whom he refers to as The Great Knock.  On a spring day at Bookham, as 
they walk to their destination, Lewis attempts to make conversation. saying that he 
is surprised at the ‘scenery’ of Surrey; that it is “much ‘wilder’ than I had ex-
pected.”  The Knock immediately replies: “Stop!...what do you mean by ‘wildness’ 
and what grounds had you for not expecting it?”  Finally, after what turns into quite 
a teaching moment, the story continues with the Knock saying, “Do you see, 
then…that your remark was meaningless?” 
Having analyzed my terms, Kirk was proceeding to deal with my proposi-
tion as a whole.  On what had I based (but pronounced it baized) my expec-
tations about the Flora and Geology of Surrey?  Was it maps, or photo-
graphs, or books?  I could produce none.  It had, heaven help me, never oc-
curred to me that what I called my thoughts needed to be “based” on any-
thing.  Kirk once more drew a conclusion without the slightest sign of emo-
tion, but equally without the slightest concession to what I thought good 
manners: “Do you now see, then, that you had no right to have any opinion 
whatever on the subject” (Lewis, 1998, p. 75). 
 
In this chapter, we take this lesson about understanding the foundations and 
implications of our assumptions from the The Great Knock and apply it in an at-
tempt to avoid straightforward assumptions regarding what is meant by certain ter-
minology.  We do not assume two individuals hold the same meaning either be-
tween themselves or that we have otherwise operationalized to this point in our 
study.  Our intention is to allow for a more flexible account of the meaning of criti-
cal terms in our study, notably hope and moral disengagement, and of the relation-
ship(s) between these terms in the worldview(s) of respondents.  This said, it re-
mains necessary to disambiguate what is meant by hope in our study, in order to 
discuss its relationship with moral disengagement.  Broadly speaking, we move 
from a relatively unsophisticated, everyday understanding of hope to more complex 
variants, first considering the etymology of the word hope and then purposely dif-
ferentiating it from terms that are often utilized to define it which, although perhaps 
closely associated, are not synonymous.  We include an explanation of the differ-
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ence between hope, optimism and self-efficacy related to Snyder (2002) and 
Snyder, Irving & Anderson (1991) which will allow us to confront the major pur-
pose of this chapter, namely to demonstrate that Snyder’s (2002) conception of 
hope is incomplete in that it treats religious thoughts as merely emotion, thereby 
failing to take into account the consequences of Bandura’s (1986, 1999) notion of 
moral disengagement and how this affects his more inclusive conception of hope.  
Bandura’s treatment enables a sort of authentic hope to be distinguished from a sort 
of morally disengaged false hope. 
We defend several crucial claims in this chapter.  First, we aim to extend 
Snyder’s (2002) more empirically oriented hope construct to incorporate aspects of 
religious belief and moral processes as interconnected rational functions.  Also, we 
contend that the selective activation of psychological mechanisms of moral disen-
gagement affects various aspects of hope, making hope something other than an 
agentively virtuous hope.  Specifically, the claim is that hope can be affected by the 
cognitive restructuring of moral sanctions caused by things such as moral justifica-
tion, euphemistic labeling, and advantageous comparison; or, if the outcome affects 
another agent, dehumanization and attribution of blame.  Moral disengagement 
may also directly influence the agency of hope by reducing the moral fidelity of 
that agency by way of diffusion or displacement of responsibility.  Agents may ac-
tivate psychosocial maneuvers that allow for the disengagement of self-sanctions 
leading to the creation and utilization of pathways of hope that are inconsistent with 
the agent’s moral schema (Bandura, 1999, 2015; Snyder, 2002). 
We also assert that emotions related to hope can have the effect of both 
strengthening or weakening self-regulatory mechanisms related to moral agency 
and assist or detract from the agent’s ability to hope in accord with their own moral 
standards.  Affect, or the experience of emotion, is something distinguishable from 
but also essentially connected to moral cognition and moral conation, and the asso-
ciation is complicated by the reciprocal relations between the aspects of moral cog-
nition, moral conation and emotion.  Affective influencers bear upon the agent’s 
ability to proactively refrain from hope that is contrary to their own moral self-
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sanctions and can also proactively encourage hope that is consistent with the 
agent’s moral schema (Bandura, 1996; Snyder 2002). 
Snyder, Irving, & Anderson’s (1991) definition of hope found in Snyder 
(2002) states: “Hope is a positive motivational state that is based on an interactively 
derived sense of successful, (a) agency (goal directed energy), and (b) pathways 
(planning to meet goals)”; however, it does not account for the prospect of hope 
that is tainted by the disengagement of moral self-sanctions (p. 250).  Notice the 
focus of hope on positive motivation related to specific goals.  Motivation can in-
clude moral disengagement and still be perceived, at least as a psychological state, 
as positive.  Hope is also different from optimism in that hope, as understood by 
Snyder, Irving & Anderson (1991) referred to specific goals whereas optimism 
normally refers to something of a more general outlook on life and the future.  
Moral disengagement can affect these specific goals as well as pathway and agency 
thoughts related to hope.  Goals, for Snyder et al., are cognitive components of 
hope that provide a “target” for mental energy (p. 250).  These goals can be con-
ceptualized in many ways and Snyder et al. do not restrict goals to some sort of 
mental imaging.  This is important in that it allows individual agents to think about 
specific goals without necessarily having a picture or image that relates to some 
sort of communicative aspect of the goal.  For Snyder et al. goals are not bound to 
mental images and are also not temporally restricted to the short term but instead 
include both short and long-term goals.  Long-term goals may be initially confused 
with something more akin to optimism, but for Snyder, optimism would lack an 
aspect of specificity that provides the objective of pathways and motivation.  The 
more vague the target or goal, the less likely the individual is to be able to create 
pathways and the more difficult it is for the individual to “warrant sustained con-
sciousness” (p. 250).  This criterion seems to offer a fairly clear division between 
hope and optimism. 
The inclusion of specific goals for Snyder’s (2002) conception of hope 
should also be considered in relation to Bandura’s (1999, 2015) criteria for the dis-
engagement of moral self-sanctions.  First, we might consider that a goal is not 
necessarily or perhaps universally moral under Snyder’s paradigm, but could be 
Hope 99 
 
agentively considered as such.  Specifically, the impact that a more moral goal 
might have on hope, as opposed to a more immoral goal, is a factor that it is im-
portant to consider.  Remember here that Bandura and Snyder both provide agen-
tive perspectives whereby the agent is essentially responsible for both the goal it-
self and the morality of the goal.  Yet, for present purposes, these agentively orient-
ed constructs do not restrict us from applying and determining implications related 
to an interpersonal relational association. 
Snyder (2002) does distinguish between positive and negative goal out-
comes, which are connected to pathways thoughts, agency thoughts and also a cog-
nitive process related to the value of the outcome, all of which could have moral 
associations.  Figure 6 helps to clarify the effect that moral disengagement can have 
on Snyder’s hope model.  Snyder’s emotional feedback and feed forward functions 
are not included in Figure 6 but these emotional processes are reciprocally inter-
connected with each aspect of the model.  In Figure 6 we illustrate the effect of 
moral disengagement as the more dominant influence and specifically related to 
distinct aspects of Snyder’s hope model including hope outcomes, pathways 
thoughts and agency thoughts.  Moral disengagement can occur during the pre-
event phase in Snyder’s (2002) model of hope through the interaction of mecha-
nisms of moral disengagement with what Snyder refers to as outcome value.  For 
example, outcome value can be morally minimized, morally justified, or otherwise 
overlooked from a moral perspective altogether, although we could argue that the 
latter is simply another form of moral justification.  Snyder alludes to this associa-
tion as he states, “Goals based on one’s own standards should be more attractive 
than goals built on the standards of other people,” which might be linked specifical-
ly to Bandura’s (1999) notion of displacement or diffusion of moral responsibility. 
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Figure 5. Relating moral disengagement to aspects of hope (Bandura, 1999, 
2015; Snyder, 2002). 
 
Moral disengagement can influence outcome values, agency thoughts and 
pathways thoughts in the hope process, a relationship that is not developed in pre-
vious research.  Snyder (2002) describes the value of the hoped for outcome as a 
significant point of consideration.  Mechanisms of moral disengagement can be ac-
tivated that affect the perceived value of outcomes related to goal pursuits and that 
influence the hope process.  Proactive moral disengagement can warrant an out-
come value related to agency and pathway thoughts so that the pursuit of a goal is 
favorable to continued cognitive engagement.  Snyder (2002) states that, “the out-
come value check-back allows the person to cease cognitive processing if a given 
goal pursuit does not have the value estimated” (p. 253).  Outcome values can be 
affected by a complex combination of check-back mental processes and also emo-
tions.  This check-back process can be affected by various mechanisms of moral 
disengagement, which might be focused on reprehensible conduct, detrimental ef-
fects, or a victim, depending upon the nature of the goal pursuits. 
Pathways focus on the more cognitive aspects of hope and agency focuses 
more on conative aspects of hope, while the selective disengagement of moral self-
sanctions interacts with each aspect differently.  The relationships are reciprocal in 
nature and can be better understood in a more complete context of human agency.  
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Bandura (1989) presents a helpful understanding of human agency through his con-
ception of Social Cognitive Theory where he offers: 
Social cognitive theory subscribes to a model of emergent interactive agen-
cy. Persons are neither autonomous agents nor simply mechanical convey-
ers of animating environmental influences. Rather, they make causal contri-
bution to their own motivation and action within a system of triadic recipro-
cal causation. In this model of reciprocal causation, action, cognitive, affec-
tive, and other personal factors, and environmental events all operate as in-
teracting determinants (p. 1175). 
 
Mechanisms of moral disengagement such as moral justification are under-
standably connected to pathways thinking, whereas mechanisms such as diffusion 
of responsibility are logically connected to agency thinking.  Consider here that 
moral justification is primarily a moral reasoning endeavor.  Pathways thinking in-
cludes what Snyder (2002) refers to as “reciprocal temporal thinking,” which links 
one’s present cognition to an image of a future goal (p. 251).  These pathways and 
the commitment to any specific pathway can be affected by mechanisms of moral 
disengagement to the point that one can hope for things that contradict one’s own 
moral schema.  Bandura (1989) states that, “Much human behavior is regulated by 
forethought embodying cognized goals, and personal goal setting is influenced by 
self-appraisal of capabilities” (p. 1175).  Bandura connects self-efficacy with hu-
man agency and mechanisms of moral disengagement and it should be of no great 
surprise that we claim that high hope persons will, ceteris paribus, have a lower 
propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.   
It is important to note that Bandura (1999) does not subscribe to an extreme 
notion of personal agency, in that his agency is part of a process of reciprocity, en-
gaging social and other outside influences.  This is a way of treating personal agen-
cy as helpful in understanding that the agent does not live in isolation.  Instead, 
agents interact with the world.  Our treatment of personal agency is more restrictive 
as a way to avoid a more general problem of moral prescription.  We assume the 
agent is ultimately responsible for the determination of moral rightness, whilst not 
prescribing this to other agents.  We should remember that this is ultimately a psy-
chological argument and not an ethical argument.  From an agentive perspective, 
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we are not initially concerned with a defense of moral dilemmas based on differing 
philosophies of ethics.  From our agentive perspective, respect for the agent’s au-
tonomy encourages us to accept a defense based in moral absolutism just as much 
as a normative ethical defense based on consequentialism.  These defenses are ul-
timately important as they are related to relationships within the organization and 
the society but we choose to separate out this philosophical ethical aspect, at least 
initially, in order to focus on understanding the psychology of the agent.  The social 
cognitive aspects of agency are much broader in scope and include such things as 
environmental and socio-cognitive factors.  However, in the context of moral agen-
cy and due to the focus on the individual’s moral schema, we choose here to focus 
on an autonomous moral agency, which should be distinguished from a more gen-
eral autonomous agency that claims people are completely independent agents with 
regard to their own actions.  This is what Bandura (1989) refers to as an “environ-
mental determinist” view (p. 1175).  In this larger context, Bandura’s framework of 
“triadic reciprocal causation,” which describes a wider interaction between the 
agent and the environment, is appropriate.  We raise this issue here as a matter of 
focus, not a matter of paradox.  Later, we will introduce a theory of agentive moral 
reinforcement, which includes a relational context and is more amenable to Ban-
dura’s Social Cognitive Theory generally and his notion of emergent interactive 
agency specifically (Bandura, 1986, 1989). 
Although we rely principally on Snyder’s (2002) conception of hope in or-
der that we might explore more operationalizable constructs that reveal the nature 
of moral disengagement and hope, it is important also to consider that hope itself 
could commonly have several different meanings.  For instance, hope is derived 
from the Greek word elpis, which is to do with ambiguity of the future and has 
more of a neutral, or perhaps even a negative, connotation.  Hope in this sense is 
related to the unknown-ness of future events and the powerlessness of the human, 
something more akin to what we in the Western tradition might consider fate.  
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Hope became a more positive word following the death of Jesus Christ and is 
commonly referred to in Western tradition and Christian thought1 as: 
…one of the three theological virtues, the others being faith and charity 
(love). It is distinct from the latter two because it is directed exclusively to-
ward the future, as fervent desire and confident expectation. When hope has 
attained its object, it ceases to be hope and becomes possession. Conse-
quently, whereas “love never ends,” hope is confined to man’s life on 
Earth.2 
 
In this examination we refer to how a more psychological concept of hope 
can be defined as involving the interconnected components of pathways and agency 
and how this construct is influenced by moral disengagement.3  By pathways hope 
Snyder considers the individual’s ability to contrive various routes or courses of 
action that one might use to advance toward a goal.  This is certainly an agentive 
perspective but we should not confuse Snyder’s use of the term agency that is spe-
cific to his construct.  By agency hope Snyder identifies the competence one per-
ceives that one possesses in order to be able to utilize the pathways effectively to 
the end of the goal.  These two aspects allow us to better understand cognitive and 
conative aspects of hope and in this sense agency includes both the motivation and 
the ability to successfully assume any pathway during the pursuit of a goal.  These 
components must not be thought of as dichotomous.  Instead, pathway and agency 
thinking should be considered as something of gestaltism in that the whole of the 
two forms a self-organizing construct for a psychological understanding of hope.  
Therefore, from this perspective, it is through the reciprocal interaction of pathways 
and agency that hope is formed.   
Bandura’s (1977) understanding self-efficacy, understood generally as a be-
lief in one’s ability to succeed in particular situations, is closely associated with the 
psychological understanding of hope.  This makes sense as we consider Bandura’s 
                                                
1See Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology of Hope for a more complete 20th-
century treaty regarding Christian hope. 
2 Hope. (2016). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved from 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/hope-Christianity on 8 September, 2016. 
3 See the psychological hope construct of Snyder et al. and Bandura’s theo-
ry of moral disengagement in previous chapters or Bandura (2015). 
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broader concept of agency with Snyder’s hope agency.  Self-efficacy is associated 
with hope in that it is an “expectancy belief that forms a cognitive set yet each “fo-
cuses on different aspects of competence and control” (Robinson & Snipes, 2009, 
p. 17).  This conception may not be completely palatable to some because we might 
easily confuse agency thinking in regards to what is meant by control, specifically 
as characterized by what might be implied by agency and control when used to-
gether.  Snyder’s agency aspect of hope is focused on control of achieving a path-
way, but not necessarily on control over the outcome or end-state.  This is an im-
portant philosophical argument that is perhaps what Bandura was alluding to when 
he writes of the differing conceptions of agency, such as a purely deterministic 
agency.  Within the context of hope, one has the power to control the pathway or 
the precept, but not the actual mechanism that might achieve the goal.  Otherwise, 
hope agency thinking simply becomes something of a sub-construct of self-
efficacy, focused too strictly on an interpretation of what the self perceives can be 
accomplished regarding certain tasks toward goal achievement. 
The empirical study of U.S. combat veterans discussed in earlier chapters 
seems to indicate a significant relationship between Snyder’s (2000, 2002) concep-
tion of hope and Bandura’s (1986, 1999) conception of moral disengagement.  Fur-
thermore, the study supports the hypothesis that the higher the levels of psycholog-
ical hope that one possesses, the less one has a propensity to disengage from one’s 
own moral self-sanctions.  Therefore, if one can increase Snyder’s form of psycho-
logical hope, one might also become more resilient against activating mechanisms 
of moral disengagement. 
There is, as might be expected, controversy related to Snyder’s psychologi-
cal conception of hope (Martin, 2014).  Hence, it is important that we analyze the 
conception of hope used in the accompanying research and how this conceptualiza-
tion differs from other perspectives on hope.  An operationalized version of 
Snyder’s conception can be compared to differing philosophical and psychological 
ideas related to hope in order that we might better understand implications related 
to the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  As previously noted, Snyder’s con-
cept is best understood as a view of hope that includes the reciprocal interaction of 
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both agency thinking and pathways thinking.  Agency thinking is a competence be-
lief specifically related to one’s perceived ability to utilize pathways developed by 
the agent that assist the agent in progressing toward a goal.  This concept of hope is 
a cognitive and motivational construct.  Hope is also understood as something that 
“initiates and sustains one’s progress in goal pursuit” (Robinson & Snipes, 2009, p. 
17).  This definition does rely on a strictly probabilistic type of hope.4  This issue 
will be clarified later as we attempt to explicate Martin’s (2013) treatise entitled 
How We Hope; which is perhaps the most complete philosophical examination pro-
duced in the past several decades on what is meant by hope and how it manifests in 
persons. 
Differing Philosophical Conceptions of Hope 
In order to better understand the relationship between hope and moral dis-
engagement, we need at least minimal understanding of varying philosophical con-
ceptions of hope that might affect the interpretation of a correlational or causal as-
sociation.  These differing conceptions, which produce varying models and when 
scientifically studied are referred to as constructs, require that we first explore dif-
fering assumptions related to an understanding of hope.  We have chosen to utilize 
Snyder’s (2002) conception of hope as our foundation for understanding hope but 
later expand his construct by including the specific psychosocial influences of mor-
al disengagement and religious thinking.  We understand that for some, hope is 
strictly emotional.  For others, hope is something wholly spiritual.  To still others, 
hope is a cognitive process.  Of course, there are all manner of conceptions in be-
tween.  For now, let us at least respect these varying considerations of hope that are 
the result of particularly different philosophies.5  This exploration of certain con-
ceptions of hope that vary in regards to philosophical assumptions and moral prem-
ise may assist in developing some understanding of why the concept of hope as op-
                                                
4 For a more thorough explanation see Crowson, J., Frueh, B., & Snyder, C. 
R. (2001). 
5 This analysis is not an attempt to determine what form of hope is prescrip-
tively right and is surely certainly not meant to develop into some sort of compre-
hensive defense of hope from any particular philosophical vantage point.
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erationalized by Snyder (1994, 2002) might be related to the disengagement of 
moral self-sanctions. 
Discourse about hope is not consistent throughout the academic community.  
Some view hope as an agentive process, others as sheer emotion, and others even 
view it as synonymous with desire.  Drahos (2004) relegates hope to a passion or 
emotion and separates this from cognition.  This relegation is common, but it does 
seem to discount the psychological gains of adopting a cognitive and conative un-
derstanding of hope.  What is more troubling is that these limited definitions, such 
as that hope is some amalgamation of the passions, do not seem to help us in under-
standing complex processes related to hope such as the disengagement of moral 
self-sanctions.  If this basic understanding is confused, then hope can be misunder-
stood as something altogether different to what psychologists refer to as hope.  For 
example, Drahos (2004) states that, “hope, which on the face of it might seem to be 
an individual and unilateral act, enters the bilateral context of the market” (p. 19).  
He uses this basic non-agentive understanding of hope to form social conclusions.  
However, where Snyder (2002) differentiates hope from emotions that influence 
aspects of the hope construct, and where outside forces are distinct elements that 
may affect specific aspects of hope but are not a part of the agentive hope process, 
Drahos (2004) does not draw out these distinctions and instead makes a social ar-
gument by defining hope in terms of the personal and also in terms of the collec-
tive.  Drahos (2004) develops an ethical argument against organizations that appeal 
to individual hope by promoting corporate hope.  We understand his meaning of 
hope to be something other than hope in that we treat hope as primarily agentive, 
and that the process that allows an individual to assume some corporate optimistic 
outlook is something relational.  Drahos’ corporate promotion of hope could be 
manifested as actions that look like a transfer of hope has taken place, but from the 
agentive perspective, the agent must remain responsible for the hope.  Perhaps the 
person is influenced to disengage from their own moral self-sanctions to engage in 
a hope that is counter to their own moral schema.  Regardless, the individual is the 
only being that can hope.  Any assumption of social or corporate hope assumes that 
individuals are all autonomous agents and we are simply assimilating the hope of 
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the many into the hope of the one.  Otherwise, there is a diffusion of responsibility 
or some other unethical aspect interfering with the agent’s hope process, which we 
consider something other than authentic hope.  This makes sense in the context of 
our empirical analysis of hope in the preceding chapters.  We understand hope as a 
fully agentive cognitive process but also realize the impact that emotion and social 
influences may have on hope. 
Mindful of this complexity, we must be yet further aware that hope may be 
understood from differing moral perspectives, differing natural scientific perspec-
tives, and differing modern psychological perspectives – all of which must be ac-
counted for in relation, for our purposes, to Snyder’s (2002) construct of hope.  We 
closely examining Snyder’s more empiricist form of hope, what we consider a 
more natural scientific type of hope, and then consider Snyder’s hope construct as 
juxtapositional with a more existentialist and a more religious interpretation of 
hope.  As we compare these different versions of hope, the limitations of each ver-
sion from any other prescriptive perspective should become clear.  These versions 
of inquiry concerning hope are of course only a start to a much more complex mat-
ter of dealing with almost infinite possibilities of moral schema available from an 
agentive perspective.  However, a central sensitivity herein is that any morally pre-
scriptive psychology of hope will be severely limited to those who agree with the 
ethical argument, and so we would do well to utilize models that are amenable to 
various moral philosophies.  Some psychologists may wish to dismiss this issue by 
way of supposedly generalizable moral principles, intuitionism, evolutionary intui-
tionism, or by some form of common sense morality.6  But here we recognize that 
moral aspects of hope cannot be generally prescriptive because people simply do 
not hold identical moral schemas.  If we therefore treat aspects of hope as generally 
prescriptive in this way we, at a minimum, only capture a portion of those who trust 
                                                
6 Jonathan Haidt has argued for the evolution of moral intuitions and moral 
emotion.  The arguments we make herein should not be confused as contradictory 
to these or any other prescriptive line of thought.  However, we do assert that the 
agent must own the reason (Haidt, 2006, 2012). 
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the proposed moral framework.  This problem is evident in Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
developmental stages, which have been criticized by way of religion and gender.7 
Attempting to appreciate the complexity of hope from a position of categor-
ical moral prescriptions allows us to create general assessments of an agent’s moral 
schema, noting of course that these categories are ultimately insufficient to precise-
ly describe any particular agent’s moral schema.  However, this application of pre-
scriptive moral categorization is how the next generation of research will continue 
to develop theory on things like hope and positive psychology, through an under-
standing of varying moral positions and a unique respect for the moral schema of 
the agent, and not by way of universal moral prescription.   Unfortunately for the 
social sciences, any advancement of this agentively relativistic view has been de-
preciated by the demarcation of academic sub-disciplines over the past century.  At 
the same time, psychology has made significant strides in understanding the human 
psyche and well-being (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Seligman, 2011).  
Therefore, we purposefully consider some major categories of moral thinking in 
order to understand more fully the psychological implications of hope, allowing us 
to understand hope by way of dissimilar moral schemas.  In the following sections, 
we consider several different moral categories while realizing that these categories 
are not mutually exclusive or all-encompassing.  We assert that these varying per-
spectives can be helpful in developing a more complete understanding of moral 
disengagement and hope but that for our purposes, Snyder’s (2002) more empiricist 
model provides a basis for accommodating aspects of the more existential and the-
istic agentive conceptions of hope.  By accommodating these perspectives and 
choosing an agentive positive psychological approach, we aim to extend Snyder’s 
(2002) construct to incorporate religious beliefs and moral processes as intercon-
nected rational functions. 
 
                                                
7 See Mensch (2009) for a comprehensive explanation of the problem of 
moral prescriptivism in developmental psychology.  For an explanation of the prob-
lem of determinism in moral psychology see Bandura (2015). 
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Snyder’s Empirically Supported Understanding of Hope 
By focusing on psychologically testable aspects of hope, Snyder (2002) of-
fers what might be considered an empiricist model of hope.  Of course, whether 
cognitive functions and emotions are fully empirical seems to be a matter of debate.  
Regardless, by understanding the relation of two principal variables Snyder offers a 
form of hope that is analyzable by psychometric means.  For Snyder (2002), the 
relational variables of pathways hope and agency hope can be studied as parts of 
the psychological construct of hope.  Of course, it is important to understand what 
Snyder means by pathways and agency, these things that together make up what it 
is we call hope.  In this sense Snyder attempts to explore each variable and its asso-
ciation to the construct, a sort of means of understanding hope by way of under-
standing its related parts. 
It is through this scientifically oriented line of inquiry that we find a con-
temporary understanding of psychological hope.  In Snyder’s account, if we can 
understand what it means to create pathways that one might undertake to fulfill 
one’s goals, and, if we can understand what it means to assume the agency neces-
sary to assume such pathways, then we can understand what it means to hope.  This 
is a measured calculation of hope as the sum of its parts focused on sensory percep-
tion, something a bit different to a more existential or theistic perspective of hope.  
Since we cannot directly observe these pathways and agency, we must infer them.  
Therefore this empirical inquiry is supported through inferential probability.  While 
not unflawed, this inquiry is surely helpful in understanding a basis for the princi-
ple processes of hope. 
As an extreme example, the empirically testable context of Snyder’s (2002) 
model of hope can be used as a relational structure by scientists who attempt to un-
derstand the neurology of hope.  The aspects of brain function affecting hope will 
surely allow us to continue to grow our understanding of the hope process and per-
haps components that interact to produce feelings and emotions related to hope.  
However, there is something of a self-imposed limitation to this kind of epistemo-
logical application since this view is inherently limited to interpretations of sense 
data, which is one reason why psychoanalysis brings something important to the 
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discussion.  The neurological exploration of hope could be similar to any other ex-
ploration of conscious feelings produced in the brain.  Things like fear and evil can 
be studied from this empirically rigorous way of understanding the mind.  A com-
plete understanding of hope demands an exploration of both the psychology of 
hope and the neurology of hope.  Other more metaphysical perspectives are also 
helpful in developing a comprehensive understanding of hope, as we shall explore 
in due course.  
An advantage of the empiricist form of hope is that the self-imposed limita-
tions of neurologically focused science keep us from self-deception and certain 
forms of more mystical bias and allow us to study the underlying central and pe-
ripheral nervous system and its relation to hope.  It might seem that Snyder’s 
(1994, 2002) understanding of hope is, at first glance, completely in line with an 
empiricist or even strictly naturalist conceptualization of hope.  However, the natu-
ralist could be critical of Snyder’s (2002) method because Snyder is essentially ap-
pealing to an aggregate of individual perception as a sort of normative reality, and 
for the strictly pragmatic empiricist, this aggregation of non-observable perception-
based science will simply not do.  In other words, Snyder is utilizing perception 
and probability theory commonly associated with present-day social science meth-
odology, which allows us to take a more agent-centered perspective of hope but of 
course does not offer the direct observation of phenomena by the scientist.  There-
for it might be better to call Snyder’s method something of a quasi-empiricist 
methodology, which could be considered more scientifically rigorous than other 
more qualitatively oriented methodologies.  But this form of methodological vari-
ant cannot fully inform us as to what hope is, why it exists, and how it is produced 
and sustained.  Snyder’s (2002) conception does allow us to better answer these 
questions, by utilizing some normative properties of his model, while accounting 
for agentive beliefs as reasonable and not strictly pathological.  From this we can 
explore a more qualitatively informative understanding of hope.  After all, these are 
important questions related to human flourishing.  The main point we make here is 
that varying views of hope studied through the lenses of varying methodologies are 
best considered, along with their respective strengths and weaknesses, to more fully 
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inform us on psychological phenomena, since no single methodology can fully in-
form us things such as hope.  According to some traditions, like theism, hope can 
never be fully explained by way of scientific inquiry alone.  So we can treat out-
groups as something like pathological and move on.  Or, we can assume the more 
challenging endeavor involving multiple understandings of methodological inquiry, 
such as is encouraged by MacIntyre (1981, 1988, 1990). 
We should consider a primary weakness of a more empiricist argument of 
hope.  This is a hope that is more scientifically testable through the use of instru-
ments that measure perception and are analyzed by way of statistical probability.  A 
deficiency with this form of method can be seen from the fact that, even if 999 
people perceive that hope is whatever they say it is, there may be one person who 
doesn’t perceive it in the same way, meaning the project would be verifiable by dis-
regarding the outlier, often referred to in economics as an error statistic, but without 
being fundamentally falsifiable.  If treated as falsifiable, we must reject the null hy-
pothesis on that single counter-observation.  Therefore, if we apply a strict interpre-
tation of the empiricist view that does not tolerate probability, we prohibit the pos-
sibility of understanding hope through normative means and would therefore con-
strain Snyder’s (2002) conception of hope to the falsifiable. However, through a 
more complete understanding of this fundamental methodological risk, we may bet-
ter comprehend the hazards associated with instruments that supposedly measure 
constructs of hope, realizing that these instruments may be flawed, which inevita-
bly might reveal something like Type I and Type II statistical errors.8  It is there-
fore of great benefit that various views, including but not limited to a more empiri-
cist form of hope, are taken into consideration. 
Martin (2013) discusses a more empiricist form of hope that includes this 
problem of probability.  She explores several interesting aspects of hope from what 
she refers to as the “evidentialist perspective” and the “certain kinds of attention 
and thought” that the hoping person may feel (Martin, 2013, p. 66).  Any hope 
based strictly in probabilistic thinking may be limiting in scope.  Yet, Martin’s per-
                                                
8See the Problem of Demarcation and other information regarding Karl 
Popper’s philosophy of science at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/#ProDem 
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spective does have a normative appeal.  In this sense, in order to call something 
hope, we must consider that it is something to be experienced by all, and also not 
constrained to an utterly subjective experience.  This view does not forbid the in-
clusion of subjective experience, but does attempt to create a normative construct, a 
construct that can hopefully be understood with parameters so as to differentiate 
hope from other psychological constructs.  Here we can include things associated 
with descriptive and inferential statistics such as construct validity and multicollin-
earity.  However, with this view based in the normative, several fundamental prob-
lems remain. 
Martin’s (2013) critique of hope is helpful in understanding what she refers 
to as an orthodox definition of hope.  It is also helpful to consider certain scientific 
assumptions that have supplemented her orthodox definition.  The orthodox defini-
tion contains both desires for specific outcomes, and the belief that the outcome 
itself is in fact possible.  However, Martin points out that Downey’s more current 
understanding of hope also relies upon the notion that the object of hope has the 
physical possibility of occurrence and is not simply based on some metaphysical 
belief.  This reliance on the object of hope is an attempt to demarcate hope into a 
scientific and thereby normative, testable, and generalizable concept.  The demar-
cation of hope as Downey suggests, may have scientific advantages, but it also 
seems to impose a stringent philosophy of science upon a psychological concept 
rooted in a very agentive type of belief, a personal belief in the object of hope.  
This personal belief is in essence agentively subjective in nature.  However, from 
the standpoint of a strictly empiricist view that includes some sort of perception, 
subjective or personal beliefs are somewhat minimized.  So in the case of this sci-
entific definition of hope, something like true hope is based in a testable reality, 
otherwise it is effectively treated as some pathology acting on or in place of true 
hope.  The aspect of reality surely has a place in the argument for hope, but this 
singular philosophical view cannot respectfully dominate the entire discourse on 
hope (Martin, 2013, pp. 11-34). 
The agentive emphasis on a moral aspect of hope offers an utterly subjec-
tive moral perspective and cannot be bound to external impositions such as hope in 
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which the outcome must be physically verifiable in order to be valid, otherwise we 
become morally prescriptive and hope becomes something that ought to be from a 
third- party perspective and not something that is intrinsically experienced.  The 
term rational is often invoked to mean different things depending on assumptions.  
Many economists define rationality in terms of social norms, by way of utilitarian 
philosophical principles.  However, if we juxtapose this definition with something 
like a theistic, and perhaps more gnostic, belief that a fallen world is filled with evil 
and operates out of immoral motives, arguments then based on social norms can 
quickly be deemed as irrational or even absurd.  Snyder (2002) offers a form of 
hope that is neither for nor against these types of supposition and which could serve 
as a platform for understanding the nature of the differences in understanding hope.  
Instead of being deemed irrational or pathological by one group, varying perspec-
tives can be viewed as having some common structure that allows for discourse that 
might lead to a fuller understanding of agentive hope, which is a more communal 
and less divisive approach to understanding hope.  Problems synergizing these un-
derstandings of hope are precisely why we need to explore what we mean by hope 
from various philosophical perspectives. 
Consider the challenge of understanding the intersection of Snyder’s (2002) 
hope construct and those who might hold to differing paradigms resulting from 
fundamentally different moral philosophies.  At the heart of this problem of under-
standing hope from a strictly psychological viewpoint, is the moral problem of 
hope.9  Hope and the nature to desire towards something, necessarily includes a 
moral aspect or component.  In Snyder’s (2002) construct this can be located prior 
to pathways and agency hope in an understanding of the moral relation to outcome 
values.  This could be the foremost reason that hope may be able to predict one’s 
propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  If the agent considers 
hope to be a fundamentally moral process, then the idea that hope is observed and 
                                                
9 The moral problem of hope relates somewhat to Hume’s is/ought problem 
but this of course depends upon an interpretation of Hume’s Treatise.  For a more 
complete review of this problem see Max Black’s The Gap Between “is” and 
“should” in The Philosophical Review, 73(2), 165-181. 
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normatively defined as some irreducible construct is, in some sense, irrelevant.  In 
other words, the observer has no specific moral claim to hope through observation.  
So in this manner one person’s hope might be another person’s folly, or perhaps 
despair, or so it might seem.  Snyder’s model for hope is agentive and can be un-
derstood within the context of the agent’s own moral schema.  However, caution 
should be taken when adapting aggregate data from this model to produce argu-
ments about what good hope should look like, say organizationally.  Of course, 
most social scientists are aware of this problem and thus tend to avoid morally pre-
scriptive implications related to constructs such as hope, since to determine the mo-
rality of hope is not the intent of the method, which is aimed instead at understand-
ing what constitutes a cognitive process of hope.  However, this method of explora-
tion is insufficient in supplying agentive information for a complete understanding 
of hope. 
A danger lies in the theory-laden weaknesses of the aggregation of individ-
ual observations related to a social science model such as hope that cannot account 
for the individual agentive moral perspectives.  Models built upon theory in a con-
structivist manner, as we have seen, also risk unintentionally inferring the normali-
zation of morality.  Specifically, if verifiability with regards to a construct for hope 
is the primary method for making sense of hope, then there is a risk associated with 
morality and confirmation bias.  This danger is reduced in Snyder’s (2002) con-
struct if the construct is used as intended, as a hope based in moral subjectivity and 
agentive perception.  The moral schema of the agent can affect all aspects of 
Snyder’s model through things such as the disengagement of moral self-sanctions, 
as shown in Figure 6.   We should not attempt to strip hope of morality due to the 
subjective nature, but instead attempt to account for the agent’s moral perspective, 
no matter the difficulty of the endeavor.  For present purposes, only then can we 
have a workable understanding of what it means to hope. 
 
Agentive Hope and Moral Disengagement 
Assuming the notion of hope contains an individual moralistic aspect, con-
trasted with something like a universal objective moral truth, we understand that 
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the subjective nature surely affects both the cognitive and psychosocial more cona-
tive components of hope.  Should the agent hope, the moral agency related to the 
process of hoping will be assumed by that agent, or otherwise disengaged from in 
one way or another.  Considering this subjective moral aspect of hope allows us to 
better understand how an individual might hope towards something that, in his or 
her own understanding, is essentially immoral.  But is this truly hope as generally 
understood?  This same individual might assuage the guilt or bad conscience asso-
ciated with this hope by activating mechanisms that allow them to disengage from 
their own moral self-sanctions.  Now consider Snyder’s pathways toward the object 
of hope.  Moral disengagement seems particularly relevant to this outcome value of 
hope.  The objects of Snyder’s pathways may be immoral from an agentive per-
spective.  An agent may consider the object of hope itself to be immoral and con-
sider pathways that are agentively moral.  In this case, the activation of mecha-
nisms of moral disengagement is focused primarily on the object of hope.  So if the 
value of the hoped for outcome involves another person, Bandura’s (1999, 2015) 
disengagement mechanism of dehumanization might be employed to assuage the 
guilt related to the value of the person/object, thus allowing the process to continue. 
An individual might also consider that the object of hope is in fact morally 
satisfying, yet they may activate Bandura’s (1999) mechanisms of moral disen-
gagement by considering and choosing pathways towards that hope that are agen-
tively immoral.  It is also possible, and perhaps even more probable from an agen-
tive perspective, that an individual may hope for something that is completely mor-
al and yet choose to develop pathways that are immoral.  In this way the individual 
might utilize pathways themselves as a means.  The individual may disengage from 
their own moral self-sanctions related to pathways of hope in order that they might 
obtain a greater good.  This more utilitarian notion of hope is nothing new to phi-
losophy.  However, Snyder (2002) provides a way to consider certain agentive as-
pects of hope that might be overlooked by other, perhaps more qualitative methods 
used in understanding hope.  There surely seems to be great value in an application 
of mixed methodologies, such as more empirical methods combined with more 
qualitative methods, to more fully understand an agentive perspective of hope, 
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which is why we attempt to understand hope from the context of the agent and by 
applying our empirical results to a larger framework of hope and beliefs.  Hope 
without understanding its intrinsic qualitative components simply does not allow us 
to explore it in the context of inconsistent agentive moral beliefs. 
Consider the disengagement of moral self-sanction directed at the object of 
hope.  This is the moral dilemma focused on the outcome of hope, or the thing 
hoped for.  This dilemma is created by a personal tension between the outcome and 
the moral schema of the individual.  In other words, a person might hope for win-
ning the lottery and at the same time believe that actually winning the lottery is 
immoral, say because it is hoping for something material in the world when one 
believes material things either are somehow evil in themselves, or that the material 
might otherwise encourage evil to flourish.  Here, the thing hoped for can be con-
sidered immoral, yet the individual may activate mechanisms of moral disengage-
ment to assuage the anguish affiliated with such a hope.  For example, one could 
utilize euphemistic labeling and refer to the lottery not as gambling, but as playing 
a prize draw or raffle.  They might also assuage the guilt associated with the hope 
of winning the lottery by moral justification by promising that they will give away 
a certain portion of the winnings to the poor or needy.  This is not a judgment of the 
agent’s moral schema, but an agentive recognition of its existence and an examina-
tion of the reasoning related to hope (Bandura, 2015). 
The tension of the moral problem related to hope might also be focused on 
the pathways themselves, the ways in which one chooses to proceed in order to 
achieve the hope in question.  The agent, in this case, may see the hope of winning 
the lottery as a truly greater good.  The agent may have no moral qualms about 
hope as related to the winning of the lottery, but they may utilize moral disengage-
ment to assuage culpability related to the creation of pathways and actions related 
to them to facilitate the outcome of the hoped for thing, in this case the winning of 
the lottery.  In fact, the individual may believe so strongly in the good of winning 
the lottery that they may do harm in order to obtain the prize.   
Consider a husband and wife who together play the lottery.  In this case, the 
husband is a bit of a philanthropist and has overtly discussed his intention to give 
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away his portion of lottery winnings to charity.  The wife instead believes that the 
winnings can bring great joy by allowing her to travel the world with her daughter.  
Furthermore, she imagines that it would be better if the husband had a heart attack 
and died upon hearing the news that they have won the lottery.  It is irrelevant 
whether the wife simply cogitatively desires such an outcome or whether she takes 
action to consciously facilitate it, shall we say by feeding him very unhealthy 
meals.  If she believes these thoughts or behaviors to be morally wrong, then in re-
lation to winning the lottery, she might create pathways that generate an opportuni-
ty for moral disengagement.  From an ethical perspective, we can of course ques-
tion whether or not this sort of hope is a hope consistent with the wife’s moral 
schema and the good of hope.  However, we might come to find that the wife hon-
estly and morally believes that a smaller harm to her husband warrants a greater 
good to society.  If this is consistent, there is no need for the wife to activate mech-
anisms of moral disengagement, because there is no moral imperative from which 
she must disengage.  Therefore her hope in this case, could be consistent.  In other 
words, she may hope for winning in her way and not disengage from her moral 
self-sanctions.  This is an important distinction because there are two sides to this 
more general question to be explored, the question of a normative hope and the 
question of an agentive hope.  From our agentive perspective, we assign autonomy 
to the moral agent.  However, we must remember that this is not the end of what 
should be a more general inquiry, but the beginning.  There remains the question of 
the ethics of the agent’s moral schema, and this moral schema’s alignment with 
something like organizational or professional ethics. 
We might also consider that, with regards to an agentive perspective of 
hope, the activation of psychological mechanisms of moral disengagement might 
occur by degrading one’s own agency related to the process of the hoped for thing.  
Bandura (1999) might consider this as something like the displacement of respon-
sibility regarding pathways to hope in general.  In our lottery example, the husband 
of a wife may think it wrong to play the lottery and so assuage the guilt associated 
with participating by displacing the responsibility to his wife.  There is another di-
mension here related to the wife who could be considered an enabler to the situa-
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tion, but for the sake of this inquiry we will focus on the agent, the husband, who 
delegates moral responsibility to the wife for the activities related to planning and 
purchasing lottery tickets.  So the husband may hope to win the lottery, but allows 
his agency to be displaced by proxy to another, shifting responsibility for the ac-
tions that might facilitate the result.  In other words, the husband has displaced his 
moral agency in regards to the hoped for outcome.  A similar scenario could be im-
agined between a soldier and a chaplain, or a counselor and a counselee, where the 
soldier or counselee displaces or diffuses moral responsibility related to pathways 
hope onto the chaplain or counselor providing advice. 
Now, here we should make note of a problem of philosophy.  While things 
like probability play a part in the hope process, they are not necessarily dominant 
from each agent’s perspective.  In order to understand such things as moral disen-
gagement as related to hope, the agent must be generally responsible for their own 
moral schema, which invokes a notion of free will, and this is a complex matter, 
which is why we focus on an agent’s initial position of moral agency.  However, 
some may still attack this agentive notion by taking on something of the following 
position: 
It seems backward for cognitive scientists to simply assume a non-
naturalistic or dualist theory of free will, since the history of cognitive sci-
ence can be seen as a series of attempts to demonstrate how we can put 
aside dualistic theories of mind and cognitive functioning…as cognitive 
scientists increasingly explain how the mechanisms of the brain can explain 
language and flexible reasoning, they do not thereby conclude that we lack 
these capacities.  Rather, they conclude that dualist theories of such capaci-
ties are false (Vargas, 2014, p. 60). 
 
It seems important to note that in some instances, the argument for a certain 
moral psychology that is dependent on and intermingled with debates about free 
will and naturalism is critically important in social science, especially in areas such 
as political theory.  To set aside notions of a non-physical mind is necessary for 
consensus.  However, to attempt to impose such beliefs upon the agent seems to 
encourage a risk of moral disengagement.  For this reason, we continue assuming 
that those of differing moral traditions can learn from one another in a way that 
may help all that are willing to develop new understandings in moral psychology. 
Hope 119 
 
Chance or probability related to the outcomes of hope for the strict empiri-
cist appear to have certain qualities that are quite different when compared to a 
more theistic or existentialist notion of hope.  The overarching differentiating as-
pect seems to center on the notion of chaos and biology.  By chaos, we simply 
mean that the normal view of the universe is that of randomness, since there exists 
no God or other supernatural entity that has set things in order.  If the agent holds 
this more atheistic and random understanding of hope, the agent operates agentive-
ly within his or her mental ability and those cognitive or conative aspects of path-
ways to hope.  The likelihood of achieving the outcome related to hope is a func-
tion of the ability of the individual and of being in a chaotic world.  The prospect of 
considering the hoped for outcome in terms of pure odds seems more likely for a 
more empiricist moral thinker because regardless of what the agent might have the 
ability to do, the chaos of being may ultimately prove superior.  The likelihood of 
achieving a hoped for outcome involves a comparative process.  The specific hope, 
say to win the lottery, is considered in the context of people who have hoped for the 
same outcome and taken action.  Through this comparative thinking, perception is 
gained regarding an estimation of the chances that I might have to actualize my 
hope through certain pathways.  I may recognize that there is a chance of higher or 
lower odds for or against my hoped for outcome, but my hopes are contained in the 
chaos that is inevitably assumed in the cosmos.  There is no external force assisting 
me in my chances of winning the lottery, and my selfness is limited to the disorder 
that surrounds me.  For a more empiricist moral thinker, the freedom to realize 
hope is not only limited by an ultimately chaotic notion of the probability of hope, 
but also by an understanding of one’s own biological limitations in creating and 
fulfilling pathways related to hope.  In a sense, the self for the strict empiricist is 
only free within the boundaries of one’s biological abilities, regardless of self-
determination.  Otherwise, things are left to chance.  This is a more deterministic 
view of the cosmos and a moral perspective that should be considered in the con-
text of hope by anyone engaging with an agent whose moral schema is developed 
with such assumptions.  The notion of probability related to obtaining or achieving 
any particular hope might be somewhat more prominent in the mind of the empiri-
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cist moral thinker than in the mind of a more theistic or existentialist moral agent.  
In other words, the moral schema of a more empiricist moral agent will support, 
due to the chaos of the universe and the law of large numbers, a greater considera-
tion of the sheer probability that something may occur in the future based on obser-
vations and events in the past.  These deterministic forms of empiricism will obvi-
ously have a bearing on how one might conceptualize and interpret Snyder’s (2002) 
pathways and agency, and allows us to scrutinize the initial empirical conceptual-
ization of hope found in our study. 
 
A More Existentialist Understanding of Hope 
Thus far we have focused on the philosophy of an agent with a more empir-
ical moral schema and the association with hope and moral disengagement.  In this 
section, we should begin by reiterating that we are not arguing for any specific 
good or bad hope, only a good or a bad hope in relation to the agent’s own moral 
schema.  This agentive focus on beliefs allows us to understand Snyder’s (2002) 
hope in a unique way, keeping the responsibility of moral belief with the agent.  
Therefore, an agent who subscribes primarily to an existentialist moral schema 
might conceive hope as something unique, holding distinctive beliefs related to 
things such as death and temporality, which may coincidentally change the parame-
ters of hope.  Certain well-known contributions by philosophers such as Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) may help us to better 
clarify a more existentialist perspective of hope, without requiring that we indict 
ourselves as experts in existentialism.  Instead, with the help of these philosophers 
and specific prominent philosophical texts, we attempt to construct a more existen-
tialist notion of hope by way of Snyder (2002).  The existentialist moral agent may 
be exceedingly comfortable with relativistic form of hope, and since hope must be 
congruent with the individual’s moral schema, there is no contradiction with 
Snyder’s (2002) model from this moral perspective.  So hope can be understood as 
agentively good if it satisfies the condition of congruency with the individual’s 
moral schema, yet the view of reality from the agent’s perspective may vary from 
that of a more strictly empiricist moral agent.  This can be viewed as an opportunity 
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for a unique exploration of hope and helps us distinguish coercive or otherwise pro-
spectively unethical processes that influence agentic hope.  What one ought to hope 
for is inevitably a matter for philosophy or theology.  When we attempt to do social 
psychology on hope, we either understand hope in this agentive and morally rela-
tivistic way, or we prescribe the moral conditions of hope, and then see who fits 
this morally prescriptive model.  That is to say that Snyder’s (2002) conception of 
hope should not be considered relativistic in the sense that researchers must ethical-
ly approve of the agent’s moral schema.  This is not the case at all.  It is instead an 
attempt to understand the psychology of hope by way of the agent’s own moral 
schema and not by moral imposition or prescription. 
The agent holding a more existentialist moral schema might consider au-
thentic hope as something to be understood through the action of hoping.  We can 
understand this type of hoping from Snyder’s (2002) pathways definition.  In other 
words, a more existentialist hope is dependent on development through acts of the 
will where hope is understood within a consideration of the means to the hoped for 
end.  This existentialist form of hope will emphasize Snyder’s pathways as para-
mount to one’s ongoing understanding of the object of hope.  If we consider the 
essence of human being and hopefulness as a part of this being, then we can begin 
to understand how a more existentialist moral agent may come to understand what 
it means to hope.  Hope in this sense happens because we are both being and hop-
ing in a sort of inextricable engagement.  Hope in this sense is understood as exist-
ing before and during our cognitive engagement related to the activity of hoping.10   
Snyder’s (1994, 2002) hope construct differs somewhat from a more exis-
tentialist appreciation of what Heidegger calls free association, where each agent 
might freely craft their own conception of hope.  Snyder (2002) focuses on goal-
oriented motivation and one’s ability to create relevant pathways through planning 
to achieve desired goals.  By focusing on goals and human agency, Snyder provides 
                                                
10 This pre-activity and activity seems something more like Heidegger’s as-
sociation between beauty as it is and the creative logic of the unconscious as some-
thing following recognition of that beauty.  This is something he associates more 
with the feeling of dwelling in one’s being. 
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a construct that is arguably measurable, since we can attempt to understand the per-
ception of an individual related to these specific definitions and then generalize to a 
larger population.  If a person actively formulates goals or perceives themselves as 
motivated in this type of action, and if a person is actively planning and seeking 
conduits to achieve related goals, then it is theoretically possible to compare one 
individual to another and thus measure the level of hope that one person might 
hold.  If we can accomplish this task of measurement then we can compare and cor-
relate different constructs.  This is the basis for the thinking behind our use of 
Snyder’s (2002) construct in our empirical study.  An existentialist moral perspec-
tive helps us appreciate some limitations of Snyder’s (2002) model and reminds us 
that one person’s hope may not describe another person’s hope, nor should it be 
prescriptively employed if we are to maintain a strong emphasis on moral agency.  
So qualitative clarification is surely warranted when utilizing such constructs as a 
basis for practice. 
From an existentialist perspective, the empirical view provided by way of 
Snyder’s (2002) hope construct may seem somewhat incomplete.  However, if we 
consider Snyder’s hope in a more MacIntyrian light, where rival or incommensura-
ble assumptions are to be respected, then perhaps we can move beyond a limited 
conception and better understand challenges to a singular perspective and reach a 
richer understanding of hope.11  For example, Snyder (2002) provides a clear dis-
tinction between the conscious and the unconscious, but for the existentialist moral 
agent, this distinction does not necessarily hold true.  The existentialist moral agent 
might instead require that hope fall within what is considered the conscious world, 
whilst the choice to hope might be considered more as existing within something 
                                                
11 Consider Snyder’s claim that the understanding of what he refers to as 
pathways and agency thinking encapsulate what it means to hope.  For example, we 
might attempt to phenomenologically suspend judgment or bracket, what it means 
to hope in a Husserlian sense of epoché.  Thus, we might suppose to isolate what 
hope is and what it means to hope within experience.  The latter as actionable may 
be more lucid within the existentialist convention.  Here I consider a primary dis-
tinction between more deterministic views, as opposed to considering the complete 
freedom of the will that we encounter in existentialism. 
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like good faith.12  In other words, hope for the existentialist moral thinker should 
not be self-deceptive and should not rely on an ambiguous conception, nor might 
we alleviate the responsibility of the action of hoping from the individual.  This is 
an appeal to the notion that if we overestimate our hope or underestimate our hope 
we act in bad faith.  So we must juxtapose something like sincerity and something 
like knowing, or what Sartre calls facticity.  This existential notion is extremely 
helpful in articulating a relationship between hope and moral disengagement be-
cause in one sense, moral disengagement can be seen as ultimately self-deceptive 
and perhaps an undervaluation of our hoped for outcome.13  However, we should 
note that Bandura (2015) denies any connection between moral disengagement and 
self-deception: 
One cannot deceive oneself into believing something while simultaneously 
knowing it to be false. Hence, literal self-deception cannot exist. Attempts 
to resolve the paradox of how one can be a deceiver fooling oneself while 
knowing the falsehood have met with little [empirical] success. These ef-
forts usually involve creating split selves and rendering one of them uncon-
scious. A theory of self-deception cast in terms of multiple selves plunges 
one into deep philosophical and unfriendly empirical waters (pp. 101-102). 
 
However, Bandura lays the blame for this conundrum of believing and 
knowing at the feet of paradox and later explains the dilemma by appealing to a 
sort of “true…knowing” and an intentional “keeping oneself uninformed” way of 
thinking (Bandura, 2015, p. 102).  This is a manner of dealing with the paradox of 
self-deception in moral disengagement, and we would generally agree with this 
epistemological argument.  However, we do not wish to completely ignore all 
forms of self-deception, whether empirically supportable or not. 
Since a more existentialist moral agent might require an extent of unknow-
ing, it seems difficult to reconcile this with a complete and scientifically universal 
construct of hope.  So in this sense one might argue that the sincerity of the agent 
and his or her understanding of hope, as well as the potential for a novel under-
                                                
12 The terms good and bad faith were used by Sartre to develop his concep-
tion of self-deception. See Sartre J. P. (1993) Essays in Existentialism. New York: 
Citadel Press. 
13 See Figure 6. 
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standing of hope through action, might be imperative.  As previously stated, this 
existential view of hope relates to Snyder’s pathways, where there is a moral sin-
cerity related to the creation of pathways in which one might fulfill hope.  In fact, 
because Snyder (2002) forwards personal agency as something that doesn’t neces-
sarily appeal to circumstances outside of one’s possible realm of control, it does 
seem at first to be harmonious with existential moral views.  However, an existen-
tialist notion of good faith requires a self-reflective moral component that exists 
beyond one’s rationality.14  Therefore we find difficulty in fully synergizing 
Snyder’s construct with aspects of hope considered independent of the agent’s own 
moral schema. 
In a recent work, which covers a more thorough view of the conception of 
hope, Martin (2013) uses an analogy within the context of the movie The 
Shawshank Redemption.  This analogy is helpful in more fully developing hope that 
might be otherwise be limited to a singular psychosocial context.  Martin’s analogy 
is particularly helpful in explicating differing conceptions of hope, as shown by 
analysis of the characters of Andy and Red.  Martin (2013), instead of focusing 
solely on the components of hope, provides an inquiry into how people generally 
go about hoping.  Martin’s process view of hope certainly has limitations.  Still, her 
work yields one of the most complete accounts of how people generally go about 
hoping, and her work is quite suitable for utilization in a comparative analysis be-
tween differing philosophical conceptions of hope.  In The Shawshank Redemption, 
both Andy and Red are sentenced to life in Shawshank prison, with little chance of 
ever experiencing life outside it.  Martin (2013) argues that Andy seems to have 
hope about freedom but Red seems to despair at the thought of being free.  Yet, 
from an existentialist moral perspective we find an ultimately subjective form of 
hope that can only be understood through one’s personal experience.  In this sense 
Andy and Red encounter different conceptions of hope within their own subjective 
                                                
14 We ought not to consider this synonymous with contemplation or ration-
alization since one of the philosophies Sartre rails against relates specifically to ra-
tionalism. Sartre might even argue that hope cannot consist strictly in conscious 
rationalism but that it does exist in something like a dream state. 
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experience.  So Red may actually hope for something like consistency and conti-
nuity.  One cannot assume that they encounter the same object of hope.  Andy 
seems able to conceptualize hope in regards to the object of a form of freedom 
where Red’s view is quite other.  Andy seems to understand prison life in a way 
that changes the meaning of the present for him and in a way that affects the hope 
he holds for his future.  In other words, his understanding of a possible future alters 
his present reality.  Snyder’s hope consists of the three interrelated aspects of goal 
orientation, pathway generation, and personal agency related to one’s ability to af-
fect such pathways.  The action-orientated form of consciousness espoused by 
many existentialist thinkers is important in understanding both the cognitive and 
conative aspects of Snyder’s hope.  This action-orientation is also critical in per-
ceiving what Snyder’s hope means to the agency of a more existentialist thinker.  
From an existentialist perspective, the moral agent might be affected more by inter-
actions between the psychological mechanisms of moral disengagement and hope 
agency than perhaps a more atheistic thinker, due to this action orientation of con-
sciousness. 
This type of hope agency is also closely related to self-efficacy, which leads 
to the question: does a more existentialist moral schema tend to have a greater in-
fluence on hope agency?  It seems reasonable to conclude that a low-hope existen-
tialist moral agent is more likely to also be low in self-efficacy and have a greater 
propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  A person with higher 
self-efficacy should logically have a lower propensity for activating mechanisms of 
moral disengagement, and we can perhaps make the same argument for self-
esteem.  Although some of these relationships have been tested, they do not specif-
ically account for differing philosophical moral frameworks (Snyder, 2002).  In so-
cial science this form of moral inquiry is often simplified to something as basic as 
religious and non-religious people, and this oversimplification is only very basical-
ly helpful in the search for new knowledge in psychology and exceedingly limiting 
for any interpretation of results.  This is unfortunate in that this form of inquiry 
never really uncovers the details and nuances of varying moral schemas and the 
effects on the relationship between things such as hope and moral disengagement.  
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Instead of simply religious or spiritual, and non-religious or not spiritual, we should 
begin to consider the many moral positions and begin to study them within com-
mon frameworks such as hope, so that we can develop models that are more ex-
planatory, models that change depending upon moral positions and models that 
elaborate more on the intricate cognitive functions related to beliefs, attitudinal 
formation and conation. 
This problem of accounting for moral disposition has consequences for 
many areas of the social sciences, including positive psychology in general, as well 
as hope theory, optimism, self-efficacy and flourishing, to name but a few.  Alt-
hough the instruments are meant to be descriptive in that they describe a model, 
they are also normatively prescriptive in that they attempt to measure normative 
aspects.  This may be fine with amoral constructs, but most cognitive and behavior-
al constructs seem to imply or assume a moral norm.  In other words, there is a 
good form of hope and also bad forms of hope.  There is good optimism and bad 
optimism.  There is good self-efficacy and bad self-efficacy.  Most importantly, 
these associations are not often readily apparent.  We just assume that the definition 
of optimism that is offered as a social science construct is good optimism and so we 
create instruments to test that good optimism by measuring levels of attributes as-
sociated with the construct (Seligman 1991; Seligman, Reivich, Jaycox & Gillham, 
1995).  This is how things like authentic leadership come about and are differenti-
ated from mere leadership.  A researcher utilizes something like a leadership con-
struct and eventually realizes that the construct allows Adolph Hitler to be catego-
rized as a good leader, since he meets all the criteria in the model.  Next, someone 
thinks that this outcome is unacceptable and so they look to separate good from evil 
and bring morality into the construct.  This is how the social sciences normatively 
develop theory.  The moral questions, beyond some basic assumptions, are often 
left for another day.  What we propose here is that the moral problem should be ad-
dressed more completely from the outset of any understanding of cognitive pro-
cesses, and especially in interpersonal and psychosocial constructs.  This becomes 
tricky if we are attempting to avoid being overly prescriptive in regards to con-
structs with moral implications such as hope.  This is a problem that can be ad-
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dressed in several ways.  Ordinarily, there is a philosophical view that is presented 
as right or good, and sometimes defended to some extent.  Other times it is left to 
something like common sense or intuition that the construct being measured cap-
tures the good.  Constructs associated with positive psychology cannot avoid this 
paradox because by positive, there is a normative implication of good or right.  So 
good hope, or to use a popular term, authentic hope, is assumed under the para-
digm. 
For example, Snyder (2002) asserts that high-hope persons will feel or 
demonstrate friendliness and happiness.  Why is this socially and culturally gener-
alizable?  Take for example the stoic person or the individual who holds the belief 
that the individual should dominate emotion.  This is a moral position and many 
through history have lived by a similar creed of ethics.  Could a person with a great 
deal of hope be non-friendly?  Could a low-hope person be exceedingly happy?  
These questions help us in understanding the nature of the problem in asking nor-
mative questions without moral psychology.  Now, consider this in the context of 
an agent who has a strong propensity to activate mechanisms of moral disengage-
ment.  If we are attempting to measure hope, we must account for all of these as-
pects of influence.  Otherwise, we risk oversimplifying exceedingly complex issues 
related to the underlying agentive moral psychology of hope.  The point here is that 
agent-centered constructs like hope and moral disengagement are helpful but can be 
problematic when moving from a descriptive theory to an instrument that measures 
agents with prescriptive implications.  In the case of hope, we assume this risk by 
placing normative value on feelings such as friendliness and emotions such as hap-
piness. 
There does seem to be an alternative to this normative and perhaps proba-
bilistically generalizable form of inquiry that is more consistent with the notion of 
moral agency.   This has to do with allowing the agent to establish the moral as-
sumptions.  Now, if we did this to an extreme, we would find that there is a differ-
ent conception of something like hope for each and every individual agent and that 
this hope would depend on his or her own subjective moral schema, making scien-
tific reliability an impossibility.  We therefore do not advocate this extreme but do 
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eventually anticipate a move beyond general categorical representations, such as 
religious or non-religious.  This categorical approach, which allows us to maintain 
a more complete agentive perspective and still provides replicable scientific exami-
nation, may be the best we can do.  Yet, as we bracket these moral assumptions into 
more and more verifiable categories, we are sure to learn more about the nature of 
the problem we are attempting to fully address. 
With this in mind, Tennen, Affleck and Tennen (2002) posit that Snyder’s 
(2002) hope construct is incomplete without the additional component of trust.  
Trust in this sense is understood as seeing some sort of order in the world.  Specifi-
cally, they state, “a trust in the goodness of the world that makes sense” and that 
“trust is the foundation of hope” (p. 312).  This is an interesting claim in light of 
our inquiry into the philosophical foundations of hope and, we believe, perhaps 
somewhat unintentionally leads us to believe that a full understanding of hope must 
include something like a virtue of trust.  Such a virtue is surely able and likely to be 
defined differently by different people.  One person’s trust might be another per-
son’s foolishness.  So in order to add moral elements such as trust to Snyder’s hope 
construct, we are either prescriptive in our assumptions at some basic level or we 
must allow the agent to define virtue.  However, this latter notion seems to be chal-
lenging because we must find a way to determine each person’s moral views on 
trust in order to make sense of hope.  Here again, the hope process is dependent 
upon the moral schema of the agent. 
There are many ways to attempt to deal with this problem but here we sug-
gest that a more deliberate categorical analysis is warranted, something much 
greater than a binomial analysis of in group or out of group, yes or no, zero or one.  
Therefore, it is critical that we begin by understanding some generally incommen-
surable views related to hope.  As Tennen, Affleck and Tennen (2002) assert, “If 
hope is a virtue, high hope individuals should pursue more virtuous goals than their 
low hope counterparts” (p. 313).  This is a prescriptive notion and what we have 
essentially suggested herein, is that psychology should not be in the business of es-
tablishing what is and what is not virtue.  This task should be left to philosophy and 
theology and should be described by psychology placing the responsibility of belief 
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primarily on the moral agent.  For now, perhaps the best we can do is to establish 
some more complex categories of moral belief.  Another, perhaps intermediate op-
tion is to utilize research methods that are more open to something of a phenome-
nological approach.  Snyder (1991) discusses this problem in the context of percep-
tion and constructivism, as described by Tennen, Affleck and Tennen (2002): 
The constructivist approach, which has generated a spate of research over 
the past decade and has been widely successful in its influence on the lay 
literature, is based on the notion that how people construe, understand, or 
appraise themselves and their world anticipates their health, well-being, and 
productivity (p. 313). 
 
This issue of perception and virtue is perhaps also related to Snyder’s goal 
orientation of hope, by considering the referential aspect of goal orientation.  This 
referential aspect seems to obliterate any attempt at objective measure and this has 
surely been a problem of psychology, to the extent that terms like moral and virtue 
seem to be dismissed with a wave of the hand as some bygone Aristotelian notions 
that simply don’t apply to contemporary psychology.  But here we offer that we can 
no longer operate under the constraints of dyadic moral understanding.  In other 
words, the moral assumption that underlies a certain psychological construct is pre-
sumed true and good, and if the agent falls outside of these parameters, then the 
agent is dismissed as outside of the norm or even counted irrational.  This is the 
position of much psychology and social science today, and this presupposing will 
simply not do. 
For those who hold a more existential moral philosophy, the consideration 
of what the conscious existence might mean in regards to hope seems important.15 
It is first interesting to note some differences in the philosophy of the more existen-
tialist thinker as compared to someone who may hold to a more religious or empiri-
cist philosophy of hope.  For the existentialist moral thinker, a way to understand 
                                                
15 Read Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) for supplementary existential under-
standing of consciousness in relation to considerations such as hope. In Being and 
Nothingness, Sartre provides an interesting perspective on existence and from this 
it is possible to infer additional aspects and conceptions of hope and hopefulness.	
Sartre, J.-P. (1966). Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological On-
tology. New York: Washington Square Press. 
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consciousness is by distinguishing between things in a sort of continuum of exist-
ence.  In order to fully understand what is meant by hope, we must first understand 
existence, and then encounter what hope is not, hence Sartre’s phrase no-thing-
ness.  So for those who hold a more existentialist moral philosophy, we should al-
low for a consideration of hope that allows for a developmental cognitive process, 
comparing hope to what it is not.  For example, hope is not freedom, hope is not 
despair, hope is not happiness, etc.  However hope is a bit more tricky than an un-
derstanding that a certain chair or a certain table, is not a certain window and is also 
recognized as not a lamp, both of which negations help me better understand the 
chair and the table.  Hope can be thought of cognitively in a similar way in that 
hope is something different than self-efficacy, although they share some common-
ality.  This aspect of existentialist thinking can be helpful in diagnosing hope for 
those who might tend to consider the world of existence in this manner (Sartre, 
1948, 1966, 1972).  What some existentialist thinkers refer to as the reflective con-
sciousness seems to have more to do with hope as a determinable action; whereas 
hopefulness, or perhaps something more like optimism, seems to be more congru-
ent with the unreflected conscious.  The unreflected conscious has been described 
as akin to a sports metaphor of being in the zone.  This is similar to what positive 
psychology refers to as optimism and something different than hope and this is 
helpful in determining agentive moral distinctions with regard to Snyder’s (2002) 
construct.  Take the basketball player who we might consider in the zone.  Making 
the basket is an aim involving a conscious hope, even if other aspects of cognition 
might dominate the process.  An example could be something like muscle memory 
that is missing certain cognitive components that make it what Snyder would con-
sider hope.  Specifically, if we remove or diminish the pathways component of 
hope so that it no longer exists or becomes something other than pathways think-
ing, then we lose the hope construct and are referring to some other phenomenon.  
Hope as hoping towards some specific goal seems consistent with what Snyder 
(2002) describes as hope and also seems more aligned to an existentialist view of 
the reflective conscious.  For the existentialist moral thinker, this form of experi-
encing hope may be something more than a simply scientifically observational or 
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strictly psychological experience of hope.  But according to Snyder’s construct, this 
something more would be better described by what Snyder might refer to as emo-
tion.  This affect of hope is not confined to existentialist thinking and will be con-
sidered in the context of Christianity and the Holy Spirit.  The point we are trying 
to emphasize here is that we measure hope through the use of Snyder’s (2002) psy-
chological construct, yet this is not the way many people understand hope.  This 
issue of definition then has implications when attempting to convert psychological 
theory to counseling practice, especially when attempting to maintain the integrity 
of moral agents. 
The limitations of Snyder’s (2002) construct do not mean it has a deficit 
that makes it nonsensical or irrelevant, but instead should be considered as captur-
ing some common understanding to be explored by way of different philosophies, 
clarifying what one means by hope without imposing a morality on hope.  We 
ought not consider the moral agent who holds a fundamental belief in an ultimately 
absurd or meaningless world to be delusional or irrational for holding this belief.  
The same could be said about the empiricist holding that hope can only be defined 
through sensory experience.  Should we treat this belief as abnormal or pathologi-
cal?  This would be a mistake from an agentive perspective of hope and will only 
lead to confusion, misdiagnosis and even a deterioration of respect for persons.  So 
how then might an empiricist moral thinker differ in a broader conception of hope 
to, say, a more existential moral agent and why does this matter? 
The more existentialist moral thinker might consider notions regarding the 
probability of hope in a different way than say, a theist, because of their perspective 
on chance.  It might mean that things that cannot be controlled affect the existen-
tialist moral schema.  For example, how others might perceive the agent.  Although 
this aspect may not dominate the existentialist’s moral thinking, it is seemingly an 
important aspect related to things that might affect hope.  There also seems to be a 
very varied notion of chaos or randomness in the world.  This is important because 
a minimization of external affects might play a role in the veracity of one’s consid-
erations regarding probabilistic notions of hope.  In other words, someone with a 
more existential moral understanding of hope may hope for something, feel ulti-
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mately responsible for the creation of pathways related to the hoped for outcome, 
yet still believe that the outcome is not achievable due to a sort of diminished agen-
cy.  It is however this focus on the self as the sole achiever in an absurd world that 
seems to differentiate a more existentialist conception of hope, which places great 
responsibility on the agent as the sole creator of one’s own existence, yet in a life 
that is essentially random.  This thinking is sure to have effects on the moral sche-
ma generally and on hope specifically.  This is a focus on the outcome of hope with 
the ever-present chance of failure, and it seems to be what Snyder (2002) refers to 
as a stressor in his model.  The point here is that the stressor may have different 
effects on the outcome values, pathways creation and agency thinking of the indi-
vidual with a more existentialist moral schema.  For the existentialist this self-
responsibility for pathways creation and agency thinking may be in certain ways 
more burdensome, but the probability of the hoped for thing not coming to fruition 
due to a stressor, or chaotic event, is still utterly present.  However, the burden on 
the self in achieving the hope is preeminent and may dominate the thoughts of the 
more existential moral thinker, and this is something a bit different to thinking 
dominated by a more theistic moral schema.  To a more existentialist moral thinker, 
the more theistic view of hope may seem like a Rawlsian veil of ignorance and 
something that may minimize personal responsibility.  A key difference here seems 
to lie in the probability of understanding and carrying out God’s will on the one 
hand, and the probability of understanding and carrying out the will of the self as 
god in an absurd and chaotic universe.  If we are to maintain a truly agentive per-
spective, both of these influences on the moral schema must be considered. 
The probability of the more existentialist moral perspective of hope being 
realized is inextricably tied to the self-made world in which the individual exists 
and the community of interaction with others who exist.  The community engage-
ment would not alleviate this type of agentive thinking as the agent maintains the 
ultimate responsibly for his or her own hope.  This thinking may also forward a 
moral schema in which no hope outside of the hope conceived by the individual 
exists.  In this sense, a more existential moral agent may be optimistic towards the 
human race or for prosperity in general, but the hope belongs to the self.  This bur-
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den of responsibility seems crushing at first, yet the existentialist moral thinker may 
see this taking on of the responsibility to hope, and the carrying out of pathways 
towards that hope, as something freeing.  To do otherwise may seem repressive and 
essentially be more like moving to act on a sort of false hope, or at least a lesser 
hope than could be otherwise realized if one would take on the full responsibility of 
their own agency and act in their hope.  The pathways toward hope within this 
moral schema may change more rapidly than pathways based on theistic beliefs due 
to this extreme focus on the self and the present.  The present is that current state in 
which the self has both the power and responsibility to change circumstances.  A 
more existentialist moral agent may consider the odds or chances of attaining hope 
but also assume a distinctive obligation in creating, controlling, amending, and in-
evitably the carrying out of pathways to hope.  This type of existentialist moral 
thinking affects the moral schema of the agent and the process of hoping. 
We should note that Bandura (2015), in describing human nature, also in-
troduces the term “potentialist” as something between applied determinism and free 
will, but the approach is not notably different than a traditional applied compatibil-
ist approach (p. 17).  His potentialism seems fitting to any approach to human na-
ture that places the human will over and above biological evolution.  Bandura 
(2015) would seem to agree more with an existentialist or theistic notion of the 
moral schema as these more easily allow for an agentive approach to being and do 
not reduce all human functioning to chemical and biological evolutionary func-
tions.  While this is a bit of speculation, we can be sure that Bandura (2015) places 
great emphasis on environmental and social factors: 
People are not merely reactive products of selection by environmental pres-
sures served up by a one-sided evolutionism.  They not only are prime play-
ers in the coevolution process but gain ascendancy in the codetermination 
process by altering their life conditions at a dizzying pace (p. 22). 
 
This is of course Bandura’s (2015) reaction against any strict deterministic 
view that might strip the agent of moral judgment.  This view is easier to conceptu-
alize within our more existentialist or theistic moral perspective since the freedom 
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of the will maintains its preeminence over evolution and in a situation where “bio-
logical endowment is [not] treated as the ruling force” (p. 21). 
 
A More Theistic Understanding of Hope 
A more theistic moral schema leads to something very different than a more 
deterministic, or existential view of hope.  As noted earlier, hope for the more exis-
tentialist moral thinker is centered on the self, and then, other things in relation to 
the self.  Hope for the more empiricist moral thinker is centered on the descriptive 
aspects of hope, and then, inferences that might be developed from these descrip-
tive aspects.  For the more theistic moral agent, hope is centered on the belief in 
God as the primary actor, while the self and the descriptive are something like se-
cond-order facets of hope.  In this sense, aspects of hope may be related to the self, 
but are not dependent on the self.  For a more theistic moral agent, hope is more of 
a gift that is given to those who place their faith in God. 
It is important to emphasize that the conflict between various philosophies 
is not the focus of this inquiry, and the intent is to understand different views on 
hope and not advocate for any particular moral philosophy.  Instead we understand 
the moral schema as a priori to an understanding of psychological hope and that 
this form of inquiry should be a concern of moral psychology, and therefore believe 
the dissection of the moral schema into something like incommensurate moral cat-
egories can be advantageous in developing new understanding of the psychology of 
hope.  This is potentially beneficial to understanding hope in the context of plural-
istic societies such as the U.S. Military.  So we are deficient if we do not address 
the common theistic worldview. 
For a more theistic analysis of the moral schema, we pay special attention to 
a prevailing American Evangelical view of Christian theism found in large popula-
tions in the United States in general and specifically in the U.S. Military establish-
ment.  The more theistic moral agent’s hope is sometimes professed as more of a 
certainty.  However, this form of hope is different than what Snyder (2002) offers.  
This more certain hope is a kind of conviction of belief in such things as the return 
of Christ, and equivalent to truth.  For many theistic moral agents, it would be con-
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sidered something heretical to consider hope in terms of probability, except perhaps 
in the context of timing.  Optimism is also something a bit different in that opti-
mism might be desired generally, but can better satisfy a requirement of probabil-
ity.  Hope, by way of faith, is something believed to be both certain for many theis-
tic moral agents, and from their perspective something altogether unknowable for 
the non-theistic moral agent.  This preliminary position might make it somewhat 
challenging for the theistic moral agent to have a fruitful dialogue with, say, a more 
empiricist moral agent, since an initial claim is that the non-theistic moral position 
essentially cannot know true hope.  Pieper (1965) makes the argument that the 
Christian’s hope is a gift from God.  This gift is not a particularly special problem 
for the Christian.  The more existentialist moral agent might argue that the Chris-
tian in this sense is simply blinded by the veil of tradition.  Instead of allowing this 
epistemological non-starter to dominate, we suggest focusing on the moral psy-
chology of the agent, allowing the agent to determine the moral parameters and on-
tological aspects of belief that may affect psychological processes. 
There seem to be two highly important aspects of belief for the more theis-
tic moral agent, and in this case specifically the evangelical Christian, and its rela-
tionship with Snyder’s (2002) hope construct.  The first relates to belief in the reve-
lation of Jesus Christ, and how this revelation is a most essential communication 
from God to humankind, otherwise known as the gospel of Jesus Christ.  For the 
evangelical Christian theistic moral agent, this knowledge is essential to all things 
related to true hope, and any specific hope without this revelation, is not really 
hope at all but something more akin to desire.  Another important aspect is related 
to the relevance of the belief in communication with the divine through prayer and 
God’s outworking in the world.  Both of these aspects of belief are important in 
understanding the effects this form of belief may have on the moral schema and 
also the construct of psychological hope.  Specifically, Snyder (2002) seems to del-
egate these forms of interaction between belief and cognitive judgment to emotion.  
Yet, this simplistic understanding relegating all interaction between belief and cog-
nition to emotion or feelings would likely be offensive to the more theistic moral 
agent.  Instead, we want to allow the beliefs of the moral agent to offer an under-
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standing of hope without degrading such beliefs, invoking the principle of respect 
for persons. 
If we wish to understand a more theistic notion of hope, we should take into 
account things such as faith and perspectives on reason, which are appreciably re-
lated to hope.  The credo of Anselm of Canterbury was “I believe so that I may un-
derstand”, from the Latin Credo ut intelligam, which was adopted from St. Augus-
tine.16  This implies a distinctly different assumption to what might be found in 
some other moral philosophies.  Belief in this sense comes prior to an understand-
ing of such things as hope.  Without this conviction of belief, the idea of hope is 
destined to be confused with something altogether different.  From a Christian per-
spective, the belief in Jesus Christ as a part of the triune godhead allows one to ex-
perience the power of God through the Holy Spirit, and this belief is what leads to a 
more authentic understanding of hope.  Of course what is meant by in Christ is 
both simple and complicated.  This belief is not simply that the person of Jesus 
Christ existed, it is a belief in the life, death and resurrection of Christ, that he was 
and is God, and that only through His power may we have authentic hope.  This is 
to offer one’s entire being to Him freely.17  Wolterstorff (1984) clarifies a philo-
sophical distinction when he states, “Augustine points to the phenomenon of abso-
lutizing as a clue.  Instead of taking God as absolute, the unbeliever absolutizes 
something else” (p. 32).  With this in mind, let us turn to how, more generally 
speaking, the theist might formulate a coherent understanding of hope by way of a 
more theologically based moral schema.  As noted earlier, the Christian hope be-
gins with a belief in the revelation of Jesus Christ.  This revelation is commonly 
broken into general revelation and special revelation.  Broadly speaking, general 
revelation, sometimes referred to as natural revelation, refers to the discovery of 
God by natural means such as reason, observation, and sense data; but also and 
perhaps most importantly for this analysis, includes the spiritual realm related to 
the agent’s conscience.  The evangelical perspective of general revelation does not 
                                                
16See Chapter 30 in Turner, W. (1903). History of Philosophy. 
17 See the Apostle Paul’s letters to the Corinthians (2 Cor 5:14-18; 8:5). 
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provide by way of reason, the knowledge of God.  Berkouwer (1959) makes this 
point quite clear: 
To speak of the general revelation of God does not in any respect mean do-
ing less than justice to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Rather, it em-
phasizes the guilt and lost condition, the darkness and the blindness, of fall-
en man, who sees the works of God’s hand no more, and no longer can dis-
cover God therein (pp. 16). 
 
In the evangelical tradition in the United States, God’s general revelation, 
which Berkouwer (1959) also deems to be sufficient for God’s judgment of hu-
mankind, is a consideration of belief that should not be overlooked when examin-
ing the moral schema of the agent.  For a more existentialist non-theistic moral 
thinker, this theistic view may be considered a sort of self-imposed veil of religion 
that creates a sort of blindness to the freedom of reality.  Likewise for the theist, the 
existentialist is oblivious to an appreciation for the general revelation of God.  Of 
course, proponents of both worldviews might believe that the strict anti-theistic 
empiricist is closed to anything metaphysical and beyond the testable senses.  This 
is of course one of the fundamental issues when trying to define something such as 
hope in a pluralistic yet agentive context.  The outcome of these different views is 
often what seems like inconsistency but may be better treated as paradox.  Unfortu-
nately, it seems that in a relational context, there is often a greater risk of coercion 
and imposition upon the moral agent, as opposed to an open willingness to under-
stand and accept someone else’s beliefs.  For many theists, especially in the United 
States, the revelation of God also includes another type of revelation found in sa-
cred texts, which also provides a foundation for some agents’ moral schema. 
According to a broad-based consensus in Protestant Christian traditions, 
special revelation has been provided to humankind due to the sinful state of the 
human and God’s willingness to restore “fellowship” with humankind; Enns (2008) 
comments for example:  “…it was essential that God reveal the way of salvation 
and reconciliation; hence, the essence of special revelation centers on the person of 
Jesus Christ” (p. 161).  This is important for an understanding of a more theistic 
moral agent who might view sacred texts as an ultimate authority.  Often, in the 
United States, when a Christian from the Protestant tradition speaks of things such 
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as hope, there is ordinarily an implied connection to the special revelation provided 
by God through the life and words of Jesus Christ and found in Biblical texts.  This 
can be an exceedingly uncomfortable foundational belief for some psychologists, 
who may hold very incommensurable beliefs than those that gird the moral schema 
of many theistic agents. 
This is not an easy concept to grasp from other incommensurable moral 
perspectives, because the moral theist includes God’s authority on all matters moral 
or otherwise.  Many American Protestant Christians suppose that the belief in God 
involves willingness on the part of the individual, as well as the grace bestowed by 
God onto the individual, that allows one to be secure in their belief of eternal salva-
tion and the prospect of spending life after death in the presence of God.  This be-
comes a form of ultimate hope common in American Evangelical Christianity.  
This particular kind of Christian hope could be incorrectly connected to the other 
incommensurable moral philosophies by understanding it as optimism.  Optimism 
has a connotation of uncertainty, and therefore a more theistic moral agent might 
reject this idea on the basis of it being something akin to a probabilistic heresy.  
This contradictory type of belief makes counseling situations exceedingly risky in 
terms of moral disengagement, which we will explore later.   
In order to understand a more evangelical type of Christian hope commonly 
found in the United States, we cannot overlook belief involving this form of ulti-
mate hope.  The two are interconnected forms of hope, which might be understood 
in Snyder’s (2002) construct in terms of his “developmental lessons of correlation 
and causality” (p. 254).  These are a part of Snyder’s “learning history” of the 
agent, which are also the basis for the agent’s moral schema (p. 254). 
The hope of the more theistic moral agent is often based on justification 
through faith and by God’s grace and is fundamentally connected to both peace and 
joy for many American Evangelical and Protestant Christians.  By peace, these 
Christians tend to mean something like the ability to live one’s life without the peril 
of damnation, or experiencing some other complete separation from God after 
death.  Theistic moral agents often connect particular hopes that are morally bound 
by one’s love for Jesus Christ and an understanding of his teachings or interpreta-
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tions of his teachings by the church.  The notion of joy is also connected to this ul-
timate hope but can be experienced in the present.  MacDonald (1995) states: “It is 
one of the delightful paradoxes of the Christian faith that joy can coexist with af-
fliction.  The opposite of joy is sin, not suffering” (p.  1696).  In this sense, the ul-
timate hope cannot be completely separated from present particular hopes.  Often 
for the more theistic moral agent, the belief in eternal salvation can produce joy in 
the present, which in turn produces determination in character, which then results 
in ultimate hope. 
This particular hope then, for many Christians, can be closely related to 
Snyder’s (2002) construct which includes the creation of pathways to the goal of 
hope and the agency required to engage in such pathways, yet the Christian’s par-
ticular hope also works a bit differently.  Pathways and agency related to the object 
of hope can be realized by the more theistic moral agent in the same way Snyder 
(1994, 2002) proposes, however, the teaching of Christian doctrine allows for au-
thentic particular hope to be different in nature.  The mechanism for activation of 
pathways to hope is not the self, but God.  Snyder (2002) might understand this ac-
tivation as part of emotions.  The American Christian understanding of hope takes 
on agency and pathways of Snyder’s (2002) hope construct in unique ways since 
“rectification with God, hope, eschatological glory, patience in suffering, the love 
of God, the Spirit of God, and the death of Christ” cannot be separated without 
consequence (Witherington, 2004, p. 131).  Having such beliefs may create in-
commensurability between two moral agents, which might cause moral disengage-
ment that could impact either agent in the relationship. 
It is particularly challenging to completely reconcile the agency aspect of 
Snyder’s (2002) conception of hope with evangelical Christian thinking such as 
that forwarded by Berkouwer (1959).  For many theistic moral agents, the notion of 
agency rests ultimately in one’s faithfulness to God.  The divide in thinking lies in 
a sort of ultimate self-reliance.  Many theistic moral agents believe that, through 
faith, God will provide the necessary agency required by the individual, but the 
source of this agency cannot be attributed to the self, otherwise there is danger re-
lated to the sin of pride.  It is at this point that certain moral agents will claim in-
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compatibility, incommensurability or some other objection related to the inability 
to synchronize agentive theory.  However, moral agents should not use this as a 
reason to end the relationship.  The agent should instead venture further into the 
meaning behind these challenging aspects of philosophy, theology, theory and 
practice.  This is a journey of understanding that MacIntrye (1981) encourages as a 
virtuous endeavor. 
We should consider that for the theist, there is the belief that pathways are 
affected through an ongoing relationship with God and that the power of the affect 
lies in the relationship.  So the theist is dually responsible for developing pathways 
to temporal goals that are consistent with ultimate goals, but may appeal to God for 
such things as endurance, wisdom, and discernment prior to and during the process 
of creating pathways.  This can be understood in Snyder’s (2002) context by way of 
his affective elements that have a reciprocal relationship with agency and pathways 
thinking.  Additionally, the more theistic moral agent often believes that God can 
directly affect both the creation of and one’s ability to realize goals that are good.  
These are those goals that are congruent with such things as theological teachings, 
Scripture, or communion with the Holy Spirit.  This is surely outside of what 
Snyder (2002) intends to captures with emotion.   
Snyder (1999) attributes high scores on his Hope Scale to better attitudes of 
well-being and stronger self-esteem.  For the more theistic moral agent it seems 
more obvious to attribute the first aspect of well-being here to a belief in God who 
is watching, protecting from evil, and has the agent’s best interest in a perfect long-
term plan.  One can understand how this type of thinking might assist the more the-
istic moral agent in times of hardship by bestowing some sense of well-being re-
gardless of the actual circumstances.  This sense of well-being could provide great 
resolve for the faithful individual who is confident in an ultimate hope beyond the 
current circumstances and has the faith that God’s plan is perfect regardless of the 
present conditions.  This type of well-being could also be powerful for the more 
theistic moral agent because pathways and agency are only wrong if they are not 
finally good, somehow contrary to God’s will.  So, the more theistic moral agent 
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may be more resolved to develop pathways pleasing to God and so fulfill their own 
well-being through faith. 
For many theistic moral agents, goals cannot be divorced from God.  They 
must always be synergistic with God’s plan for the believer’s life.  If the goals are 
not good in this sense, then pathways cannot be fully supported by the accompany-
ing moral schema.  What we might call evil goals may cause cognitive dissonance 
for theistic moral agents.  For example, the agent may have the personal goal of 
buying a new house, without God having approved this goal in the mind of the 
agent.  What can then be said about God’s response to this hope?  Perhaps it would 
be considered that this is not good hope at all.  On the other hand, this belief in the 
search for God’s will could allow the more theistic moral agent to continually seek 
new goals and new pathways through something like prayer or meditation.  Cogni-
tive dissonance related to goals for the theistic moral agent is evidence of moral 
disengagement and hope that is not authentic. 
The probability that any particular hope might be realized should not be in-
validated even if the agent, as the theist might, places all possibilities in the hands 
of God.  In other words, there exists a maintaining of agency, since the individual 
cannot comprehend the future relative to God’s plan.  There is still a probabilistic 
notion of hope that can be assigned to the theistic moral agent.  However, this no-
tion of hope might be perceived differently than other agents’.  In one sense, the 
theistic moral agent might assume full responsibility in actions related to fulfilling 
the hope they believe is the will of God.  The agent may believe they are provided 
with strength or endurance by God to both create and maintain pathways to hope, 
but the outcome cannot be known in a certain temporal sense. 
The more theistic moral agent, especially in the United States, often claims 
guidance from sacred texts such as the Bible, or even to possess wisdom through 
communication with the divine.  However, if the agent truly believes God has re-
vealed a particular hope, then we are no longer speaking of hope, in the sense that 
there is no perceived chance of failure related to the hoped for thing.  There may be 
a lack of faith, but the constraints of certainty no longer allow for hope to be 
Snyder’s (2002) conception of hope.  Instead, we must consider that the hoped for 
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thing for the theistic moral agent, might be determined through reason as an inter-
action with the divine. 
So for the theistic moral agent, particular hope is always related to a sort of 
yearning that the outworking of God in the world is fulfilled, but also an under-
standing that the agent cannot know God’s exact plan.  This yearning can be ac-
commodated in part by Snyder’s (2002) affective dimensions.  There is a form of 
uncertainty present in the mind of most theistic moral agents, which allows for the 
notion of probability.  However, the theistic moral agent may speak of this proba-
bility in different terms related to hope since faith in the sovereignty and will of 
God exists on one hand, and a living-by-faith exists on the other, which creates a 
sort of paradox.  This may be communicated as a sort of certainty on the part of 
theists due to a matter of conviction but it should not be confused with certainty in 
the context of Snyder’s (2002) conception of hope.  The common ground between 
various agents may be found in the unknowableness of particular hopes.  There is a 
seeking for a relatively good hope in all agentive moral accounts, and there is typi-
cally a search for pathways related to that hope.  There also seems to be a form of 
creativity and self-efficacy related to pathways, even if the source of that creativity 
is claimed to be ultimately different.  Finally, there is the unknowable outcome re-
lated to any particular hope.  The more theistic moral agent may articulate this un-
knowableness differently, but it still exists, otherwise the agent claims to either be 
God or know the mind of God, which is something altogether different to hope.  
Hence, there is a chance that the hoped for thing is either misleading, in other 
words not good hope at all, or that the thing hoped for is not part of God’s plan in 
the same way, time or place that the agent conceptualizes the hope. 
The more theistic moral agent is assumed to activate mechanisms of moral 
disengagement, pathways, agency and goals in a different way than the more em-
piricist or existentialist moral agent.  An understanding of these various assump-
tions is important when considering relationships between agents and should not be 
overlooked in situations where counseling is a primary purpose of establishing the 
relationship.  
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The Moral Nature of Hope 
Thus far we have considered hope in regards to three common moral posi-
tions common in a modern pluralistic society or diverse organization in the West, 
specifically in the United States.  Research also suggests a relationship between the 
greater prospects of personal hope as measured by Snyder and colleagues and there 
being a lower propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions. In 
Snyder’s (2002) hope construct there seems to be an implied moral aspect.  This 
aspect is treated in an agentic fashion, which is morally subjective.  The assumed 
agency and pathways related to the goals of hope must be morally consistent with 
the individual’s moral schema.  The goals themselves must also be consistent with 
one’s moral schema.  Otherwise, the individual contradicts his or her own moral 
character, a concept that refers to moral consistency over the long term.  However, 
it is obviously not the case that the goals, pathways and agency associated with 
hope are always consistent with one’s moral schema.  This is the basis for the con-
nection to Bandura’s (1999) notion of moral disengagement.   
Consider a specific moral question related to hope, something like, is it 
wrong to hope for the murder of an evil dictator?  First, we need to inquire as to 
whether this is truly hope in the mind of the agent or if, although certain individuals 
may use the word hope, the actual meaning of their hope is something other than 
Snyder’s (2002) conception of hope, or it is otherwise hope that is not consistent 
with their own moral schema.  The answer is of course dependent upon the agent 
although the presuppositions may be different, depending on the structure of the 
individual’s moral schema.  If the agent assumes something of a consequentialist 
ethic related to the outcome value, they may believe that it is generally wrong to 
kill, yet this moral principle can be trumped by another principle related to what the 
agent considers a greater good, which may justify the agent in hoping for such a 
thing without them compromising their own agentic moral schema.  Another moral 
agent may hold to more of a Kantian Categorical Imperative and believe that it is 
never right to kill regardless of the consequences or outcome.  In essence, the moral 
schema of the individual can determine something about the outcome value of 
hope.  Of course, an inconsistency can occur with this same agent where the out-
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come value of hope appears coherent, but where the agent disengages from his or 
her own moral self-sanctions. 
For the more theistic moral agent who believes in objective truth, their ethic 
can be derived from an interpretation of God’s revelation.  In the case of the killing 
of the evil dictator, the individual might justify hope without compromising his or 
her own moral schema.  However, many American Christians differentiate between 
what is meant by killing and murder.  So even in this seemingly straightforward 
example, there can still be a disengagement of moral self-sanctions directed at the 
outcome value of hope. 
A more difficult question might be related to understanding whether hoped 
for things, agency related to hope, and pathways to things hoped for, could be 
amoral.  For some this may not be possible.  To the more theistic moral agent this 
amoral notion seems problematic if all things must inevitably correspond to God’s 
revelation.  If hope includes agency, then there is a moral aspect to that agency be-
cause “Christian eschatology directs us not only toward the end times but also to 
responsibilities in the present day to work for God’s praise and glory” (Reed, 2007, 
p. 82).  The responsibility of the agent should include both cognitive and conative 
aspects of hope for the Christian in search of God’s will, where hoping is consistent 
with God’s plan. 
Hopes are not necessarily equally morally relevant to the individual at any 
single moment.  In other words, hopes hold value in time.  From an agentic per-
spective, the individual assumes the overall aspect of morality related to hoping and 
each particular hope is subject to the agent’s moral schema to the degree the agent 
recognizes the relationship through some sort of conscious reflection.  That all hope 
from an agentic perspective is necessarily moral is key in understanding a relation-
ship to the disengagement of moral self-sanctions, regardless of a priori assump-
tions. 
Consequences of Moral Disengagement and Religious Thinking on Hope 
The relationship between hope and moral disengagement is reciprocal in na-
ture.  The strength of beliefs, and perhaps aspects of faith, and ultimate authority 
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related to the agent’s moral schema are important aspects of hope, when consider-
ing any particular agent.  Martin (2013) takes an encyclopedic approach in analyz-
ing hope, which offers a unique and robust perspective.  An encyclopedic approach 
also lends itself to the categorization of individuals into having one kind of hope or 
another, as opposed to attempting to understand how the agent has come to deter-
mine what hope means.  This is not a moral categorization but a more intense focus 
on how hope happens psychologically. 
Martin attempts to deal with subjectively varied understandings of hope 
through a justificatory approach.  While critiquing Ariel Meirav, she states, “…he 
[Meirav] is right that the difference between hope and despair is a matter of the jus-
tificatory attitude one adopts.  He is also right to call this attitude a way of ‘seeing’ 
rather than a belief” (Martin, 2013, p. 58).  This aspect of seeing hope emphasized 
a process approach to hope, although the process of hope does seem inextricably 
tied to beliefs.  The individual’s perceived attitude is agentive, and reciprocally re-
lated to the agent’s own rational beliefs.  However, the rational ultimately belongs 
to the agent, otherwise we start to describe pathology.  There is no categorical dif-
ference between good or bad hope if we assume that the agent is a conscious being 
and responsible for their underlying beliefs and a rational deliberation that leads to 
attitudinal formation.  Martin (2013) offers essentially that if hope happens, there 
will be differences in the strength of hope.  For example, there is a distinguishing 
aspect among agents where hope seems to be stronger in one agent under certain 
circumstances, a type of hoping against hope.  Martin (2013) indicates that working 
with cancer patients inspired her initial interests in hope.  She compares two pa-
tients’ conceptions of hope and describes the result as, “there is some sense in 
which her hope [Bess’s] is higher or greater or stronger than Alan’s” (Martin, 2013, 
p. 48).  Martin initially investigates what she refers to as the orthodox definition of 
hope to help us understand that this orthodox, or what might be understood as a 
more traditional western, definition fails to account for some aspects of hope, spe-
cifically this greater or stronger aspect observed in some cases of individuals who 
hold hope for the same object.  It seems that the moral emphasis one places on such 
things as Snyder’s (2002) outcome value are relevant.  A greater conviction related 
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to the moral schema can certainly influence the value of hoped for outcomes.  The 
propensity for moral disengagement related to the outcome value of the hoped for 
thing is also influential.  Bandura (1999) does not suggest otherwise in that activa-
tion of mechanisms of moral disengagement can assuage a little or a great deal of 
the guilt associated with a questionable outcome.  Hence Snyder’s (2002) focus on 
this value aspect of hope.  This greater or lesser form of hope is something that 
cannot be set aside by claims of irrationality if we grant the agent rationality based 
upon their own beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behavioral manifestations related 
to hope. 
Referencing an earlier example, Martin (2013) analyzes the movie The 
Shawshank Redemption and offers that that Andy and Reds’ attitudes related to the 
hope of escape from the prison differ greatly.  Martin states that Andy and Red, 
“plausibly share the same desire and probability estimates” related to the freedom 
from prison (p. 49), but that Andy seems to have a greater hope than Red.  She 
points out that the orthodox definition cannot account fully for this difference.  
“Mental imaging”, which refers to something like visualization, seems somewhat 
insufficient to account for the hope described in this case, as well as other cases she 
presents (p. 52).  When considering mental imaging and an agentive perspective of 
hope, the individual’s hope may be framed in the context of the individual’s moral 
schema.  We can then attempt to account for comparative differences in hope be-
tween individuals who presumably hope for the same goal or outcome, but display 
different attitudes toward the goal or behavioral manifestations related to the out-
come.  Consider the difference between Red, who seems not to be overly hopeful 
for his freedom from prison, compared to Andy, who is exceedingly hopeful to-
wards his freedom.  Morally speaking, Red may believe he deserves to be punished 
for his crime, more so than Andy, who is notably innocent of the crime he is ac-
cused of.  But, even if this is not the case, Red might still be contented with prison 
life, and while someone other than Red may not understand why he might not want 
to be free as Andy does, it is surely reasonable that this might be the case.  In the 
The Shawshank Redemption, Red committed a crime and Andy did not, yet both 
were sentenced to life in prison.  Andy and Red are both presented as warranting 
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their freedom regardless of their former actions.  Still, when we consider the 
agent’s moral schema in relation to the hope they have regarding freedom, it is not 
difficult to understand why they may have the same desire to be free, but have dif-
fering hopes toward that objective, or to use Snyder’s term, goal - since, from an 
agentive perspective, the agent’s moral schema is treated as unique and distinct 
(otherwise, there is no autonomous agency). 
Desire to achieve a hoped for goal or objective is an attitude reflective of 
the agent’s interaction with his or her own moral schema.  We may have a strong 
desire for something we believe is good or worthy and is completely in line with 
our own moral schema.  However, we may also begin a process of hope and con-
currently activate psychological mechanisms of moral disengagement.  In other 
words, we can disengage from our own moral self-sanctions in order to assuage 
associations of guilt or conscience related to the goal.  This becomes complicated 
because whether the agent actually believes in the goodness or the hope is, for our 
purposes, the ultimate responsibility of the agent, as is the issue related to activat-
ing mechanisms of moral disengagement in order to hold a consistent attitude to-
ward a hoped for thing.  The addition of relationships complicates this hope pro-
cess. 
Consider Air Force members piloting UAVs in a combat zone during Oper-
ation Enduring Freedom.  Pilot A hopes for the destruction of the enemy with min-
imal collateral damage.  This mission may be carried to completion and the hope 
fulfilled without any disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  Here the pilot be-
lieves the enemy should be destroyed and there is no cognitive or conative disso-
nance.  However, Pilot B may hope for the same outcome, while being somewhat 
unsure of his ultimate authority to kill anyone, even the enemy, much less children 
who may be helping the enemy by bringing them food and who happen to be in the 
area of the strike zone.  How is it that both of these pilots may display the same 
kind of hope?  It is possible to understand this observational similarity by taking 
into account the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  Simply put, Pilot B can 
activate mechanisms of moral disengagement in order to carry out the hoped-for 
objective of destroying the enemy.  Furthermore, at the time this is happening, Pilot 
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B may be unaware of the activation of these mechanisms of disengagement and it 
may only be years later that this dissonance with his or her own moral schema 
comes to light.  It is reasonable that this issue of hope related to moral disengage-
ment is also related to other issues such as PTSD and self-destructive behaviors.  
Now, focus on the behaviorally manifested state as compared to the full state, from 
belief to action, which includes the agent’s moral schema.  If both states allow for 
the alignment of the agent’s own moral schema, then there should be no direct ef-
fect regarding different levels or greatness of hope.  If however, Pilot A is in line 
with his or her moral schema, whilst Pilot B is activating mechanisms of moral dis-
engagement in order to fulfill a hoped for outcome, it is reasonable to assume that 
there will be differences in the behavioral manifestations which could be easily 
translated as variations in the agents’ strength of hope. 
In a similar light, the probability of achieving one’s goal or objective is tied 
to one’s moral schema.  Here we need to consider how the agent might think about 
probability in general as well as consider the probability of success related to an 
associated hope.  One of the inherent difficulties related to understanding how an 
agent might understand any assigned probability corresponds to the issue of per-
sonal philosophy related to what is and what ought to be.  We do not suggest that 
an agent is actually considering this is/ought problem for each hope, but we do 
suggest that this problem is relevant and should not be completely overlooked 
when discussing hope in the context of probabilities.  An individual may accept a 
standard of probability, such as is found in the social sciences with confidence in-
tervals of 95 or 99 percent, which allows for a 5 or 1 percent significance level, and 
interpret the results as both what is and what ought to be.  This essentially means 
that, in the standard case of social science, up to 5 percent of results can involve a 
rejection of a null hypothesis.  Of course, people do not go around formally conjur-
ing up hypotheses, null hypotheses, and what the probability of error threshold will 
be, then calculating the data in an attempt to determine what they might consider 
truth, wondering whether they might have committed a type I or type II statistical 
error.  However, some people do view the world in this way.  So if probability in 
hope is to be utilized in understanding hope, conscious psychological mechanisms 
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must be implied in order that the agent is able to make sense of something like 
probability or chance of success (Black, 1964). 
Nevertheless, there are some fundamental aspects related to hope and prob-
ability that should initially be explored from more philosophical perspectives.  It 
seems problematic that an observer could assign any authentic value to an agent’s 
hope relating to the probability of success, beyond having some understanding of 
how the agent might perceive and communicate those odds.  But consider the per-
son who claims that they do not believe in odds because of a belief that “God 
doesn’t play dice.”18  It seems that there are several issues we must face in order to 
accommodate this type of moral agent, or otherwise we must consider them simply 
irrational and move on.  Therefore, at the outset of any exploration of hope, we 
should consider how one understands probability related to hope.  If by probability 
we mean to include some completely external influencer, or an external influence 
that somehow works through the agent, then we might be able to better understand 
the hope of this sort of agent.  So in this case the agent may hope for something that 
is completely consistent with his or her own moral schema and that their belief sys-
tem includes, for example, a sovereign God.  In one sense this could mean that an 
individual is not really hoping independently, but that they are simply trying to un-
derstand the will of God and then respectively hope for that outcome.  In this case 
hope simply becomes a means.  This line of thinking requires a belief in some infi-
nite force, and in one sense perhaps countering probabilistic thinking. 
 
Hoping and Disengaging from Moral Self-sanctions 
It is important to consider the aspects of rationality, probability, and auton-
omy in agency if one is to understand how the disengagement of moral self-
sanctions might influence hope.  Although proponents of Rational Choice Theory 
may wish to focus on a broader spectrum of social behavior, and although moral 
                                                
18 This famous quote is not used here as Einstein intended.  His was a meta-
physical understanding of order.  However, some people do interpret his meaning 
in this way to synthesize their understanding of God as being fully omnipotent, 
omnipresent, and omniscient and in complete control of all things. 
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behavior can be considered a social behavior, the intent here is to continue to allow 
the individual to assume full agency within the context of their own moral sche-
ma.19  Arguments that begin with an attempt to define morality for the individual 
can be helpful, especially in a social or organizational context.  However, factoring 
in the autonomy of the individual moral agent is necessary to understand such 
things as hope and the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  Otherwise, we are 
not really talking about self-sanctions. 
Martin (2013) provides a logical association of hope with moral self-
sanctioning through her incorporation analysis, where there is a special focus on 
desire.  She specifically describes an aspect where an individual might incorporate 
their desire into personal agency.  This licensing provides reasoning for the motiva-
tion to conduct activities related to the hoped for thing.  In a different manner, we 
might say that licensing provides the agency to desire the pathways to hope.  This 
is not exactly what Martin means by her incorporation analysis, but it does allow us 
to focus on a specific aspect of hope that she elucidates well, which is a licensing 
aspect of hope.  We should consider the practical norms associated with licensing 
and incorporating one’s desires into their own agency, but also consider the reasons 
for engagement with activities related to the pathways of hope.  These reasons 
might affect one’s propensity to disengage from moral self-sanctions, explicitly the 
justificatory reasons for the assumption of agency related to the creation and fol-
low-on activities related to hope. 
Bandura (1999) provides several specific instances of moral disengagement 
through the activation of psychological mechanisms.  These mechanisms are relat-
ed to Martin’s (2013) notion of licensing within her incorporation analysis.  For 
example, we might consider Bandura’s argument that moral agency is “manifested 
in both the power to refrain from behaving inhumanely and the proactive power to 
behave humanely” (Bandura, 1999, p. 193).  It is logical that there is a noteworthy 
relationship between licensing in hope and a proactive power to behave.  Further-
                                                
19 The major controversy in Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is related to 
norms and to economic utility, and the necessary autonomy from such utility.  See 
Opp (2012) for a detailed analysis of the social science controversy related to RCT. 
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more, this connection could be considered a causal relationship.  It is reasonable 
that one must first license the desire for the practical attitudes related to hoping be-
fore one can proactively engage in activities related to the hoped for behavior.  The 
latter is included in Snyder’s (2002) pathways.  A follow-on question should of 
course inquire as to the nature of the agent’s licensing and that relationship to the 
agent’s moral schema. 
The obvious connection is the association between the argument that hope 
by incorporation is licensed and that licensing can be affected by psychological 
mechanisms related to the selective disengagement of moral self-sanctions, which 
can be activated to allow for such licensing.  This may at first seem counterintuitive 
and so an example might be in order.  To develop this idea, consider Martin’s 
(2013) cancer patients Alan and Bess.  In Martin’s story, Alan and Bess have the 
same diagnosis of cancer and both hope for an unlikely outcome by enrolling in an 
experimental cancer treatment program.  However, Alan seems to hope something 
of a lesser hope than Bess, who likely seems overly optimistic about the treatment, 
from Alan’s perspective.  One of the causes of such a lessening of hope might be 
found in the strength of agency that might occur if one has activated mechanisms of 
moral disengagement in order to justify the hoped for outcome.  Perhaps Alan 
thinks about the economic cost of his treatment for his family.  On the one hand he 
wants to live, but he is also confident that his treatment may simply prolong some 
kind of suffering for his family.  Alan may utilize moral justification, palliative 
comparison and euphemistic labeling to assuage the guilt associated with hurting 
his family.  He may also utilize diffusion or displacement of responsibility to make 
this hope morally palatable.  For example, he may ask his family what they think he 
should do, knowing full well that they will offer their full support for any treat-
ment, thereby diffusing his own moral agency related to the treatment option cho-
sen. 
This moral disengagement associated with hope can surely have an effect 
on what might be perceived as a sort of altruistic hope.  A strength in the hope that, 
prior to a sort of deep reflection, might be thought of as providing the twofold 
strength of agency as well as a fortitude regarding the creation and execution of 
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pathways to hope.  Moral disengagement related to hoping is also reasonably asso-
ciated with the incorporation of desire, specifically the licensing of such desire to-
ward hope.  Hence, moral disengagement related to hope might help explain Mar-
tin’s (2013) observation of the cancer patients Alan and Bess, who both seem to 
equally desire the cure, but where Alan seems to have a slighter hope than Bess. 
Understanding a more detailed account of the relationship between the dis-
engagement of moral self-sanctions and hope will allow us to better account for 
forms of lesser or greater hope.  A lesser or greater hope can be affected by moral 
disengagement during what Martin (2013) refers to as the incorporation element of 
hope because it better explains the variation in hope that might occur where there 
seems on the one hand the same probability of the hoped for outcome and the iden-
tical potency of desire, but on the other hand where one person may still seems less 
hopeful than the other.  This is essentially the disengagement of moral self-
sanctions combined with Martin’s (2013) account of what she refers to as hoping 
against hope as an increase in the licensing of the adoption of desire for hope.  To-
gether, the characteristics of moral disengagement and licensing related to the in-
corporation aspect of hope, allow us to plausibly explain perceived variation in ob-
servations related to hope and moral agency. 
Snyder, Sigmund and Feldman (2002) conclude, “Many of the costs and 
benefits of Religion may be explained by hope theory” (p. 237).  This connection 
assists in understanding a relationship between hope, religion and moral disen-
gagement.  We will discuss the specific relationship between intrinsic religiosity 
and moral disengagement at some length but will consider the more general notion 
of religion and hope.  The advent of positive psychology has allowed psychology to 
move beyond the idea that religion is simply some manifestation of mass neurosis 
or pathology and instead that religious belief and practices are a part of psychologi-
cal phenomena that can be studied and that help explain and predict human behav-
ior, conation and cognition.  Religion can affect mental health and well-being in 
positive and negative ways, but herein we agree with Snyder et al. in that religion 
as a phenomenon is a result of normal psycho-social behaviors and explainable 
through psychological processes and constructs (p. 234).  In fact, our research sup-
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ports the idea that certain kinds of religiosity or spirituality are more effective than 
others in positively affecting psychological processes.  We have also supported the 
notion that hope and intrinsic religiosity are different psychological constructs that 
both positively correlate and together are important in predicting one’s propensity 
for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions. 
Snyder, Sigmund & Feldman (2002) remind us that goals are targets of 
cognitive processes and purposeful behavior.  Goals vary in things like abstractness 
and time.  Some goals are more easily mentally imaged than others and some take 
many years to achieve.  Other goals may never fully be achieved in the normal 
lifespan.  Yet, Snyder’s construct includes cognitive mechanisms related to the pur-
suit of all goals captured in pathways thinking and agency, but important to our ex-
amination of intrinsic religiosity, “the subjective experience of hopefulness does 
not depend on the actual existence or reality of such pathways” (p. 235).  Since the 
notion of agency in hope is also based on perception, there seems no reason that 
subjective religious beliefs would differ from any other sort of beliefs in their abil-
ity to motivate one to utilize developed pathways.  Specific goals can be considered 
religious when the agent ties them to larger abstract religious goals.  The religious-
ness of goals may have a greater or lesser effect on pathways and agency relative to 
the intrinsic religious connection to the outcome value.  Therefore goals can be-
come sacred in terms of the agent’s mental processes (Snyder et al., 2002).  How-
ever, the relationship of sacred or religiously oriented goals to mental and physical 
health becomes a bit more complicated because unless we maintain health only in 
terms of the agent’s perspective, we become prescriptive regarding what constitutes 
good health.  Snyder et al. (2002) point out that some scientists have determined 
that religion is harmful to human flourishing and mental health, yet their position is 
not quite so broadly defined.  They conclude that specific goals derived from spe-
cific religious beliefs may be harmful to particular persons.  We agree with this as-
sessment to the extent that the mental processes are congruent with the moral 
schema of the agent. 
However, the goal conflict has been negatively correlated with religious or 
theistically oriented goals (Emmons, Cheung & Tehrani, 1998).  Our research 
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demonstrates that hope is negatively associated with one’s propensity for the disen-
gagement of moral self-sanctions.  This evidence would seem to indicate that reli-
gious oriented goals could have either a positive or negative effect on well-being 
generally.  Positive effects of religiously oriented goals may cut down on certain 
unhealthy practices such as smoking or eating unhealthy foods.  Still, our research 
shows that religious practice, in the case of predicting a propensity for moral disen-
gagement is not significant, meaning that it seems less important that things like 
goal congruence and hope are affiliated with religious rights and rituals.  Our re-
search does indicate a positive relationship between hope and intrinsic religiosity 
when related to moral disengagement.  Therefore, in terms of cognitive well-being 
is seems that the practice of religious activities is far less important than the convic-
tion of religious belief.  Furthermore, it is possible that religiously oriented out-
come values may have a positive effect on pathways creation and agency related to 
hope.  This makes sense if the conviction is authentic and the agent is not activating 
mechanisms of moral disengagement related to hope (Snyder, Sigmon & Feldman, 
2002).  This conception is demonstrated in Figure 6, although more research needs 
to be done to fully appreciate these relationships. 
Snyder, Sigmon & Feldman (2002) indicate that more pathways might be 
created through religiously oriented thinking and that a confidence in belief may 
also allow for more agency thoughts and state: 
Religion often instills confidence in believers that they can accomplish their 
goals or the divine commands.  These agency thoughts are the result of both 
specific religious beliefs and the supportive resources inherent in most reli-
gious communities.  The more agency thoughts, the higher the person’s 
psychological well-being…Religion offers social support, doctrines, and di-
vine aid, thus increasing the available pathways and one’s sense of agency 
(p. 237). 
 
It is also possible that the strength or veracity, as opposed to the sheer number, of 
pathways and agency thoughts are important to hope, especially when perceived as 
divine intervention. 
There seems to be ample evidence of a connection between positive aspects 
of religious thought and hope.  Furthermore, it seems practical to conclude that 
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hope might be strengthened and made more resilient by these religiously oriented 
thoughts and that this form of hope may lower the propensity for activation of 
mechanisms related to the disengagement of moral self-sanctions, and that this may 
lead to a lowering of self-destructive behaviors.  Of course, more research should 
be conducted to elucidate and verify these connections, and it is our hope that this 
will happen. 
 
 
Chapter 6 – Intrinsic Religiosity and Moral Disengagement 
Our research has demonstrated a significant correlation between what 
Koenig and Büssing (2010) describe as intrinsic religiosity and Bandura’s (1999) 
notion of moral disengagement.  Intrinsic religiosity has become a common term 
often juxtaposed with extrinsic religiosity.  Originally, Hoge (1972) and Allport 
and Ross (1967) contrasted these two types in an attempt to distinguish a sort of 
subjective internalized religiosity, which became known as intrinsic religiosity, 
from the practice of religion and religious ritual such as attending church or partici-
pating in a religious choir.  The latter is what has become known generally as ex-
trinsic religiosity and can be further categorized into organizational religious activ-
ity, such as attending a religious function, and non-organizational religious activity, 
such as personal prayer or the study of sacred texts (Koenig & Büssing, 2010).  The 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions seems to be understandably allied with the 
notion of intrinsic or subjective religiosity by two primary factors, conviction and 
motivation as described by Koenig and Büssing (2010).  We utilize the term subjec-
tive motivation as synonymous with intrinsic motivation throughout this explora-
tion. 
Our research establishes significance and connects moral disengagement 
with intrinsic religiosity and is focused on combat veterans who recently returned 
from war.  This particular form of trauma provides unique insights regarding intrin-
sic religiosity’s association with moral disengagement.  The first phase of inquiry 
follows from the previous chapter and provides a more theistic view of intrinsic 
religiosity, which also backs up our view that the psychology regarding affairs of 
the present life lived are inextricably connected with expectations and a conviction 
based on those expectations regarding the afterlife.  This analysis is followed by 
another common view of intrinsic religiosity that is more associated with the pre-
sent but with an expectation of the uncertainty of there being anything following 
one’s present existence.  This latter encompassing view, which we shall refer to as 
the unknowable view, is associated with intrinsic religiosity through something akin 
to Pascal’s Wager, where there exists some rational benefit to believing in the di-
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vine but where this rationale is based on odds or probability rather than something 
more analogous with a commitment through faith.  Individuals with this view, who 
include those with a more empiricist moral schema, might refer to themselves as 
agnostics or skeptics.   
Therefore we consider intrinsic religiosity and its relation to the disengage-
ment of moral self-sanctions in light of three general philosophical views of life, a 
theistic view, an agnostic view, and an antitheistic view.  We purposefully use the 
term antitheist here to distinguish clearly between the second, more agnostic moral 
view - the unknowable view - and those whose perspective is more adamantly op-
posed to the incorporation of any conception of the divine into their reason, to the 
point of actively rationalizing against any form of personal religiosity.  This is an 
attempt to take into account the protest culture articulated earlier and make intrinsic 
religiosity relevant to all agents by focusing on the psychological mechanisms re-
lated to intrinsic religious belief and moral cognition and conation. 
 
A More Theistic View of Intrinsic Religiosity 
Our more theistic view should not be regarded as strictly limited to those 
who would consider themselves theists.  Nor do we believe this analysis to be con-
textually restricted to be merely applicable to populations such as combat veterans.  
Certain deistic, polytheistic and pantheistic philosophical positions are worthy of 
consideration within our context.  Someone who has experienced any near-death or 
traumatic experience - a car accident, for example - might also fit into the contextu-
al portion of this analysis.  We argue that the more theistic moral position can be 
contextually adapted to any theist or other person who has an intimate understand-
ing of the finality of their present state and who actively pursues communion with 
the divine in order that their life might be in accord with a divine plan, however 
that may be interpreted more specifically by the individual.  Moreover, the agentive 
moral perspective is important here because we continue to focus on the beliefs of 
the individual as providing some authority for analysis, as opposed to imposing a 
right, ought or should upon the individual moral agent.  The intent is to allow for a 
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closer analysis of the proposed connection between intrinsic religiosity and the in-
dividual’s moral schema. 
For the more theistic moral agent, intrinsic religiosity can be manifested by 
strong conviction; a conviction that is inevitably connected with things like moral 
motivation and hope (Rest et al. 1999; Snyder 2002).  It is the potency of this con-
viction that might distinguish the more theistic moral agent from the more agnostic 
or antitheistic moral agent.  It is quite common to hear similar opinions from those 
who claim Christianity as a basis for their theistic moral beliefs.  If asked, do you 
have any doubt that Jesus Christ is God or that God exists, or, do you believe you 
will go to heaven after you die?  Theistic moral agents often provide answers that 
allow us to glimpse the conviction of their intrinsic religiosity.  Many Christians, 
when queried with these types of question, at least initially, respond that they have 
absolutely no doubt for example, that Jesus Christ is God and that God exists.  Of-
ten this conviction is accredited to their strong faith and the work of the Holy Spir-
it.  These same theistic moral agents may also cite specific passages of the Bible 
such as “…and you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free” (John 8:31 
ESV).  Or, “I write these things to you who believe in the name of the Son of God 
that you may know that you have eternal life,” where stress is placed on the word 
know (1 John 5:13 ESV).  Regarding this knowing state, many Christians will spe-
cifically claim that they know these things as fact or truth and are completely cer-
tain.  This observation is important in understanding the mindset of some Christians 
who might be considered resilient theistic moral agents and who have a strong psy-
chological conviction associated with their intrinsic religiosity and their moral 
schema.  The actual truth of these statements is somewhat of a secondary consider-
ation and we are not interested in verifying or falsifying any particular theological 
belief beyond seeing that the belief is congruent with the agent’s own moral sche-
ma. This inquiry aids our understanding of how an agent comes to a stronger or 
perhaps clearer conviction of their own moral schema, helping us to understand the 
veracity of the beliefs that underlie this system and the motivation related to the 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions. 
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Responses from Christians regarding intrinsic beliefs provide at least some 
understanding of their level of conviction regarding the beliefs they hold and the 
makeup of their moral schema.  We can also assume without much trouble that 
most agents generally do not spend a great deal of time considering whether they 
really believe what it is they say they believe, especially when it comes to religion 
and spirituality.  Instead, these beliefs become convictions that are rarely internally 
deliberated, except in extraordinary situations.  It may be true that some who claim 
such conviction may only see the strength of their conviction crumble under stress-
ful circumstances, so we must recognize that there is something of a gap between 
explicit revelations of personal faith and the intrinsic religious reality.  In other 
words, there is a resolve that should be addressed related to conviction and intrinsic 
religiosity.  Not even the individual agent can know this resolve for certain, or at 
least perhaps until it is tested by circumstance.  Some aspects of resolve related to 
conviction and intrinsic religiosity might be exposed in the face of trials or adversi-
ty.  We should consider this aspect of the resolve of conviction because many peo-
ple face trauma or even difficult circumstances only to see the conviction of their 
subjective beliefs tossed aside.  Some Christians claim that they love god, but sub-
sequently curse that same god, or otherwise turn from their conviction in the face of 
traumatic events.  Other people seem to strengthen their conviction in their subjec-
tive religiosity in the face of similar tribulation.  This is an important perspective 
and one reason we have focused our research on those who have experienced com-
bat situations.  We continue by assuming that the agent’s perception of their own 
subjective religiosity and the resolve of their conviction are accurate and genuine, 
but admit that this is inherently problematic.  Perhaps research into motivation re-
lated to intrinsic religiosity can furnish some glimpse into the extent of resolve in 
the conviction of the agent, since the outcome of motivation is somewhat more ob-
jective in the sense that it is not completely dependent on the agent’s perception.  
Still, this claim can be problematic because motivation, in order to become objec-
tive, must be interpreted by someone or something other than the moral agent. 
The relation of motivation and conviction can be understood from a cona-
tive perspective, where motivation is more conscious and conviction more intuitive.  
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This is not to say that there are not cognitive components involved in both aspects 
of intrinsic religiosity, only that one is perhaps more dominant than the other in cer-
tain phases of a process that moves from belief to action.  In other words, motiva-
tion can be described as more closely associated with an impulse while conviction 
can be described as more of the result of mental action and the understanding of 
reason and choice.  From this perspective, we might consider motivation as a result 
of conviction manifested in the form of directed effort towards a goal.  Ryan and 
Fiorito (2003) continue this line of thought: 
From a cognitive, self-regulating model, a person’s religious involvement 
consists in part, of that person adopting purposive intentions and personal 
goals and then acting to realizing them (p. 131). 
 
The purpose component of Ryan and Fioritos’ (2003) argument is quite in-
teresting in that it alludes to telos and something beyond mere goals.  This can be 
connected with the veracity of goals or to use Snyder’s (2002) terminology, the 
outcome value.  Purposeful intentions can provide a greater or lessening resolve 
and inevitably impact both agency and pathways thinking related to hoping and 
manifest as a stronger or weaker desire for goal attainment.  Our research also sug-
gests that the purpose and conviction of religious belief can reduce or buffer the 
propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  Pargament (1992) points 
out that both the means, how we might go about our task, and the ends, the pur-
poseful activity or goals we pursue, are important in understanding the effects of 
intrinsic religiosity on psychological well-being.  Prior research demonstrates a 
connection to what Ryan and Fiorito (2003) refer to as good and bad religion.  In-
trinsic religion is considered “good religion” in that it has greater value-laden im-
plications, whereas “bad religion” is considered something more extrinsically ori-
ented (p. 132).  Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990) also conceptualized a value-laden dis-
tinction between good and bad religion.  These connections are consistent with our 
more precise findings that intrinsic religious orientations may be more effective 
than extrinsic religious orientations, such as Koenig and Büssings’ (2010) orga-
nized and non-organized religious activities, in reducing the propensity for the 
agent to disengage from their own moral self-sanctions. 
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Motivation related to the subjective component of religiosity can be some-
what complicated to understand from a more theistic moral perspective.  Even dis-
cussing a truly agentive perspective involves some difficulty since the theist’s mo-
tivational aspect of intrinsic religiosity is connected to the divine.  Therefore, if we 
ask the theist to describe motivation in this sense, many may allocate aspects of co-
nation to the power of the Holy Spirit, as they perceive the divine moving within 
them.  This is a fundamental tenet of most forms of Christianity and is one of those 
incommensurable or incompatible aspects that distinguish a Christian form of mo-
tivation related to subjective religiosity from another.  The same might be said 
about the more cognitive aspect of conviction since many Christians intrinsically 
believe that their conviction is not of their own doing alone, but essentially the do-
ing of the divine.  We are not ignorant to the challenge this poses in understanding 
intrinsic religiosity from an agentive perspective, but do think it is necessary to ac-
count for this distinction amongst differing beliefs adopted by individuals if we are 
to attempt to understand the perception of the agent.   
This consideration regarding divine outworking in human thought and ac-
tivity is not taken into serious account in many pluralistic or secular settings in 
which an organization attempts to affect aspects of individual’s reactions and ac-
tions such as the disengagement of moral self-sanctions leading to self-destructive 
behaviors.  Psychologists and even chaplains are often unable or unwilling to truly 
appreciate this aspect of many people’s beliefs and the intrinsic influence it holds. 
The effect of relational interactions between those holders of positional or referen-
tial power like psychologists, chaplains, and leaders in general, and those whom 
they treat, counsel or lead - and with whom they hold incommensurable personal 
beliefs - is somewhat unclear, which should encourage more research into this pos-
sible conflict of beliefs.  If a leader intends to develop a follower whilst respecting 
the follower’s agency, the leader ought not to assume that the follower is something 
like delusional for believing that their religious beliefs are affected or otherwise 
motivated by the divine.  If the leader fails to respect the autonomous agent in this 
way, then he or she does not take into practice an autonomous agentive perspective, 
but instead imposes their own a priori intrinsic religiosity upon the agent.  The re-
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sult can be cognitive dissonance and perhaps catastrophic self-destructive behaviors 
on the part of the agent. 
There seems to be several distinct aspects to a more theistic intrinsic religi-
osity.  Without an understanding of how the agent forms their inner belief, we can-
not fully appreciate how one who holds a more theistic moral view might disengage 
from their own moral self-sanctions.  This of course holds for all agentive views if 
we are to encourage personal development and agent-centered change.  For the 
more theistic moral agent, the conviction and motivation of intrinsic religiosity is 
dependent on the fundamental belief that they do not take on these aspects unaided 
and that the potency of conviction and motivation are based upon their relationship 
with the divine.  Their perceived relationship with the divine is unique because this 
prospective relationship is the fundamental source of all that is good.  Therefore, if 
a more theistic agent can know and commune with the divine, then they possess the 
hope of realizing the good in life.1  This communion may come in the form of a 
supernatural understanding of sacred texts where the divine intercedes with an un-
derstanding through things like faith, hope and wisdom.  The more theistic moral 
agent may also undergird their convictions through this communion with the di-
vine, which can affect both cognition and conation.  Accordingly, this form of in-
trinsic religiosity could lessen a propensity for the activation of mechanisms of 
moral disengagement and lessen behavioral manifestations inconsistent with the 
agent’s moral schema such as self-destructive behaviors. 
 
A More Agnostic Moral Agent and Intrinsic Religiosity 
We use the term agnostic loosely to mean a general view of the sacred or 
divine where it is considered unknowable from the perspective of a personal rela-
tionship.  This perspective may include those who hold to views that are more ag-
nostic, deistic or even pantheistic in orientation.  In other words, the unknowable 
view relates to those individuals who fundamentally believe that they cannot cer-
tainly know if the divine exists, and that only something like an ethereal encounter 
                                                
1 Meaning something like Aristotle’s eudaimonia or human flourishing and 
the life well lived. 
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may allow for some sort of actual communication with the divine.  This is different 
from theism in that for theism we assume the belief in the ability to communicate 
personally with God.  However, the unknowable view does have a form of intrinsic 
religiosity that it is important to understand in the context of a relationship to the 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  In this view we might consider subjective 
religiosity as not taking the form of faith as it does with the more theistic moral 
agent.  Yet, this agent might still choose a form of credence or duty to morality as a 
basis for their moral schema. 
There has been research into subjective religiosity, psychological distress 
and depression that highlights an interesting point related to religious conviction 
and a more agnostic or indifferent view of religion in general.  Higher levels of 
psychological distress were noted in those who were something like participants in 
religious practice, but not committed to the belief system.  These are individuals 
who may attend church or participate in other religious activities or rituals but who 
do not hold a strong commitment to the underlying beliefs, as opposed to someone 
like the aforementioned theistic moral agent, whose communion with the divine is a 
critical aspect of being.  The result of a more theistic moral conviction, as opposed 
to mere practice of religion, is consistent with research presented earlier, where no 
statistically significant relationship was found between the propensity to disengage 
from one’s moral self-sanctions and active participation in organized or even non-
organized religious activity (Eliassen, Taylor & Lloyd, 2005). 
We should consider the notion that it is not the religious activities of the 
moral agent that are most important when considering things like psychological 
distress or moral disengagement, but that it is the strength of the moral beliefs and 
their relation to one’s moral schema that are of paramount concern.  In fact, the 
most at-risk category related to the propensity for the disengagement of moral self-
sanctions is the moral agent who perceives an ardent unknowableness related to 
their own intrinsic religiosity.  This moral agent may consider a caricature of Pas-
cal’s Wager and conclude that it is a better bet to believe in the divine than to take 
some unnecessary risk.  Here there is something reduced in the conviction of the 
moral agent.  This is a different type of belief than most theistic moral agents 
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would declare, and surely not a traditional Christian perspective where belief in-
cludes the conviction of being able to commune with the divine.  Furthermore, this 
more agnostic moral agent would may not have the force of conviction of either the 
theistic moral agent or the atheist moral agent, both of whom may be considered 
more resolved in their beliefs, which could impact the strength of their conviction 
in regard to maintaining their own moral schema. 
Having certain views towards the knowableness or unknowableness of the 
divine and the afterlife might be viewed as making an epistemological and ontolog-
ical choice.  However, the conviction represented by the choice and the resolve of 
that conviction we assign to the moral agent, and so we posit a continuous model of 
belief as opposed to a strictly categorical separation between groups.  The more 
agnostic moral agent may risk a sort of cognitive dissonance when confronting ad-
versity or psychological distress.  Consider for a moment the combat veteran who 
is struggling with the fact that he or she feels responsible for the death of a com-
rade.  This is a common theme amongst those suffering from combat-related PTSD.  
This experience may cause deep thought on the part of the agent as they seek to 
make sense of the situation.  Some may fall into a sort of rumination, others a more 
healthy form of reflection.  But it seems logical that those who claim an unknowa-
ble agnostic view of the divine may, in times like these, turn to this higher power 
through things like prayer and meditation or to sacred texts.  The more agnostic 
moral agent may seek answers through prayer, with wording something like: “God, 
if you exist, please forgive me and assuage my anguish for my actions on the bat-
tlefield.”  But this type of prayer seems hollow and unable to resolve a much deep-
er sort of cognitive dissonance because the object of the conviction, in this case 
God, is considered to be perhaps even probable, but still unknowable.  Therefore, 
the ability of the object of conviction related to the moral agent’s intrinsic religiosi-
ty to affect the psychological cause of the distress is somewhat diminished. 
In the case of the more agnostic moral agent, it is imperative that we con-
sider the strength of intrinsic religiosity as a possible culprit, or at least contributor, 
related to what Martin (2013) sees as a diminished hope in certain people.  The 
agent who has committed to a more atheistic moral view or a more theistic moral 
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view has the potential for a greater sense of conviction.  From an atheistic perspec-
tive, this conviction may contribute to resolution of distress based in the self, and 
for the theist this conviction may contribute to resolution of the same kind of psy-
chological distress but based instead in communion with the divine.  But the more 
agnostic moral agent may be more at risk regarding the relatively weak conviction, 
and although these agnostic beliefs may be proposed as something intellectual or 
well-reasoned, the same lack of veracity regarding moral beliefs may also prove to 
be a hindrance in the resolution of psychological distress or cognitive dissonance 
that relates to their moral schema.  Aspects of motivation related to the more agnos-
tic moral agent’s intrinsic religiosity might be more likely to be affected by cona-
tive dissonance when the object of belief is in doubt.  We are not suggesting that 
the more theistic or atheistic moral agent can epistemologically know the object of 
their belief any more than the more agnostic, yet there can be a difference in re-
solve.  For the more agnostic agent, the motivational or conative aspects of intrinsic 
religiosity can be less impactful in regards to their psychological well-being. 
Consider as an example again, the combat veteran who experiences psycho-
logical distress related to the death of a comrade.  This soldier decides to seek help 
from their organization.  Where will they go?  To whom will they speak?  In most 
cases, if they seek out anyone at all, which is another common problem - altogether 
related to a culture that sees psychological distress as a weakness - they will likely 
seek out one of three types of individual in their military organization: a leader, a 
psychologist, or a chaplain.  Now we must ask if all of these people understand the 
dilemma articulated above and related to more agnostic moral agents, who com-
prise a large portion of the U.S. Military specifically. Will these counselors under-
stand the implications of their interaction with such a moral agent? The psycholo-
gist might focus on emotions, feelings, mental processes, and primarily on the be-
havior of the soldier in question.  The military chaplain might focus on what the 
chaplain considers to be the spiritual and religious needs of the soldier, and the 
counsel of the more general leader would be somewhat unpredictable, depending 
on many factors, including their own agentive moral schema and views on leader-
ship.  A lack of understanding on the part of psychologists, chaplains and leaders in 
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relation to the more agnostic moral agent and intrinsic religiosity could have nega-
tive consequences because instead of assisting the agent, there is a risk of their 
causing additional cognitive dissonance.  In other words, the counselor, whoever 
that might be, may inadvertently cause the more agnostic moral agent to ruminate 
on religious beliefs more similar to those held by a theistic or atheistic moral agent.  
This type of counsel may even lead to some sort of coercive influence upon the 
more agnostic agent’s moral schema and might cause greater psychological distress 
in the long run. 
 
A More Atheistic Moral Agent and Intrinsic Religiosity 
I use the term atheist here to describe a category distinct from the more ag-
nostic moral agent, although these categories should not be considered mutually 
exclusive.  However, the more agnostic moral agent maintains the possibility of the 
divine and establishes their moral schema under this general assumption.  The more 
atheistic moral agent is one who claims a greater certainty that god does not exist, 
where this forms the basis of their intrinsic religiosity, perhaps something of a hu-
manist religiosity.  Some more atheistic moral agents will use the terms nature or 
universal laws to describe something similar to the divine, or at least to describe an 
order to the cosmos, but this is something much different to the authoritative God 
of the more theistic moral agent or the possible but unknowable deistic understand-
ing of the more agnostic moral agent.  Terminology can be problematic when con-
ducting research related to intrinsic religiosity because it is much easier for the re-
searcher to discount the more atheistic moral agent as simply not possessing intrin-
sic religiosity.  However, consider certain survey items or questions that are often 
constructed to gauge an agent’s level of intrinsic or subjective religiosity.  Three 
items posed in the Duke University Religion Index (DUREL) showed a significant 
correlation between the specific measure for intrinsic religiosity and a propensity 
for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions. 
The first item states, “In my life, I experience the presence of the divine (i.e. 
God)” (Koenig & Büssing, 2010, p. 79).  The respondent is then asked to answer on 
a 5 point Likert scale ranging from definitely not true to definitely true of me.  
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When we initially consider this question, the assumed response of the more atheis-
tic moral agent is toward the extreme end of the scale - definitely not true of me.  
But this assumption may be misplaced.  In many pluralistic societies it is common 
to refer to atheism as a religion.  This seems to be something of a relatively new 
phenomenon in the United States.  This argument is often a sort of leveling of the 
playing field in the mind of some atheists, who might be offended by the question 
itself, as if it makes them somehow less religious because they don’t believe in a 
god.  The other items in the DUREL might only reinforce this outcome.  The next 
items in the index state, “My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole 
approach to life” and “I try hard to carry my religion over into all other dealings in 
life” (Koenig & Büssing, 2010, p. 79).  It is surely reasonable to conclude that 
some more atheistic moral agents will answer items such as these with contempt, 
and others will perceive their god to be a god of science or cosmic order.  This is-
sue with the items within the survey instruments used in this project should be ex-
plored further in the future to attempt to establish a more complete notion of intrin-
sic religiosity related to the moral agent.  The more atheistic moral agent may view 
intrinsic religiosity as something utterly similar to the way the more theistic moral 
agent sees it, but it is possible that we often misrepresent a suitable categorization 
due to offensive language used in survey items.  So where the term nature might 
offend some, the term god might offend others.  From an agentive perspective, an 
individual can have very strong convictions that might be categorized as intrinsic 
religiosity, and they can be firmly atheistic in their beliefs.  In other words, we 
ought to ensure we grant the moral agent respect for having their own beliefs that 
form the basis for their own moral schema.  This should be done by proactively 
taking the agent’s fundamental belief system into consideration when constructing 
psychometric instruments. 
Once we take on the assumption that it is possible for the more atheistic 
moral agent to treat their beliefs similarly to that of the more theistic moral agent, 
we can begin to appreciate that the term religiosity can be used to capture the more 
atheistic moral agent’s sense of intrinsic religiosity.  Therefore, we should not ex-
pect that all atheists would answer questions or items such as those posed in the 
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DUREL on the extreme not true end of the scale.  Furthermore, regarding convic-
tion and intrinsic religiosity, it is possible that an agent who holds a more atheistic 
view may have strong convictions related to their moral schema and intrinsic relig-
iosity.  Remember that we are considering the conviction of a set of subjective be-
liefs.  Someone who has adamantly considered the problem of the existence of the 
divine and come to the conclusion that God does not exist can be incredibly con-
vinced of this idea.  This is a conclusion that is very hard for many, especially per-
haps the more theistic moral agent, to appreciate.  Many who hold to a more theis-
tic view of intrinsic religiosity would say that the more atheistic moral agent is 
simply blind to truth.  Of course, this is also how many atheistic moral agents treat 
the belief system of the more theistic moral agent, as something of a grand illusion.  
An understanding of this sort of controversy is helpful with respect to our explora-
tion regarding an agentive conception of intrinsic religiosity and its connection to 
the propensity for moral disengagement.  The outcome can look very similar.  If 
this is the case, then the conviction related to the more atheistic view should be 
treated no differently from a theoretical psychological perspective than that in-
volved in the more theistic view.  Those who might be categorized as more atheis-
tic in their thinking may have very strong conviction related to their intrinsic religi-
osity and others may have very a weak conviction related to their intrinsic religiosi-
ty, just as there are more theistic moral agents who might have either strong or 
weak convictions related to what they consider their intrinsic religiosity.  Similarly, 
the more conative aspects of intrinsic religiosity can be manifested as something 
very similar for both groups.  This is important in understanding the connection 
between intrinsic religiosity and moral disengagement. 
Intrinsic Religiosity in Social Practice 
Sternthal, Williams, Musick & Buck (2010) conducted a systematic review 
of research related to religion and mental health.  They concluded that “religious 
beliefs and practices were consistently associated with greater life satisfaction and 
psychological well-being; increased hope and optimism, less anxiety and fear, re-
duced substance abuse and addictive behavior; and decreased depression” (p. 343).  
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Our research confirms some of these conclusions but also reveals interesting excep-
tions and differences.  Firstly, we conclude that intrinsic religious belief is more 
important than organized religious activities such as attending church or participat-
ing in religiously oriented rituals such as burning candles or incense or singing reli-
gious hymns.  We do not conclude that these organized and non-organized religious 
activities are not helpful to well-being, only that they are not as important as the 
agent’s intrinsic religious beliefs.  Salient aspects of religiosity impacting long-term 
well-being are found in intrinsic belief.  Sternthal et al. (2010) point out that most 
studies on religiosity have been focused on religious practices and behavioral mani-
festations and that these measures “fail to capture the complexity of religious life” 
(p. 343).  Our research is in line with this suggestion and focuses on the subjective 
components of religious thought and specific long-term impediments to intrinsic 
religiosity such as the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  Our research sup-
ports the notion that the disengagement of moral self-sanctions is perhaps the single 
most threatening agentive aspect of cognition related to psychological distress and 
cognitive dissonance in the long term. 
We must also be more attentive in addressing different bases for the agent’s 
moral schema.  The more atheistic moral agent, just as the more theistic moral 
agent, may possess a stronger or weaker conviction and motivation related to their 
intrinsic religiosity, and these aspects will affect someone’s propensity to disengage 
from their moral self-sanctions.  Instead of making arguments for any particular 
moral schema, we propose that it is most important that we understand the cogni-
tive and conative aspects of intrinsic religiosity related to moral disengagement in 
order to better understand the depths of the moral agent’s thinking.  When inter-
preting or applying social science research, it is possible to corrupt moral agency 
through prescription due to the variation of fundamental moral philosophies that 
can be entrenched in the mind.  The history of engagement with these cognitive as-
pects of belief has been to begin with right, wrong, good and bad and then impose 
this thinking on our subjects.  This is surely the way in which most people ap-
proach others in everyday life, which is a primary reason to consider the perspec-
tive provided herein.  That inclination to impose moral prescriptions on an agent 
Intrinsic Religiosity 170 
 
must change if we are to truly gain a deep appreciation of the agent and the intricate 
aspects of the psychological mechanisms within the agent that may affect some-
one’s propensity for moral disengagement. 
The analysis of this subjective form of religiosity brings us to an interesting 
question.  How do we treat intrinsic religiosity relationally as we go about the prac-
tice of social interaction?  Specifically, we are interested in exploring how a person 
who holds some power or authority ought to act towards an agent who may be 
seeking counsel.  Earlier, we discussed a soldier struggling with some sort of PTSD 
and cognitive dissonance related to moral aspects of their combat experience.  This 
is a most intriguing case to consider and highlights some of the dangers of this kind 
of personal interaction.  However, we should not blindly assume that religion is 
positive for the agent because the agent may be in conflict with his or her own 
moral schema, and for the more theistic moral agent, perhaps God (Koenig, Par-
gament, and Nielson, 1998).  While religiosity can assist with things such as a 
sense of purpose or security when dealing with certain situations, there can also be 
conflict and this conflict can be manifested by mechanisms of disengagement relat-
ed to moral self-sanctions.  Entering relationships with any moral agent struggling 
with things such as PTSD allows for reinforcement of the moral agent’s true moral 
schema or otherwise assisting the moral agent in moral disengagement. 
Consider the military leader or commander who attempts to assist a soldier 
who is displaying symptoms of PTSD.  We can assume there is some level of trust 
between the leader and his or her follower and that the follower seeks out counsel 
from the leader regarding feelings of despair or confusion regarding an incident 
that happened in the theater of war.  In this example, let us say the soldier chose not 
to interfere in what most people in the United States would consider a public do-
mestic dispute.  Specifically, the soldier witnessed a husband in Afghanistan who 
was in an alleyway beating his wife with a stick for an unknown reason.  The sol-
dier kept walking and did nothing to interfere.  Non-interference in situations like 
this was clearly a part of the rules of engagement (ROE) at the time, but the soldier 
can’t stop thinking about this specific incident.  The soldier expresses feelings of 
guilt and shame, and regrets that he did not intervene.  This may seem like a silly 
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example to some, but it is events such as this that later, once the agent has the op-
portunity to reflect, cause psychological discord, moral disengagement and self-
destructive behaviors.  So here we have a simple case of a soldier who believes 
they did something that is in conflict with their own moral schema, but let’s assume 
it was clearly not illegal according to the ROE.  The soldier approaches their im-
mediate commander, for whom they have great respect, for help.  How might the 
leader interact with this soldier?  In some cases, the military leader will act like a 
moral authority, which is often touted as an essential aspect of military leadership.  
The leader will listen to the general situation and circumstance, and determine that 
there was no legal reason to intervene and that the inaction on the part of the soldier 
did not contradict the ROE.  The leader, whether by positional or reverent authority 
has assumed the role of a moral authority and will often counsel the soldier in a 
way that helps alleviate the guilt or assuage the anguish related to the specific ac-
tion, or in this case inaction.  In the act of attempting to alleviate the guilt, the lead-
er will likely provide moral reasoning for the soldier’s action being justified.  This 
counsel can be considered as wisdom coming from a moral authority, and the sol-
dier may leave the counseling feeling somewhat alleviated of the self-reproach 
caused by the incident. 
In this case the leader is at risk of encouraging the disengagement of moral 
self-sanctions, especially if the leader’s moral schema is vastly different from the 
soldier.  The risk of the leader affecting some sort of longer-term moral dissonance 
is lessened if there is a recognition that the leader’s influence may encourage moral 
disengagement; but this is likely not at the forefront of the leader’s thoughts.  The 
leader who has assumed this moral authority risks a sort of unintended moral coer-
cion.  The leader of course has no intention of harming the soldier, but this is pre-
cisely what can result from this type of engagement.  Instead, the leader might con-
sider that they are, whether they wish it or not, assuming this moral authority and 
act cautiously as they proceed, focused on assisting the soldier in an understanding 
of their moral schema that allows the soldier greater insight into their own cogni-
tive dissonance without diffusing or displacing moral agency onto the leader.  
Therefore, it may not really matter, in terms of the soldier’s moral schema, that the 
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action of the soldier was within the ROE.  We should also assume that the leader’s 
intrinsic religiosity is in some ways different to the soldier’s. 
Unfortunately, this is too often not the case because the leader feels a natu-
ral obligation due to his or her position to fix the soldier by convincing the soldier 
to alter their moral schema.  This may lead to greater unit effectiveness and cohe-
sion in the short term.  But this kind of fixing through moral authority is a short-
term solution at best.  The leader will not normally alter the moral schema of the 
soldier at all but instead, by assuming moral authority that inherently belongs to the 
soldier, the leader encourages the activation of psychological mechanisms of moral 
disengagement in the soldier, causing long-term cognitive dissonance.  Some may 
argue that this is justified through some sort of utilitarian defense of the leader’s 
actions and it is hard to reason against such an argument in certain circumstances 
where the time and situation might dictate a need for advancing a greater good of 
the military unit.  However, the leader does well to realize when he or she may be 
affecting the activation of these psychological mechanisms, so the situation can be 
dealt with more in favor of the long-term psychological health of the soldier.  In the 
short term, the leader may think that he or she is doing right by providing the sol-
dier with a moral justification for their actions that have caused psychological dis-
tress, where a moral argument can be made for such actions.  However, unless the 
soldier truly believes, and by this we mean that the soldier does not contradict his 
own moral schema, the soldier is likely to be activating psychological mechanisms 
that permit the disengagement of moral self-sanctions and provide temporary as-
suagement from guilt.  Someday however, the soldier will likely revisit this dilem-
ma and one of three things will occur: either the soldier will actually change or ad-
just his or her own moral schema, which is most unlikely; the soldier will continue 
to engage in the disengagement of moral self-sanctions, which is more likely; or it 
is very likely that the soldier will realize that he or she was just assigning moral 
authority to another.  This last result includes an element of what Bandura (1999) 
refers to as displacement or diffusion of responsibility.  What we suggest is that, if 
circumstance permits, it may be better to sacrifice a short-term “reduction of anxie-
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ty” or “daily adjustment” for “long-term growth” which better accounts for the risk 
of disengagement of moral self-sanctions (Hackney & Sanders, 2003, p. 52). 
Here we should remember that the moral schema is connected to the agent’s 
intrinsic religiosity.  Now, take the Christian military leader, who feels an obliga-
tion to the soldier, the U.S. Military, and to God, and feels justified in discussing 
the moral dilemma by way of his or her own intrinsic religiosity and moral schema. 
Leaders often counsel from their own perspective of intrinsic religiosity in moral 
matters, as this is the nature of leading.  But we should ask if this is in the best 
long-term interest of the agent.  Of course, the answer is, “sometimes not” and in 
pluralistic organizational settings such as the military, any other assumption to the 
contrary can be risky.  The leader may, while assuaging short-term guilt, actually 
cause long-term harm to the agent.  The leader essentially runs the risk of encour-
aging moral disengagement by speaking from a dissimilar intrinsic religiosity and 
incongruent moral schema.  Now, if the leader holds in high esteem the principle of 
respect for persons and considers this issue, and is sympathetic to the risk of en-
couraging moral disengagement on the part of the soldier, then the leader can lessen 
the risk of impairing real moral development or otherwise bringing psychological 
harm to the agent.  Due to the sometimes overwhelming aspect of conviction relat-
ed to intrinsic religiosity as discussed earlier, and its association with the individu-
al’s moral schema, this type of error seems likely within organizations in which 
leaders take on great responsibility for the health and welfare of their followers, as 
we find in the U.S. Military. 
This example helps to illustrate a risk within many organizations, particular-
ly those with a hierarchical structure of authoritative leadership where the leader 
feels personally responsible for all facets of the agent’s life.  Similar dilemmas are 
not restricted to the front line leader, especially in the military or similar contexts 
such as those we often find in police forces.  In many cases the leader may opt to 
recommend the involvement of a chaplain or a psychologist, often without much 
consideration as to which counselor might be best for the particular moral agent in 
question.  If the leader holds a more atheistic moral schema and intrinsic religiosity, 
they may be more inclined to send the soldier or agent to a psychologist.  If the 
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commander is a more theistic moral agent him or herself, and believes the dilemma 
is in any way connected to spirituality or religious belief, they may be more in-
clined to send the soldier to the chaplain.  This is a tangential issue that we do not 
intend to solve herein, but we believe that it is extremely important for organiza-
tions to consider, especially when the leader holds a more formalized sort of moral 
authority over followers.  If the leader considers this problem and has some meas-
ure of respect for the autonomy of the agent’s moral schema, then the leader can at 
least deliberate over his or her own actions with more intentionality and more ap-
propriately provide a reflective and thoughtful sort of leadership to the specific 
agent in question.  After all, “religion is a multifaceted construct and it is possible 
that different aspects of religiosity are differentially related to mental health” 
(Hackney & Sanders, 2003, p. 43). 
We should reemphasize that this issue is not limited to a commander type of 
leader but is also appropriate for consideration by chaplains and psychologists 
alike.  These individuals, in the context of the pluralistic organization, especially 
that of the U.S. Military, are in no ethically separate category in regards to the 
agent.  They hold no moral authority greater or lesser than that of the commander.  
The chaplain and psychologist are leaders in their own right and assume the same 
level of responsibility related to the agent’s psychological well-being.  However, 
we must understand that the agent in these situations may be directed to one or the 
other, the chaplain or the psychologist, depending on the intrinsic religiosity of the 
front line leader or commander.  Perhaps the frontline leader or commander may 
inquire as to the spirituality of the follower prior to directing them to the chaplain 
or psychologist.  In today’s pluralistic U.S. Military, it could certainly be either the 
chaplain or psychologist.  The U.S. Military has encouraged the diversity of reli-
gion within the chaplain ranks.  Therefore we should consider other dangers of 
moral agency and intrinsic religiosity from a leader’s perspective.  We should per-
haps consider scenarios like the Baptist soldier who is directed to the Catholic 
chaplain.  This may be due to a determination by the leader that the soldier holds an 
intrinsic religiosity closely aligned with the chaplain.  But, although the two may 
perhaps be categorized as both falling within a more theistic type of intrinsic religi-
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osity, we must not assume that this translates into comparable non-contradictory 
moral schemas.  The agent must be treated with moral autonomy when attempting 
to assist them in some long-term resolution related to a moral dilemma.  We pro-
pose that the possibility of causing long-term damage to the psychological well-
being of soldiers through a misunderstanding of moral agency is neither well un-
derstood nor dealt with effectively though leaderful practice within the U.S. Mili-
tary and other similar organizations.2
                                                
2 For a more complete elucidation of leaderfulness, see Raelin, J. (2005). 
We the leaders: In order to form a leaderful organization. Journal of Leadership & 
Organizational Studies, 12(2), 18-30. 
 
Chapter 7 – Agentive Moral Reinforcement 
The fundamental claim resulting from this investigation is that various 
agentive notions of hope and intrinsic religiosity are significant predictors to the 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  We have demonstrated that this is im-
portant for several reasons, not the least of which has to do with the connection be-
tween moral disengagement and the propensity for self-destructive behaviors.  We 
have also argued that our research demonstrates that there is a significant statistical 
relationship between hope, intrinsic religiosity and moral disengagement.  Further-
more, when moral disengagement is treated as a criterion variable, it seems likely 
that we can decrease someone’s propensity for the disengagement of moral self-
sanctions, thereby decreasing a propensity for self-destructive behaviors, by target-
ing specific psychological and psychosocial aspects of the agent.  We have demon-
strated this more general thesis by measuring and analyzing the interaction of vari-
ables related to one’s hopefulness and intrinsic religiosity but believe these are not 
the only predictor variables associated with positive psychology and that affect an 
agent’s propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  However, at-
tempts to manipulate predictor variables related to the disengagement of moral self-
sanctions should be done without encouraging contradiction related to the agent’s 
own moral schema and should not be otherwise coerced by the imposition of some 
other schema.  In simple terms, we have argued that if we can assist a person in 
changing their perspectives regarding hope and intrinsic religiosity in a positive 
manner, we might then diminish the same individual’s propensity for the disen-
gagement of moral self-sanctions.  This lessening of someone’s propensity for 
moral disengagement should then have a direct effect on the agent’s tendency to-
ward self-destructive behavioral manifestations. 
Clarifying Agentive Moral Reinforcement 
Many psychological, social and environmental factors influence an agent’s 
ability to behave in ways consistent with their own moral schema.  As both Ban-
dura (1996) and Snyder (2002) have suggested, emotion and environment have a 
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reciprocal relationship with behavioral manifestation.  Agentive moral reinforce-
ment is the developmental process of strengthening the fidelity of self-regulatory 
mechanisms that govern moral conduct whilst diminishing a propensity for the em-
ployment of psychosocial maneuvers that license activation of psychological mech-
anisms leading to the selective disengagement of moral self-sanctions. 
Agentive moral reinforcement consists of the key components of moral be-
liefs, moral reasoning and moral emotion, as shown in Figure 7, and is related to 
agentive characteristics such as values congruency, purpose clarification and be-
havioral consistency, as shown in Figure 8.  These relational models are supported 
by many well-researched and related theoretical constructs including Social Cogni-
tive Theory (SCT), and specifically triadic reciprocal causation (Bandura, 1996), 
Moral Foundation Theory (Haidt, 2003), Hope Theory (Snyder, 2002), and moral 
ambiguity in the relational context (Schafer, 2014).  Bandura’s SCT and triadic re-
ciprocal causation support the strong connection between personal factors (e.g. 
cognitive and emotional), environmental factors (e.g. relational and organizational), 
and behavioral factors (e.g. conditioning and reinforcement).  All of these factors 
must be accounted for in the context of agentive moral reinforcement.  Snyder’s 
Hope Theory supports the important connection between reasoning, emotion and 
specific aspects of psychological well-being, an essential assumption in agentive 
moral reinforcement.  Schafer’s explanation of moral ambiguity affirms the im-
portance of the impact of dyadic communication and relational factors that influ-
ence the evaluative moral process, also fundamental elements of agentive moral 
reinforcement. 
The implications of agentive moral reinforcement may be far-reaching and 
are surely not limited to the simple psychological models presented herein.  Cogni-
tive and conative psychological aspects such as optimism and authentic happiness 
may also contextually increase the predictability of moral disengagement, although 
we cannot currently scientifically support this notion beyond theory.  We can also 
not currently make empirical claims that aspects such as personal flourishing are 
unimportant.  What we do claim is that an agent’s conception of hope and intrinsic 
religiosity are important aspects to consider when making any attempt to take a 
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comprehensive view of an agent’s propensity to disengage from their own moral 
self-sanctions.  Treatment, intervention, counseling, and other mechanisms for af-
fecting these aspects of the individual must begin with an understanding of and re-
spect for the agent’s autonomous moral schema, especially within a pluralistic so-
ciety, which in the United States claims to support the rights of freedom of religion 
and freedom from religion. 
Agentive moral reinforcement begins with the precept of human dignity and 
due reverence for the moral agent.  The person is preserved as an autonomous mor-
al agent who engages with an organization or society and who is fundamentally ac-
countable for his or her own beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behavioral manifesta-
tions.  Moral agency is a possible but should also be considered within the leader-
follower relationship, especially within hierarchical organizations such as the U.S. 
Military where the autonomy of the moral agent is more naturally diminished by 
circumstance.  Here, we do not use the term leader frivolously.  A leader might be 
a friend, a colleague, a manager, a chaplain, a psychologist, or anyone else who 
holds influence over the moral agent.  Within the context of this relationship, both 
leader and follower have the opportunity to disengage from their own moral self-
sanctions, but the leader also has some power to influence the agent and in proac-
tively refraining from activating mechanisms of moral disengagement.  The leader 
may believe it is wrong to coerce a follower into contradicting the follower’s own 
moral schema.  Still, the leader may disengage from this moral prescription through 
mechanisms of moral disengagement and thereby affect the follower.  The follower 
agent may, in similar fashion, grant moral responsibility to the leader that inherent-
ly belongs to the follower agent.  We should here be cautious in the way we refer to 
the follower agent as opposed to the leader agent, since both are considered auton-
omous moral agents in their own right yet both hold different moral schemas and 
dissimilar stations within the context of the relationship.  Of course, similar forms 
of psychological maneuvering by leader agents and follower agents are conducted 
frequently within the organizational context.  But the more conflicting the moral 
disengagement with the agent’s own moral schema, the more it may affect other 
aspects related to the moral fidelity of either agent, although the follower agent is at 
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a greater risk as the relationship unfolds.  However, consequences may affect the 
psychological wellbeing of either agent in the long run. 
In order to encourage the development of agentive moral reinforcement, one 
should consider aspects of the individual that may provide psychological resilience 
to the agent’s propensity for moral disengagement.  These aspects of positive psy-
chology include things such as hope and intrinsic religiosity, but there are many 
psychological aspects that may positively reinforce an agent’s moral thinking and 
reduce the likelihood of moral disengagement.  Of course the leader, counselor, or 
chaplain cannot truly understand these aspects of the follower agent without the 
development of an intimate and mutually respectful relationship.  Even then, the 
leader, counselor or chaplain must not assume the moral responsibility of the fol-
lower agent and should operate initially with the understanding that the follower 
agent’s moral schema is preeminent, thus avoiding some sort of moral coercion.  
For example, if the follower agent currently believes it is utterly wrong to kill an-
other person regardless of circumstance, yet has done so in a previous combat sit-
uation, the psychologist should not attempt to provide pathways of reasoning to al-
leviate the moral dilemma outside of the follower agent’s own current moral sche-
ma.  For example, if the combat veteran believes that the Bible is the inspired word 
of God and therefore a primary authority on all moral issues, reasoning provided by 
the psychologist that contradicts this authority of scripture, as it is often referred in 
the U.S., is perilous.  It might encourage the agent towards a temporary disengage-
ment from the agent’s own moral self-sanction against killing, that is dependent 
upon their principled moral reasoning based on sacred texts, and which may later, 
upon further reflection by the follower agent, lead to psychological distress.  
Seligman, Rashid & Parks’ (2006) notion of positive psychotherapy is an example 
of what could be a very healthy and prosperous relationship between a counselor 
and counselee, assuming that agentive moral reinforcement is taking place and not 
a coercion of what they refer to as “meaning” (p. 774). 
But do leaders, counselors or chaplains routinely operate with such respect 
for the follower agent and with prodigious sensitivity to the agent’s moral schema, 
especially when the former is unfamiliar with the follower agent’s principal moral 
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authority?  In these circumstances, sensitivity to the follower’s psychological as-
pects such as hope and intrinsic religiosity are of the utmost importance.  The lead-
er agent should normally operate within the philosophical assumptions of the fol-
lower agent.  The agent’s interpretation of moral authority must be taken into ac-
count and then related to explicit positive psychological aspects of the follower 
agent such as hope, optimism and intrinsic religiosity.  This relational activity can 
then more suitably effect change in the agent’s attitude towards the moral dilemma 
that may be the cause of psychological distress.  This form of reverence for the 
agent’s moral schema is not something instinctively awarded in hierarchical plural-
istic organizations.  Instead, the leader, counselor or chaplain often tends to operate 
as if their philosophies are justified by their personal interpretation of organization-
al values and are therefore right or good, and think that by helping the follower 
agent to appreciate this justified quality, the agent might gain some new and better 
perspective in regards to their moral dilemma.  In fact, this approach runs a great 
risk of generating conditions that increase an agent’s propensity to disengage from 
their own moral self-sanctions.  This intervention or treatment may effect a tempo-
rary assuagement of guilt or shame, but may also be the primary cause of devastat-
ing psychological distress in the long run, should the follower agent come to recog-
nize his or her own moral disengagement.  
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Figure 6. Agentive moral reinforcement and the relation to self-destructive 
behaviors. 
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a critical and far too generalized assessment, but we do think this area is something 
about which military organizations should be concerned, specifically the long-term 
psychological resilience of the individual soldier.  Perhaps further questions should 
be considered, related to how and why the follower agent is experiencing hope.  
What constitutes the follower agent’s intrinsic religiosity?  What insight can we 
appreciate related to the follower agent’s present moral schema and the more philo-
sophical aspects of existence?  These are just a few questions that should be seri-
ously considered if attempting to justly assist a follower agent who has a propensity 
for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions and also a risk of self-destructive be-
haviors. 
The aspect of respect for persons within the context of agentive moral rein-
forcement should not be reduced to something like mere care.  The relational con-
text in which agentive moral reinforcement can thrive and govern is within the con-
text of the virtue of love.  The relationship must include an interpersonal affection 
that exceeds ordinary compassion or empathy.  The leader agent in the relationship, 
whether counselor or chaplain, ought to bear the burden of possessing a self-
sacrificing love that includes benevolence and affection directed to the good of the 
follower agent as an end in itself.  In order to maximize the potential for agentive 
moral reinforcement to occur, there must be an intimacy and commitment between 
the leader agent and follower agent that is often lacking or otherwise not consid-
ered.  The words sacrificial love are not too strong to describe the human condition 
that should be present in the relationship that might encourage agentive moral rein-
forcement.  Although this relationship need not begin at a point where this type of 
love that is benevolent, committed, affectionate, and compassionate exists, it must 
be developed in order for moral reinforcement to flourish as a result of the relation-
ship.  If the leader agent and follower agent relationship in the context of agentive 
moral reinforcement is not fostered, and this form of altruistic sacrificial love is not 
conatively or purposefully generated, then the relationship runs a far greater risk of 
suffering the consequences related to the disengagement of moral self-sanctions, 
and in the counseling environment this moral disengagement is most threatening to 
Agentive Moral Reinforcement 183 
 
the follower agent, although the same threats of moral disengagement and resulting 
psychological distress do exist for the leader agent also. 
How can a leader expect to excellently engage personal aspects of an agent 
such as hope and intrinsic religiosity without this authentic form of sacrificial love? 
Excellently is a key term here, by which we mean to incorporate an expected striv-
ing for virtue.  Now, some may argue that this excellent interpersonal engagement 
is possible without authentic sacrificial love.  However, if the self-sacrificing nature 
of love on the part of the leader is diminished, then this form of leader-follower re-
lationship is something less than virtuous in an agentive sense, and runs a greater 
risk regarding moral disengagement on the part of the follower agent. 
The situational practicality of agentive moral reinforcement may be difficult 
to implement consistently under many current paradigms, including the traditional 
counselor-patient relationship or military leadership environment.  The pragmatic 
implications of this theory of agentive moral reinforcement are surely important 
and we certainly do not claim to understand how best to create the full scope of en-
vironmental conditions that encourage this type of relationship under current organ-
izational paradigms; although we do suggest that these relationships are at present, 
at least in many cases, not ideal.  While we respect the difficult organizational cir-
cumstances that accompany the leader-follower relationship, the problem of im-
plementation and third order organizational effects is not our initial concern as we 
focus on the agent.  However, one should recognize that the organizational struc-
ture, traditions, laws and culture in many pluralistic societies such as the U.S. Mili-
tary are often ill-equipped to create intimate relationships based on authentic sacri-
ficial love, which in the military is something very different to what might be at-
tributed to something like strong camaraderie.  If authentic sacrificial love is a key 
virtue of the relationship between the follower agent and others such as chaplains, 
counselors or leaders, then the organization has, at a minimum, some obligation to 
acknowledge obstacles in creating such relationships.  This is of course based on 
the assumption that people are of exceptional value and should be respected as au-
tonomous human agents, and in hopes that organizations might begin to change 
current paradigms to address cultural issues as regards relational deficiencies.  
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Most organizations have a great challenge in understanding this dilemma as a mor-
al issue since many organizational decisions are operationally determined in a cli-
mate suited for the diffusion of moral responsibility.  In this organizational situa-
tion, utilitarian arguments are unsurprisingly dominant.  But if we consider the 
moral autonomy of the agents involved, say the leader agent and the follower agent 
for example, the utilitarian arguments will often fail when placed into the context 
of individual moral schemas. 
For example, in the United States, classrooms that cover topics such as eth-
ics or social justice often propose the thought experiment commonly referred to as 
The Trolley Problem.  This problem creates a moral dilemma in which the student, 
acting as a moral agent, must decide to act or otherwise be accountable for inaction.  
Proposed actions are limited to results that will end in either killing one person, or 
consist of inaction that will kill several people.  Many students appeal to some sort 
of utilitarianist ethics to negotiate the dilemma and inevitably decide to take action 
to save the several but kill the one or the few.  It seems initially to be a simple cal-
culation of the greater good.  There are normally a few students that refuse to act 
and kill the several by providing reasoning related to an absolving fate, or some-
thing to that effect.  But very few students are ever confident about either option 
and most of the students think that whatever option they choose is still somehow a 
bad solution because the dilemma forces them to contradict their own moral princi-
ple related to not killing people.  Even in this artificial context, it is often easy to 
observe manifestations of cognitive dissonance and even psychological distress, 
and it is not uncommon for students to wish to readdress this dilemma weeks after 
the problem has been posed in the classroom, which clearly indicates that it has 
been, shall we say, on their minds.  In smaller classrooms where there is more in-
teraction regarding the dilemma between the students, it is often fairly easy to ob-
serve manifestations of forms of moral disengagement taking place in the minds of 
the student agent, such as diffusion of responsibility.  In other words, some students 
inevitably choose to act or not act because the majority of the class has chosen to 
act or not act.  In other cases, one student will make a convincing and passionate 
argument and another student will then change what seemed like a secure position 
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by what seems to be a form of moral justification, but a justification that clearly 
contradicts at least one of the agent’s primary moral principles, again indicating the 
possibility of moral disengagement.  The point here is that if these things can be 
observed in a college classroom with an artificial moral dilemma, how much more 
potent must these dilemmas be when engaged by an agent in the organizational 
context, where intimidation, coercion, and many other social pressures are often 
onerously present.   
When agentive moral reinforcement is presented thus, it may seem like 
something of a common sense argument, and one might wonder why any organiza-
tion would hesitate to create such conditions.  However, one might also recognize 
that many organizations are not primarily concerned with creating conditions that 
encourage autonomous moral agency, a condition that is far beyond some synchro-
nicity of organizational and individual values.  If we attempt to apply agentive 
moral reinforcement to a leadership context within an organization operating under 
competing philosophies, such as might be found in certain highly competitive capi-
talistic situations, we also quickly realize that agentive moral reinforcement might 
be easier to employ in certain organizational contexts where autonomous moral 
agency can exist more freely and where agents are not required to forgo their per-
sonal moral freedom or inevitably be expelled from the organization.  Applying this 
assumption of moral agency can be exceedingly difficult in contexts such as those 
that operate within an organizationally competitive environment, which is of course 
often the case in a capitalistic corporation or a military unit. 
Agentive moral reinforcement should be considered especially important in 
counseling environments.  In these environments, relationships such as those in-
volving a mentor, a chaplain, or even a counseling psychologist are common.  Con-
sider a context that we have purposefully engaged herein, the context of the chap-
lain and soldier in the U.S. Military.  As U.S. soldiers, both of these individuals 
would be said to have obligations or duties to their military unit, their military ser-
vice, such as the Army or Marine Corps, and their country.  A standard role of the 
chaplain in any U.S. Military unit is to form relationships of trust with soldiers in 
order that they might effectively counsel soldiers on spiritual issues.  Of course, 
Agentive Moral Reinforcement 186 
 
these spiritual issues often have moral implications.  Now, consider that it seems 
inherently virtuous to grant both the chaplain and the soldier autonomous moral 
agency within the context of their relationship, and that to do otherwise would be 
counter to the basic moral principle of respect for persons.  Most U.S. Military 
leaders would agree with these basic assumptions if we limit the context to the rela-
tionship, not jeopardizing the strength of the larger military unit.  However, placing 
these basic assumptions within a theory of agentive moral reinforcement is often 
not pragmatically intuitive, and is instead brushed aside as impractical or even 
threatening to the mission or integrity of the organization.  In order for agentive 
moral reinforcement to flourish, the military chaplain must first appreciate that the 
soldier is a moral agent with a distinctive autonomous moral schema worthy of def-
erence.  The agent’s schema should also not be implied as organizationally con-
sistent.  The chaplain must also consider that both parties in the relationship have 
the potential to influence the activation of psychological mechanisms of moral dis-
engagement and be cautious about the perils of influencing the agent’s moral 
schema by way of formal authority.  Furthermore, the chaplain must recognize 
long-term implications associated with agentive moral reinforcement and psycho-
logical distress on the one hand, and psychological resilience on the other.  The 
chaplain, in order to avoid this risk of influencing moral disengagement and the 
possibility of long-term psychological distress on the part of the soldier, should ap-
proach the relationship in a spirit of authentic sacrificial love in which care for the 
soldier’s long-term mental health is preeminent. 
The notion of sacrificial love may seem somewhat off-putting in the context 
of a psychologist-soldier relationship, but this is likely due to alternate connotations 
related to the word love that tend to dominate our modern society.  Perhaps our 
rendition of authentic sacrificial love here is somewhat unconventional, yet it does 
seem to best capture the essence of an important relational aspect of agentive moral 
reinforcement.  Plus, the primary principles associated with the chaplain-soldier 
relationship ought to endure in other ideal counselor-counselee relationships.  
Therefore, consider the soldier who has had a traumatic experience in combat and 
is demonstrating signs of psychological distress.  For the sake of clarity on this spe-
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cific point, we can assume that the soldier freely approaches the chaplain for assis-
tance, and is otherwise not ordered to see the chaplain by a commander.  However, 
we should recognize that coercion into any counselor relationship might generate 
confounding difficulties.  Now, consider the common bond described between sol-
diers; a bond often described in some way that communicates that the soldiers are 
fighting not for their country or people back at home, but simply for the comrade 
next to them in combat.  It is common to hear soldiers state that they would “give 
their life” for their comrade, and of course many have done this throughout history.  
Perhaps the most dramatic stories involve those individuals who have sacrificed 
their lives by throwing themselves on grenades, or dragging a fellow soldier to 
safety whilst under direct enemy fire.  Many of these acts are done for reasons such 
as, feeling a deep affection or love for their comrades, and not a sort of psychologi-
cal egoism that might suggest that the soldier sacrificing his life does this out of 
some reprehensible self-interest such as fame.  Soldiers may often experience cir-
cumstances similar to what I have offered prior to the beginning of a counseling 
relationship with a chaplain or psychologist.  Close examinations of ongoing rela-
tionships with comrades, which many soldiers are accustomed to, reveal this close 
bond.  These relationships often involve a form of sacrificial love to the point that 
comrades, without the slightest hesitation, would give their life for each other.  This 
preamble is an important context for the chaplain or counselor to consider.  If the 
chaplain holds within him or herself or directly communicates counterfeit senti-
ments, perhaps that the relationship is built on something more like pity, or any-
thing other than an aim toward what we describe as authentic sacrificial love, then 
the relationship is at risk of engendering moral disengagement. 
If we consider additional agentive aspects of the soldier, such as hope and 
intrinsic religiosity, with attention toward a possible association with moral disen-
gagement and self-destructive behaviors, the chaplain or counselor might be more 
sensitized to certain foundational aspects of the relationship.  If the chaplain is sen-
sitized to the threat of moral disengagement occurring within the counseling rela-
tionship, and appreciating that this moral disengagement might occur more readily 
without a deep and abiding respect for the moral autonomy of the agent, then there 
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may be less of a propensity for the disengagement of moral self-sanctions, especial-
ly for the follower agent or counselee.  If chaplains and counselors understand this 
virtue, they can begin to form a trusting relationship based on a commitment to au-
thentic sacrificial love.  The relationship can begin with a healthier form of charity 
that can grow into a relationship of noble trust and respect.  In this case, counselors 
will hold the soldier’s beliefs regarding hope and intrinsic religiosity as agent-
centered, valid and respectable, and not something to be fixed or corrected.  In or-
der for this to occur it is possible that the chaplain will be required to set aside his 
or her most fundamental beliefs related to things such as hope, religiosity and spir-
ituality.  In other words, the chaplain or counselor might in a sense sacrifice his or 
her own philosophical or theological position for the sake of honoring the soldier as 
an autonomous moral agent worthy of agentive moral reinforcement.  Therefore, 
the good and most effective long-term counseling relationship will be approached 
with an expectation of authentic sacrificial love for the follower agent. 
The term ideal was used earlier to describe the best counselor-counselee re-
lationships that have this form of authentic sacrificial love.  Attempting to under-
stand what the counselee is psychologically experiencing by placing oneself within 
the other’s frame of reference is most insufficient.  This is something more akin to 
empathy, which is not adequate to describe what is meant by authentic sacrificial 
love because empathy assumes that the counselor can experience what the coun-
selee has already experienced.  In a sense, this merely empathetic approach could 
be considered some sort of psychological slight regard on the part of the counselor 
relative to the full experience of the counselee.  Empathy, whilst present in agentive 
moral reinforcement, must be humbled.  The vain sort of pride that is often hidden 
within empathetic relationships must be kept in check by humility.  Now, some 
might argue that we are not speaking here of true empathy, but instead referring to 
some form of pity.  However, empathy is different to pity in that the counselor’s 
premise is that he or she actually possesses the capacity to place themselves in the 
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circumstance of their counselee, which is of course absurd and brings to mind the 
story of The Pitcher’s Pitcher.1  
Consider a Major League Baseball (MLB) pitcher who wishes to seek ad-
vice on how to become a better pitcher.  He receives offers from two people to pro-
vide advice on his development.  The first counselor is a MLB Hall of Fame pitcher 
who recently retired after many years of playing in the Majors.  The second counse-
lor is intimately familiar with the pitcher’s current team and has watched him pitch 
every game of his MLB career.  Although this counselor’s experience came by way 
of his armchair and television, this counselor is very passionate about this pitcher’s 
circumstance, to the point of often throwing empty beer cans at the television to 
show his discomfort with the pitcher’s actions.  Who should the pitcher approach 
for advice?  Both may provide a useful perspective for the development of the 
pitcher, but perhaps it is better for the pitcher to seek advice from the MLB Hall of 
Fame pitcher, since their experience is a little more contextually similar.  This an-
swer may seem obvious.  But this is not all there is to this story.  What if the MLB 
pitcher approaches the relationship with a sense of superiority due to his personal 
experience?  His experience is surely closer to the current pitcher’s experience than 
the beer-wielding fan in front of the television.  Still, neither of their experiences is 
identical to the experience of the pitcher who is seeking help.  In fact, the MLB 
Hall of Fame pitcher may be able to offer a great deal of advice, and it may all be 
bad.  The point we recognize here is that the crucial concern is not necessarily 
about the experience of the counselor as related to the counselee but rather, the eth-
ical stance of the counselor upon entering into the relationship.  Of course similar 
experiences can be helpful.  So we should ask if the MLB Hall of Fame pitcher is 
entering the relationship with a virtuous respect for the current MLB pitcher’s 
unique experience and fundamental beliefs.  This makes this story much more dif-
ficult to resolve because it actually may be better for the pitcher to seek counsel 
from the beer-wielding fan, if the fan is approaching the relationship with a form of 
authentic sacrificial love.  If both advisors approach the situation in the same way, 
                                                
1The story of The Pitcher’s Pitcher was recalled from many years past but 
we have found no present reference. 
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an argument from experience could be made for the MLB Hall of Fame pitcher.  
Yet, there are many complicating factors that are undoubtedly not so obvious.  So 
the best we can say is, ceteris paribus, we should choose the MLB Hall of Fame 
pitcher. 
Any assumption that a counselor can fully understand another person’s ex-
perience seems to be utterly irrational, yet assumption seems common.  The coun-
selor should consider beginning the relationship by assuming his or her own expe-
rience is unique in relation counselee’s experience.  This assumption of humility on 
the part of the counselor is the beginning of what may lead to a relationship based 
on authentic sacrificial love.  Humility related to a more considerate sense of genu-
ine relational experience is a positive way to begin the respectful and virtuous rela-
tionship in which a high level of human dignity is granted equally to both parties.   
Some might argue that a form of compassion, as opposed to sacrificial love, 
will remedy this form of relational interaction.   However, the term compassion 
does not fully encompass and cannot be considered synonymous with authentic 
sacrificial love.  The Book of Virtues, edited by William J. Bennett, describes com-
passion as: 
…a virtue that takes seriously the reality of other persons, their inner lives, 
their emotions, as well as their external circumstances.  It is an active dispo-
sition toward fellowship and sharing, toward supportive companionship in 
distress or in woe…compassion thus comes close to the very heart of moral 
awareness, to seeing in one’s neighbor another self (p. 107). 
 
But consider this form of compassion in our context.  Would the soldier de-
scribe the relationship found in the camaraderie on the battlefield as merely com-
passion?  Obviously this would be unlikely.  Yet, there is likely a desire on the part 
of the soldier to have such relationships in something of a more ideal form.  These 
ideal expectations cannot be met with mere compassion, and, like empathy, com-
passion can go wrong if left to its own, and is severely insufficient in describing the 
virtuous choice of authentic sacrificial love.  This is not to say that virtues such as 
empathy and compassion are not important in the relationship between counselor 
and counselee agents.  In fact, what are commonly referred to as the four cardinal 
virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, are important in the practice of 
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agentive moral reinforcement, but not sufficient.  The cardinal virtues are descrip-
tive of the moral activity involved in agentive moral reinforcement, yet agentive 
moral reinforcement, in order to be fully recognized, must be viewed as only ideal-
ly fulfilled through the virtue of charity or love, which is often historically de-
scribed as a theological virtue (Pieper, 1965).  However, in this context we assume 
charity or love to be an ethical virtue and not restricted to a theological gift from 
God. Simply stated, the cardinal virtues are insufficient in describing the ideal rela-
tional form of what we mean by agentive moral reinforcement.  Therefore, in order 
to ensure authenticity in the relationship, we require the virtue of love to be a nec-
essary component of agentive moral reinforcement. 
Consider the following scenario, which it is reasonable to assume might oc-
cur at the beginning of a chaplain-counselee relationship.  In a few sentences, the 
chaplain may determine that the soldier believes in God.  In fact, the chaplain 
might make this assumption if the soldier simply approached the chaplain for coun-
seling under his or her own volition and not by some commander’s order.  Many 
U.S. Military chaplains will offer the soldier the opportunity for the chaplain to 
pray for the soldier and the interaction that is about to take place.  This seems, on 
the face of it, a benign act that has little to do with moral disengagement.  However, 
if the act weakens the moral responsibility of the soldier-agent or establishes some 
greater moral authority on the part of the chaplain-agent, the relationship is already 
at risk for such things as diffusion of moral responsibility or deceitful moral justifi-
catory cognitive responses that are counter to the soldier-agent’s own moral sche-
ma.  The chaplain must therefore, from the outset, be cognizant of these perilous 
actions and perhaps even forgo certain aspects of his or her own moral reasoning in 
order to establish a relationship that is most likely to encourage agentive moral re-
inforcement.  The way in which this prayer is conducted might be inevitably harm-
ful to the psychological well-being of the agent-soldier.  Furthermore, the act itself 
may be harmful at this point in the relationship, since the chaplain cannot have any 
authentic sense of the goodness of the act within the context of agentive moral rein-
forcement.  Consequently, any action that may cause a liberation of moral respon-
sibility on the part of the soldier-agent should be undertaken with great caution or 
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perhaps avoided altogether.  Now, there is a circumstance that may be worth con-
sidering relative to a belief that the agent may harm themselves or others, but situa-
tions like this should be treated as not being ordinary. 
Consider also the aspect of reinforcement.  This term implies both an en-
couragement of moral agency and an enduring reward of psychological well-being.  
It is very possible that some near-term cognitive dissonance might not be immedi-
ately alleviated, and that a chaplain or counselor ought not to attempt to provide 
some sort of satisfying philosophical or theological wisdom, which might even be 
an act of pride counter to authentic sacrificial love.  Instead, we might assume that 
somewhere in the labyrinth of the mind of the agent, there exists a map for psycho-
logical reconciliation, a map that is at the beginning of the relationship both incom-
plete and inadequate.  The virtuous chaplain or counselor will not attempt to some-
how force or otherwise coerce insight into pathways that relieve the moral dilem-
ma, but will instead embolden the agent to explore the deep realms of his or her 
own mind as a responsible moral agent, remembering that “not all those who wan-
der are lost.”2  This may seem to the chaplain to be a form of sacrifice on his or her 
own part, because positive results may be not immediately evident.  But consider 
the complexities of establishing a relationship of mutual trust and respect.  In an 
instant, the chaplain, by way of a well-reasoned theological argument based on 
something like a just war tradition and regarding the justificatory killing of enemy 
combatants in the throes of war, convinces the soldier-agent that a dilemma caused 
by killing someone in combat is not a moral dilemma at all and that the soldier was, 
in one way or another, justified in killing the enemy combatant.  This argument 
may seem to offer great promise and immediate psychological rewards.  Yet, the 
chaplain in this situation is more focused on solving the immediate moral dilemma, 
as opposed to helping the soldier-agent confront his or her own philosophies or be-
liefs on the matter, and this may work to some extent in the short-term.  However, 
consider the soldier several years later, sitting on the front porch of his or her 
house, drinking tea and contemplating the argument of the chaplain relative to his 
                                                
2 This refers to a positive aspect of this famous quote from J.R.R. Tolkien in 
his poem ‘The Riddle of Strider’. 
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own moral schema.  We might argue that the soldier-agent’s moral schema has 
changed, and this is of course possible, but not likely.  Dangers of psychological 
discord lie in assumptions such as this.  Once the soldier-agent has an opportunity 
to conduct deeper reflection upon the circumstances, there are recognizable risks.  
Especially a risk that the agent will inevitably feel that they were somehow duped 
into believing an argument that is not consistent with their own moral schema, and 
causing cognitive dissonance to the agent.  This form of postponed dissonance may 
be far worse, since the agent not only feels duped but may also regret that they con-
tinued on with life as though the dilemma never existed, which may stir feelings 
such as anger, resentment and despair.  In this situation, reflection can quickly turn 
to unhealthy rumination. 
For many, the past unreservedly affects the future.  Consider the Christian 
who believes that he will be held to account for his actions in life by God on the 
Day of Judgment.  In this sense, the past and present life of the agent affects the 
future.  Therefore, the chaplain or counselor ought not to enter this relationship 
with the intent of providing advice or counsel that might override the agent’s moral 
schema.  The complexity of the differences in their moral schemas should be val-
ued and considered agentively authoritative.  To disregard or overrule an agent’s 
moral schema at the start of a counseling relationship is absurd considering the 
complexity of personal philosophical differentiation in a pluralistic society such as 
we find in the U.S. Military.  But to be clear, at the beginning of the relationship it 
might behoove the chaplain or counselor to take extra caution and not assume a 
strong correspondence between philosophical assumptions by considering such 
simple questions as, “Do you believe in God?”, which may in actuality divulge 
very little about an agent’s moral schema. 
The sense of moral superiority by a chaplain or counselor in a relationship 
with a counselee is possible; still, the counselor might minimize the extent to which 
this risk of moral dominance could negatively affect the agent, through an under-
standing of the possible catastrophic psychological outcomes.  This may at first 
seem like a slight to professional counselors, but consider that most intellectual 
people spend considerable time and effort in developing their own moral schema 
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and therefore become quite convinced that their moral philosophy is both right and 
good, and we have granted the counselor nothing less.  What we suggest is that the 
chaplain or counselor, out of an authentic sacrificial love for the counselee, should 
willfully relinquish their own moral philosophy in an attempt to more altruistically 
assist the counselee-agent to retain his or her own moral agency and support them 
in navigating their moral dilemma.  This is perhaps an unchallenging sounding ap-
proach, but it does seem it would be exceedingly difficult to practice consistently.  
It is not that counselors cannot and do not often act with virtue in these circum-
stances.  It is more that there are problematic and self-deceptive psychological vul-
nerabilities that create the conditions for the breakdown of self-regulatory mecha-
nisms and the ensuing disengagement of moral self-sanctions. 
Now, this entire argument may at first seem to fly in the face of proponents 
of positive psychology.  However, at a fundamental level there is much synergy 
between the philosophy of positive psychology and a theory of agentive moral rein-
forcement.  If positive psychology is defined as, “A science of positive subjective 
experience, positive individual traits, and positive institutions that promise to im-
prove quality of life and prevent the pathologies that arise when life is barren and 
meaningless” (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 5), then there seems to be 
consistency, and perhaps some inconsistency, with agentive moral reinforcement, 
depending on the interpretation of several terms. 
First we must consider the different notions of the social sciences.  We pre-
viously provided three very different philosophical positions regarding science and 
its proposed limitations.  Therefore, if we are to choose one of these general posi-
tions, perhaps that of the more empiricist moral schema, then there will of course 
be difficulties when attempting to synchronize positive psychology with agentive 
moral reinforcement, especially if suppositions do not allow the moral agent con-
viction of belief and a full assumption of moral responsibility.  But these challenges 
can be overcome and therefore should not govern that certain fundamental aspects 
of positive psychology ought not to be employed simultaneously with a theory of 
agentive moral reinforcement.  We believe in quite the opposite, with some notable 
caution.  The fact that the agent is suffering some sort of cognitive dissonance re-
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lated to a personal moral dilemma must of course be distinguished from some se-
vere psychological disorder.  The caution here is twofold.  First, a psychological 
disorder should not be overlooked in favor of the agentive aspect that places full 
responsibility on the agent when the agent is unable to accept such a responsibility.  
Second, psychological disorders are often not easily diagnosed and so the interac-
tion between counselor, chaplain or leader and the counselee-agent should operate 
accordingly.  It is far too easy for a counselor-agent, who is firmly established in 
one of the moral philosophies discussed previously, to consider the thinking of a 
counselee-agent holding a different moral philosophy as simply irrational.  Judg-
mental assessments of this kind are quite contrary to what we have established 
herein as agentive moral reinforcement and instead seem more like an approach of 
something like moral reconfiguration.  Such a hasty and judgmental attitude will 
surely not coexist with the type of sacrificial love that we offer as a necessary com-
ponent of agentive moral reinforcement. 
However, if we consider the essential role of science as descriptive and not 
prescriptive, and if we assume a psychology consistent with the respectful and pur-
poseful attempt at understanding the moral nature of the relationship, then there is 
little disagreement between the positive psychologist’s notion of science and that of 
agentive moral reinforcement.  This is especially true if we consider the importance 
of acquiring a richer appreciation regarding the moral schema of the agent.  Moreo-
ver, a scientific understanding of psychology, as well as a healthy appreciation 
concerning the philosophy of science, provides a suitable foundation for the coun-
selor-agent’s behavior that ought not be overlooked.  Just as the positive psycholo-
gist claims to focus away from a diagnosis of pathology and toward an appreciation 
of subjective experience, agentive moral reinforcement should not focus on moral 
judgment and instead focus on appreciation of the moral schema of the agent.  This 
obligation to the counselee-agent’s moral schema is somewhat beyond, but not ex-
clusive of, strict scientific inquiry. 
There is also a fundamental synergy in both positive psychology and agen-
tive moral reinforcement, and this synergy is related to Seligman and Csikszent-
mihalyis’ (2000) notion of “positive subjective experience” (p. 5).  The focus on 
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how agents view their own experience is crucial for agentive moral reinforcement 
and is directly related to someone’s ability to obtain a fulfilling and satisfying view 
of their own life.  However, agentive moral reinforcement adds certain parameters 
to this more general characterization of positive subjective experience and should 
operate within these parameters.  Agentive moral reinforcement is not simply con-
cerned with the agent’s subjective experience, but encourages a deeper understand-
ing of this experience by both agents and relative to both agents’ personal moral 
schema.  Furthermore, each agent is sensitive to the limitations of subjective expe-
rience and has an appreciation of risks regarding the agents’ ability to employ 
“psychosocial maneuvers by which moral self-sanctions are selectively disen-
gaged” (Bandura, 1999, p. 193).  The employment of such psychological maneu-
vers may create temporary and otherwise self-deceitful changes in subjective expe-
rience inconsistent with the agent’s moral schema. 
The notion of subjective experience should imply responsibility and owner-
ship on the part of both agents in the relationship, and an increased awareness of 
the need for sacrificial love on the part of any counselor-agent toward the perhaps 
more vulnerable counselee-agent.  The moral responsibility relating to the individ-
ual’s subject experience ought not to be diffused onto others, or displaced by the 
counselee-agent onto the counselor-agent.  In the process of agentive moral rein-
forcement, both subjects must assume moral agency and expect the same in return.  
This is conceivably a greater parameter than imposed by positive psychology, per-
haps due to the more pathological tradition of diagnosing and fixing people from 
which positive psychology seems to be trying to escape.  The assessment of posi-
tive psychology in this light may alleviate this burden of tradition and bring the 
overall positive psychology enterprise more in line with the essence of agentive 
moral reinforcement.  Certainly, the two concepts seem generally compatible and 
one might easily perceive where a focus on the practice of positive psychology 
might benefit a process of agentive moral reinforcement.  Thus, there seem to be at 
least two major issues that must be resolved in order that positive psychology and 
agentive moral reinforcement attain synergy.  The first is that all subjects must be 
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preserved as autonomous moral agents.  Second, all agents must be keenly aware of 
the potential risk regarding the selective disengagement of moral self-sanctions. 
Finally, we connect what seems to be the fundamental purpose of positive 
psychology as stated by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyis (2000), “to improve 
quality of life and prevent pathologies” (p. 5).  If we consider that the disengage-
ment of moral self-sanctions is in itself pathological, and that the disengagement of 
moral self-sanctions can lead to pathologically related tribulations such as self-
destructive behaviors, then we can also consider that both positive psychology and 
agentive moral reinforcement have similar ends, which include the long-term psy-
chological resilience of the agent.  The psychological resilience of the agent is a 
focus in positive psychology.  Still, it is possible that an agent may exhibit short-
term psychological resilience by activating psychological mechanisms that allow 
the agent to selectively disengage from his or her own moral self-sanctions.  These 
concerns for long-term psychological resilience, the prevention of tertiary patholo-
gies, and the quality of life of the moral agent are more effectively addressed by an 
additional attention to agentive moral reinforcement.  The primary concern here is 
that, by excluding agentive moral reinforcement, all parties involved may be hood-
winked into believing that psychological resilience is transpiring, when the coun-
selee-agent is actually activating psychological mechanisms that allow the agent to 
assuage some near-term anguish by disengaging from their own moral self-
sanctions.  The process of agentive moral reinforcement will assist in lessening the 
risk of this type of deception and provide the greater prospect of long-term moral 
fidelity and psychological resilience. 
In their definition of positive psychology, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 
(2000) focus on the “positive institution” as a fundamental aspect of psychology (p. 
5).  We propose a similar conception regarding the implementation of agentive 
moral reinforcement within an institution, organization or other social system.  The 
institution, organization or system must support a positive environment and also 
encourage positive individual and social interaction in order to realize the potential 
of agentive moral reinforcement.  This includes the initial presumption that the 
agent is respected and not treated as if they are pathological or psychologically un-
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sound, but that they have within themselves the ability to confront the heart of their 
own moral dilemmas and deal with these dilemmas within their own moral frame-
work. 
As we offered earlier, agentive moral reinforcement is interrelated with 
such things as hope and intrinsic religiosity.  Neither hope nor intrinsic religiosity 
is easily confined to a specific category in Figure 7, although for any particular 
agent, conceptions of things like hope and intrinsic religiosity may fall primarily 
within a particular feature of agentive moral reinforcement.  Hope defined as 
Snyder (2002) defines it will fall more within our notion of moral reasoning in the 
context of agentive moral reinforcement.  Yet, as we have noted, many others de-
fine hope as a more affective conception.  Therefore, personal aspects such as hope 
and intrinsic religiosity are particularly difficult to effectively address more gener-
ally within organizations or institutions that are pluralistic in nature, and also ulti-
mately committed to creating an environment free of religiosity.  The problem of 
common definition is surely a challenge to be overcome for many pluralistic organ-
izations.  Yet, this problem can be mitigated in many ways, including pluralistic 
organizations advocating for the dignity and respect of every agent. 
As we noted earlier, there is often a tension between freedom of religion 
and freedom from religion in pluralistic institutions, and this tension affects per-
sonal relationships to differing extents and in different ways.  Often, this tension 
cannot be easily resolved.  Some may cry for complete freedom to practice all as-
pects of their religion and others will cry for a complete ban on all religious prac-
tice.  There are of course religious practices and beliefs that are fundamentally toxic 
to an organization and that should be controlled.  Take, for example, the religious 
practices of some minority religions.  Some may be relatively benign like polyga-
my, yet other practices may call for the sacrifice of virgins or babies.  Secular 
forms of minority religion fare no better and have led to genocide, infanticide and 
other historical atrocities (Trigg, 2007).  The argument for how religion may affect 
a pluralistic organization, or what is or is not considered a religion in a pluralistic 
society, is not the focus here.  However, we should recognize that these are difficult 
and emotional issues in pluralistic organizations such as the U.S. Military, and 
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should therefore encourage the ongoing exploration of what is currently considered 
religion, what ought to be considered religion, what ought to be rules or laws gov-
erning certain practices of religion, and of course the freedom to express religious 
belief, as just some of the important contexts for a larger discussion associated with 
agentive moral reinforcement.  The consequences that such rules, obligations and 
authorities might have related to agentive moral reinforcement are important to 
know in the organizational context.  It may therefore be useful to initially consider 
agentive moral reinforcement in a more idealistic fashion, and then apply it as best 
we can to the organizational context in which it operates.  But of course we then 
run the risk of lofty thinking that is far from reality and situated in a place where 
agentive moral reinforcement might be discarded as some sort of flight of fancy, a 
nice thing to consider but completely impractical given the real organizational cir-
cumstances.  This should not be the case and instead we ought to consider the chal-
lenges that might need to be overcome regarding the implementation of an unadul-
terated form of agentive moral reinforcement within the context of pluralistic socie-
ties such as we find in the U.S. Military. 
If we consider the situation between the chaplain-agent and soldier-agent, 
we might recognize that both of the actors find themselves in a struggle, a struggle 
between their obligations to the organization and commitments to their own moral 
schema.  It might be ideal if organizational values aligned perfectly with the indi-
vidual values of its members, with those values being created from the agent’s 
moral schema, and this may be the case to some extent.  Individuals who freely join 
the military often presume to share many of the values of that military organization.  
But even if all the values are shared, the extent to which each value is held will 
vary.  To complicate matters further, organizational values are often vague and can 
be translated by the agent in various ways.  In order to disambiguate these values, 
an organization like the U.S. Military will often create rules and guidelines to assis-
tant agents in the navigation of core values.  However, we should remember that in 
the presence of the moral dilemma, implementation of rules and value constructs is 
agentively insufficient.  The moral dilemma will occur within the context of some 
conflict between values.  Therefore, it is paramount that we should allow agentive 
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moral reinforcement to abound within the organization, strengthening the whole by 
strengthening the long-term psychological resilience of each autonomous moral 
agent. 
Personal Aspects of Agentive Moral Reinforcement 
We conclude our current project by focusing on three psychologically criti-
cal aspects of agentive moral reinforcement.  These aspects, depicted in Figure 8, 
should not be overlooked and by way of positive self-reflection, the agent can 
strengthen his or her own psychological resilience and reduce the propensity for the 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions.  We refer to these specific aspects as pur-
pose clarification, values congruency and behavioral consistency.  By purpose clar-
ification we attempt to emphasize the importance of a teleological perspective in 
one’s life.  This purpose clarification involves such things as understanding posi-
tive aspects related to one’s goals, intentions, aims and ends, and the lived life.  
Everyone, even the nihilist, is ultimately a teleological being.  Purpose clarification 
is the recognition and strengthening of positive aspects related to one’s teleological 
connection to the world.  Purpose clarification is associated with a deeper under-
standing of the moral schema by the agent, which can have positive conative af-
fects related to motivation and intentions. 
 
Purpose	Clari-ication	
Values	Congruency	
Agentive	Moral	
Reinforcement	
Behavioral	Consistency	
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Figure 7. Characteristics related to efficacious agentive moral reinforce-
ment. 
The second psychologically critical aspect of agentive moral reinforcement 
is values congruency.  The values congruency aspect relates to an agent’s ability to 
maintain a positive reflective attitude and consistently harmonize the values they 
place on individual moral standards.  The reflective attitude offers the ability to 
bring incongruences between moral attitudes and the agent’s moral schema to the 
forefront of consciousness.  Once incongruence is exposed, the agent can then re-
flect on the nature of the incongruence, the issues causing the incongruence and 
possible solutions that might better align attitudes with the agent’s moral schema. 
The final aspect of agentive moral reinforcement, behavioral consistency, is 
found in the sustainment of moral judgment and moral character.  Here, we de-
scribe the nature of moral judgment and moral character as interrelated.  As the dif-
ficulty and complexities related to moral judgment increase, behavioral manifesta-
tions related to the consistency of moral character tend to decrease.  The agent’s 
development in the area of moral judgment can have a positive effect on the con-
sistency of moral action.  This is of course in line with other theories of moral de-
velopment related to neo-Kohlbergianism, but here we emphasize the difference in 
each agent’s moral schema and the basis for moral judgment.  In other words, our 
moral principles in agentive moral reinforcement are not considered universal. 
These psychological aspects of agentive moral reinforcement are reciprocal 
processes; each aspect should neither individually nor holistically be considered as 
fully realized in the developmental context.  Instead, we should consider that the 
closer these aspects are to being in a sort of evolving equilibrium with the agent’s 
moral schema, the more the agent can realize the personal and positive authority 
gained through agentive moral reinforcement.  The developmental process leading 
to a harmony between cognitive, affective and conative moral aspects, as well as 
reliability in moral character, is the ultimate purpose of the psychological resilience 
that can be discovered through agentive moral reinforcement. 
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Appendix A 
Research Project Summary Form 
 
Original Title of Research Project: 
Religion, Spirituality and Comprehensive Soldier Fitness in the United States Mili-
tary 
 
Name and title of Researcher, and Details of Project:  
Name:   Kirk G. Mensch 
Department: Theology and Religion  
Supervisors:  Esther Reed & Avril Mewse 
Email:   kgm201@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Start & end date permission requested for: Start - October 2013; End - June 2015 
 
Date submitted: 18 October 2013 
 
SYNOPSIS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
This research aims to investigate a possible connection between the psy-
chological concepts of Flourishing, Religion, Future, and Moral Disengagement 
(FRFMD) in the context of the United States Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fit-
ness program and specifically its unique rendering of the notion of spiritual fitness.   
In recent years, there has been a great deal of consternation over the Ar-
my’s proposal to encourage spiritual fitness.  Some groups have condemned the  
U.S. Military’s leadership with accusations of the attempted establishment of reli-
gion, or on the other hand, the infringement of individual rights of freedom from 
religion.  Specifically, this research will assist in explaining a possible relationship 
between flourishing, which is a self-perceived success in important areas such as 
relationships, self-esteem, purpose, and optimism; religiosity, which is the level of 
one’s religious involvement; adult hope, which is a perceived future success or 
self-efficacy; and the concept of moral disengagement, which will be used as a 
criterion variable.  Specifically, statistical analysis will be conducted to determine if 
religiosity is a significant predictor of moral disengagement.  Other independent 
variables, both demographic and as related to positive psychology, will be utilized 
as control variables in order to isolate a possible phenomenon.  This is essentially 
the principle hypothesis.  
Through the use of validated personal questionnaires, a literature review 
and ethical inquiry, this project will endeavour to understand how religiosity is re-
lated to aspects of personal wellbeing and the propensity for the disengagement of 
moral self-sanctions. 
 
Definition of invited participants: 
The respondent pool will be developed from the United States Military and 
focus on combat veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.  The pool may grow 
to include non-combat personnel.  The respondents may consist of current active 
duty, reserve, national guard, retired or other former service members.  The prima-
ry veteran population will be recruited initially from the United States Army and the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC) and will initially center on commando unit 
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personnel.  Military veterans and unit leaders/commanders will be approached via 
email and social media.  The researcher will secure the respondents’ permission 
by way of a letter of introduction included in the consent page on the electronic 
website.  Each respondent will be required to push a consent button prior to be-
ginning the survey.  Each respondent will be directed to a Limesurvey web-page.  
The Limesurvey Research System provided by the University of Exeter will be uti-
lized as the collection tool and for the management of data storage.  Respondents 
will be required to read the consent statement and provide their consent prior to 
taking the survey.  An exit survey button will be provided in the survey and all re-
spondents will be afforded the opportunity to read a debriefing statement provided 
at the end of the survey.  Limesurvey is approved by the University of Exeter for 
use with this type of research and is registered under the Safe Harbor agreement 
(please see http://export.gov/safeharbor/). 
Respondents will be notified in the consent statement that their participa-
tion as individuals will be anonymous.  Contact information for the research team 
will be provided to the respondents in the consent form.  Respondents can opt out 
of the survey at any time prior to completion of the online survey.  The instrument 
should take less than 20 minutes to complete. 
 
Data or information to be collected, and the use that will be made of it: 
The methodology used by this research project reflects a combination of 
quantitative research and follow-on ethical inquiry.  Respondent data will be col-
lected by administering a psychometric instrument that is an amalgamation of 
widely used and validated sub-scales.  A theoretical model has been developed 
using flourishing, religion, and hope, as independent variables and moral disen-
gagement as a dependent variable.  This theoretical construct will be tested 
through analysis of the quantitative data collected from the administration of the 
psychometric instrument.  This research conforms to the ethical guidelines speci-
fied by the Social Research Association (2003) and the American Psychological 
Association (2010) guidelines (please see http://the-
sra.org.uk/sra_resources/research-ethics/ethics-guidelines/ and 
http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx).  Any implicit guideline for research in 
the USA subsists within the SRA’s guidelines. 
 
How will the information supplied by participants be stored? 
Data gathered for the purpose of this research project will be safely stored 
on servers located in the United Kingdom and which will conform to the Safe Har-
bor agreement.  Any paper copies related to this research will be secured in a 
locked filing cabinet in the Principle Investigator’s (PI’s) office or on the hard drive 
of the PI’s computer system which is password protected and conforms to the Uni-
versity of Exeter’s Information Technology “Keep it Safe” guidelines (please see 
http://as.exeter.ac.uk/it/regulations/infosec/keepitsafe/#passwords). 
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Contact for further questions: 
 
Dr. Kirk G. Mensch 
154 Ashford Drive 
Lebanon, PA  17042 
 
U.S. Phone: +1 717 376 9784 
 
Email: kgm201@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Professor Esther D. Reed 
Head of Theology and Religion, Associate Professor 
University of Exeter 
Amory Building 
Exeter EX4 4QH 
 
Extension: 3249 Telephone: 01392 723249 
 
Email: E.D.Reed@exeter.ac.uk 
 
 
Additional contact should you have any general questions or concerns: 
 
Dr. Zoë Boughton 
Ethics Officer, College of Humanities 
University of Exeter 
Department of Modern Languages 
Queen’s Building 
The Queen’s Drive 
EXETER EX4 4QH 
U.K. 
 
+44 (0) 1392 724209 
 
Z.C.Boughton@exeter.ac.uk 
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Appendix B	
Information	and	Consent	Statement	Form	
 
This research project aims to investigate a possible connection between the 
psychological concepts of Hope, Religion and Ethics in the context of the 
United States Military.  This research is funded by no outside contributors. 
The collected data may be used in research in both dissertation form and 
any published articles, books or papers given on the subject. 
  
The use of the psychometric instrument as a contribution to understanding 
the psychology means that statistical analysis of the data will be included in 
the research.  The data collected may be stored for as long as is necessary 
for the completion of this research project and any subsequent publications 
or continued research. 
 
You will not be identified by name as a respondent and your answers will be 
anonymous.  You will be able to refuse any questions you do not wish to 
answer and to discuss matters you believe are of interest with the re-
searchers.  You may withdraw from participating at any time prior to sub-
mission of the instrument by pressing the “Exit Survey” button. 
 
By pressing the “Begin Survey” button, I voluntarily agree to participate and agree 
to the use of my data for the purposes specified above. 
 
 
For any further information or follow up questions please contact Dr. Kirk Mensch 
at kgm201@exeter.ac.uk or the University of Exeter Research Advisors at 
a.j.mewse@exeter.ac.uk or e.d.reed@exeter.ac.uk. 
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Appendix C 
Flourishing, Religion, Future, and Moral Disengagement (FRFMD) 
Scales with demographic questions 
 
Below are 8 statements with which you may agree or disagree. Using the 1–7 scale 
below, indicate your agreement with each item by indicating that response for each 
statement.  
7 - Strongly agree  
6 - Agree  
5 - Slightly agree  
4 - Neither agree nor disagree  
3 - Slightly disagree  
2 - Disagree  
1 - Strongly disagree  
 
____ I lead a purposeful and meaningful life 
____ My social relationships are supportive and rewarding 
____ I am engaged and interested in my daily activities 
____ I actively contribute to the happiness and well-being of others 
____ I am competent and capable in the activities that are important to me  
____ I am a good person and live a good life 
____ I am optimistic about my future 
____ People respect me  
 
 
Below are 5 statements to assist in understanding YOUR level of religious in-
volvement.  Please read and answer each of the following questions. 
  
_____ How often do you attend church or other religious meetings? 
1 - Never; 2 - Once a year or less; 3 - A few times a year; 4 - A few times a month; 
5 - Once a week; 6 - More than once/week  
_____ How often do you spend time in private religious activities, such as prayer, 
meditation or Bible study? 
1 - Rarely or never; 2 - A few times a month; 3 - Once a week; 4 - Two or more 
times/week; 5 - Daily; 6 - More than once a day  
_____ In my life, I experience the presence of the Divine (i.e., God).  
1 - Definitely not true; 2 - Tends not to be true; 3 - Unsure; 4 - Tends to be true; 5 - 
Definitely true of me  
_____ My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life. 
1 - Definitely not true; 2 - Tends not to be true; 3 - Unsure; 4 - Tends to be true; 5 - 
Definitely true of me  
_____ I try hard to carry my religion over into all other dealings in life - (IR) 
1 - Definitely not true; 2 - Tends not to be true; 3 - Unsure; 4 - Tends to be true; 5 - 
Definitely true of me  
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Directions: Read each item carefully. Using the scale shown below, please select 
the number that best describes YOU.  
 
1 - Definitely False  
2 - Mostly False 
3 - Somewhat False  
4 - Slightly False  
5 - Slightly True 
6 - Somewhat True  
7 - Mostly True 
8 - Definitely True  
 
___ I can think of many ways to get out of a jam.  
___ I energetically pursue my goals. 
___ I feel tired most of the time. 
___ There are lots of ways around any problem.  
___ I am easily downed in an argument.  
___ I can think of many ways to get the things in life that are important to me. 
___ I worry about my health. 
___ Even when others get discouraged, I know I can find a way to solve the prob-
lem.  
___ My past experiences have prepared me well for my future. 
___ I’ve been pretty successful in life. 
___ I usually find myself worrying about something. 
___ I meet the goals that I set for myself.  
 
 
  
Below are statements with which you may agree or disagree. Using the 1–7 scale 
below, indicate your agreement with each item by indicating that response for each 
statement.  
7 - Strongly agree  
6 - Agree  
5 - Slightly agree  
4 - Neither agree nor disagree  
3 - Slightly disagree  
2 - Disagree  
1 - Strongly disagree  
 
 
_____ It is okay to spread rumors to defend those you care about. 
_____ It is alright to lie to keep your friends out of trouble. 
_____ Playing dirty is sometimes necessary in order to achieve noble ends.   
_____ Taking something without the owner’s permission is okay as long as you’re 
just borrowing it. 
_____ It’s okay to gloss over certain facts to make your point. 
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_____ When you’re negotiating for something you want, not telling the whole story 
is just part of the game.  
_____ Considering the ways people grossly misrepresent themselves, it’s hardly a 
sin to inflate your own credentials a bit. 
_____ Compared to other illegal things people do, taking something small from a 
store without paying for it isn’t worth worrying about.  
_____ Damaging property is no big deal when you consider that others are assault-
ing people.  
_____ People shouldn’t be held accountable for doing questionable things when 
they were just doing what an authority figure told them to do.  
_____ People cannot be blamed for misbehaving if their friends pressured them to 
do it.  
_____ You can’t blame people for breaking the rules if that’s what they were 
taught to do by their leaders.  
_____ People can’t be blamed for doing things that are technically wrong when all 
their friends are doing it too. 
_____ It’s okay to tell a lie if the group agrees that it’s the best way to handle the 
situation.  
_____ In contexts where everyone cheats, there’s no reason not to.  
_____ Taking personal credit for ideas that were not your own is no big deal. 
_____ Walking away from a store with some extra change doesn’t cause any harm.  
_____ It is OK to tell small lies when negotiating because no one gets hurt.  
_____ Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can 
be hurt. 
_____ It’s okay to treat badly somebody who behaves like scum. 
_____ Violent criminals don’t deserve to be treated like normal human beings.  
_____ People who get mistreated have usually done something to bring it on them-
selves. 
_____ If a business makes a billing mistake in your favour, it’s okay not to tell 
them about it because it was their fault.  
_____ If people have their privacy violated, it’s probably because they have not 
taken adequate precautions to protect it. 
 
 
What is your age? 
_____ Under 12 years old 
_____ 12-17 years old 
_____ 18-24 years old 
_____ 25-34 years old 
_____ 35-44 years old 
_____ 45-54 years old 
_____ 55 years or older 
 
What is your gender? 
_____ Male 
_____ Female 
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How do you describe yourself? (please check the one option that best describes 
you) 
_____ American Indian or Alaska Native 
_____ Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander  
_____ Asian or Asian American  
_____ Black or African American  
_____ Hispanic or Latino  
_____ Non-Hispanic White 
 
Are you: 
_____ Married (to opposite sex) 
_____ Domestic Partnership or Married Same Sex 
_____ Widowed  
_____ Separated 
_____ Divorced 
_____ Never been married  
 
What is the highest grade or year of school you completed? 
_____ Less than High School Graduate/GED 
_____ High School Graduate/GED 
_____ Some College or Associate’s Degree 
_____ College Graduate (BA, BS, etc…) 
_____ Graduate Degree (MA, MS, MBA, etc…) 
_____ Terminal Degree (PhD, JD, etc…) 
 
How many children live in your household who are... 
_____ Less than 5 years old?  
_____ 5 through 12 years old?  
_____ 13 through 17 years old? 
 
Current or Final Military Rank 
_____ Enlisted 
_____ Non-Commissioned Officer  
_____ Warrant Officer 
_____ Cadet 
_____ Officer (Company Grade 01-03)  
_____ Officer (Field Grade 04 or higher) 
 
Number of Combat Deployments 
_____ None 
_____ 1 
_____ 2 
_____ 3 
_____ 4 
_____ 5 
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_____ more than 5 
 
Military Rank on Last Combat Deployment 
_____ Enlisted 
_____ Non-Commissioned Officer  
_____ Warrant Officer 
_____ Cadet 
_____ Officer (Company Grade 01-03)  
_____ Officer (Field Grade 04 or higher) 
 
Branch of Service 
_____ Army 
_____ Air Force 
_____ Coast Guard 
_____ Navy 
_____ Marine Corps 
_____ Other Government Agency 
 
Do you believe you have Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)? 
_____ Yes 
_____ No 
 
Have you been treated for or do you believe you have a substance abuse prob-
lem? 
_____ Yes 
_____ No 
 
Have you been treated for any psychological issues that relate to your deploy-
ment? 
_____ Yes 
_____ No 
 
Have you been convicted of a crime or punished under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) for something you believe is related directly or indi-
rectly to your combat deployment? 
_____ Yes 
_____ No 
 
 
 
 
 
This research is being conducted with support from the University of Exeter, Dev-
on, United Kingdom.  For any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the 
lead researcher (Kirk G. Mensch) at kgm201@exeter.ac.uk. 
